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Abstract 
 Abstract                                                         
Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) integrity is defined as a measure of the trust that can be 
placed in the correctness of the information supplied by the navigation system. Although the concept 
of GNSS integrity has been originally developed in the civil aviation framework as part of the 
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) requirements for using GNSS in the 
Communications, Navigation, and Surveillance / Air Traffic Management (CNS/ATM) system, a wide 
range of non-aviation applications need reliable GNSS navigation with integrity, many of them in 
urban environments. 
GNSS integrity monitoring is a key component in Safety of Life (SoL) applications such as aviation, 
and in the so-called liability critical applications like GNSS-based electronic toll collection, in which 
positioning errors may have negative legal or economic consequences. At present, GPS integrity 
monitoring relies on different augmentation systems (GBAS, SBAS, ABAS) that have been conceived 
to meet the ICAO requirements in civil aviation operations. For this reason, the use of integrity 
monitoring techniques and systems inherited from civil aviation in non-aviation applications needs to 
be analyzed, especially in urban environments, which are frequently more challenging than typical 
aviation environments. 
Each application has its own requirements and constraints, so the most suitable integrity monitoring 
technique varies from one application to another. This work focuses on Electronic Toll Collection 
(ETC) systems based on GNSS in urban environments. Satellite navigation is one of the technologies 
the EU recommends for the European Electronic Toll Service (EETS), and it is already being adopted: 
as of 2012, toll systems for freight transport that use GPS as primary technology are operational in 
Germany and Slovakia, and France envisages to establish a similar system from 2013. 
This dissertation begins presenting first the concept of integrity in civil aviation in order to understand 
the objectives and constraints of existing GNSS integrity monitoring systems. 
The derivation of the GNSS integrity requirements and the appropriate integrity monitoring techniques 
capable to meet them needs a deep knowledge of the targeted application and of its needs and 
constraints. Consequently, a thorough analysis of GNSS-based ETC systems and of GNSS navigation 
in urban environments is done in Chapter 2 with the aim of identifying the most suitable road toll 
schemes, GNSS receiver configurations and integrity monitoring mechanisms. In this case, the need of 
integrity is not given by safety reasons as in civil aviation, but rather as requirements of economic 
nature (overcharging and undercharging). Geo-fencing is selected as the method for developing 
GNSS-based ETC systems over a given area or road network, dividing the tolled region in geo-objects 
which are the basic pricing sections. A simple user detection (geo-object recognition) algorithm is 
proposed to charge a user the price of a section whenever it is detected inside it. Receiver autonomous 
integrity monitoring (RAIM) is chosen among other integrity monitoring systems due to its design 
flexibility and adaptability to urban environments. Finally, the most promising GNSS receivers are 
retained, giving special emphasis to dual constellation GPS & Galileo users. The use of SBAS 
corrections is optionally considered for reducing pseudorange errors. 
An accurate pseudorange measurement model is a key input in the derivation of the GNSS integrity 
requirements and the evaluation of RAIM performance. A nominal pseudorange measurement model 
suitable for integrity-driven applications in urban environments has been obtained following a 
methodology similar to that of civil aviation, splitting the total pseudorange error into five independent 
error sources which can be modeled independently: broadcasted satellite clock corrections and 
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ephemeris errors, ionospheric delay, tropospheric delay, receiver thermal noise (plus interferences) 
and multipath. Nominal errors are modeled as zero-mean Gaussian variables, which is consistent with 
the error models and integrity monitoring systems used in civil aviation, as well as with SBAS 
corrections. In this work the fault model that includes all non-nominal errors consists only of major 
service failures. 
Once the ETC scheme and the fault model are known, the GNSS integrity requirements with which 
design the RAIM can be calculated. First, the top level requirements of toll applications are defined in 
terms of maximum allowable probabilities of missed and false geo-object recognition. Afterwards, the 
relationship between positioning failures and incorrect geo-object recognition is studied, resulting in 
maximum allowed probabilities of missed and false alarm values that depend on the number of 
independent positions with available RAIM employed to decide whether the user is or not inside a 
pricing section. 
Two RAIM algorithms are studied. The first of them is the Weighted Least Squares Residual (WLSR) 
RAIM, widely used in civil aviation and usually set as the reference against which other RAIM 
techniques are compared. Since one of the main challenges of RAIM algorithms in urban 
environments is the high unavailability rate because of the bad user/satellite geometry, a new RAIM is 
proposed. The novel algorithm, based on the WLSR RAIM, is designed with the premise of providing 
a trade-off between the false alarm probability and the RAIM availability in order to maximize the 
probability that the RAIM declares valid a fault-free position. 
Finally, simulations have been carried out to study the performance of the different RAIM and ETC 
systems in rural and urban environments. Electronic toll collection by means of GNSS in urban 
environments with geo-objects shorter than 500 m and road topologies that allow a Horizontal Alert 
Limit (HAL) of 25 or 50 meters has been demonstrated to be feasible with certain signal combinations 
of dual constellation GPS & Galileo users. Single constellation users only attain the requirements in 
rural environments with some receiver configurations. In all cases, the availability obtained with the 
novel RAIM improve those of the standard WLSR RAIM. 
The main contributions of this thesis are a detailed analysis of GNSS-based ETC systems, a numerical 
pseudorange nominal error model due to ionospheric delay in Galileo single-frequency receivers, a 
pseudorange nominal error model due to multipath in urban environments suitable for applications 
with GNSS integrity, the failure tree that leads to geo-object misleading positions, the derivation of the 
    and     of fault detection RAIM algorithms for GNSS-based ETC in the case of a threat model 
consisting on major service failures, a novel RAIM, based on the WLSR RAIM, that increments the 
number of valid positions within the integrity requirements in urban environments, the derivation of 
the analytical expression of the chi-squared non-centrality parameter in the WLSR RAIM and the 
derivation of the null correlation between the test statistic and the navigation solution error in the 
WLSR RAIM. 
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Résumé 
 Résumé                                                           
L'intégrité des signaux GNSS est définie comme la mesure de la confiance qui peut être placée dans 
l'exactitude des informations fournies par le système de navigation. Bien que le concept d'intégrité 
GNSS a été initialement développé dans le cadre de l'aviation civile comme une des exigences 
standardisées par  l'Organisation de l'Aviation Civile Internationale (OACI) pour l'utilisation du GNSS 
dans les systèmes de Communication, Navigation, et Surveillance / Contrôle du Trafic Aérien 
(CNS/ATM), un large éventail d'applications non aéronautiques ont également besoin de navigation 
par satellite fiable avec un niveau d'intégrité garanti. Beaucoup de ces applications se situent en 
environnement urbain. 
Le contrôle d'intégrité GNSS est un élément clé des applications de sécurité de la vie (SoL), telle que 
l'aviation, et des applications exigeant une fiabilité critique comme le télépéage basé sur l'utilisation du 
GNSS, pour lesquels des erreurs de positionnement peuvent avoir des conséquences juridiques ou 
économiques. Chacune de ces applications a ses propres exigences et contraintes, de sorte que la 
technique de contrôle d'intégrité la plus appropriée varie d'une application à l'autre. Cette thèse traite 
des systèmes de télépéage utilisant GNSS en environnement urbain. Les systèmes de navigation par 
satellite sont l'une des technologies que l'UE recommande pour le Service Européen de Télépéage 
Electronique (EETS). Ils sont déjà en cours d'adoption: des systèmes de télépéage pour le transport 
poids lourd utilisant GPS comme technologie principale sont opérationnels en Allemagne et en 
Slovaquie, et un système similaire est envisagé en France à partir de 2013. 
À l'heure actuelle, le contrôle d'intégrité GPS s'appuie sur des systèmes d´augmentation (GBAS, 
SBAS, ABAS) conçus pour répondre aux exigences de l'OACI pour les opérations aviation civile. 
C´est la raison pour laquelle cette thèse débute par une présentation du concept d'intégrité en aviation 
civile afin de comprendre les performances et contraintes des systèmes hérités. 
La thèse se poursuit par une analyse approfondie des systèmes de télépéage et de navigation GNSS en 
milieu urbain qui permets de dériver les techniques de contrôle d'intégrité GNSS les plus adaptées. Les 
algorithmes autonomes de type RAIM ont été choisis en raison de leur souplesse et leur capacité 
d´adaptabilité aux environnements urbains. 
Par la suite, le modèle de mesure de pseudodistances est élaboré. Ce modèle traduit les imprécisions 
des modèles de correction des erreurs d'horloge et d'ephemeride, des retards ionosphériques et 
troposphériques, ainsi que le bruit thermique récepteur et les erreurs dues aux multitrajets. 
Les exigences d'intégrité GNSS pour l'application télépéage sont ensuite dérivées à partir de la relation 
entre les erreurs de positionnement et leur effets dans la facturation finale. 
Deux algorithmes RAIM sont alors proposés pour l'application péage routier. Le premier est 
l'algorithme basé sur les résidus de la solution des moindres carrés pondérés (RAIM WLSR), 
largement utilisé dans l'aviation civile. Seulement, un des principaux défis de l'utilisation des 
algorithmes RAIM classiques en milieux urbains est un taux élevé d'indisponibilité causé par la 
mauvaise géométrie entre le récepteur et les satellites. C'est pour cela que un nouvel algorithme RAIM 
est proposé. Cet algorithme, basé sur le RAIM WLSR, est conçu de sorte à maximiser l'occurrence de 
fournir un positionnement intègre dans un contexte télépéage. 
Les performances des deux algorithmes RAIM proposés et des systèmes de télépéage associés sont 
analysés par simulation dans différents environnements ruraux et urbains. Dans tous les cas, la 
disponibilité du nouvel RAIM est supérieure à celle du RAIM WLSR. 
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Les contributions principales de cette thèse sont: l'analyse détaillée des systèmes de télépéage utilisant 
GNSS, un modèle numérique d'erreur nominale sur les mesures de pseudodistance due au retard 
ionosphérique pour des récepteurs Galileo monofréquence, un modèle d'erreur nominale sur les 
mesures de pseudodistance à cause dues aux multitrajets dans des environnements urbains adapté aux 
applications de télépéage utilisant GNSS, l'arbre de défaillance pour des applications de télépéage 
ainsi que la dérivation de la configuration des algorithmes RAIM pour ce type d'applications, un 
nouvel algorithme RAIM qui augmente la disponibilité en milieu urbain, la dérivation de l'expression 
analytique du paramètre de non centralité chi-carré pour l'algorithme RAIM WLSR, et la 
démonstration de la corrélation nulle entre le test statistique et l'erreur de position dans l'algorithme 
RAIM WLSR. 
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Chapter 1  Introduction 
1.1. Motivation of the work 
Civil aviation navigation is a Safety of Life (SoL) application that needs reliable navigation aids in 
which integrity plays a major role, defined as a measure of the trust that can be placed in the 
correctness of the information supplied by the total system, including the ability of providing alerts to 
the user when the requirements are not assured to be met. The concept of GNSS integrity has been 
originally defined in the civil aviation framework as part of the International Civil Aviation 
Organization (ICAO) specifications required to use GNSS in the Communications, Navigation, and 
Surveillance / Air Traffic Management (CNS/ATM) system. Since current standalone GPS cannot 
meet the civil aviation requirements, and in particular does not provide integrity as specified by the 
ICAO, several augmentation systems able to monitor GNSS integrity have been developed: GBAS, 
SBAS and ABAS. Most of the existing GNSS integrity monitoring systems, techniques and algorithms 
have been conceived to support civil aviation SoL operations within the ICAO specifications. 
Reliability in GNSS is defined as the ability of a Standard Positioning System (SPS) Signal in Space 
(SIS) to perform its required functions over a specified time interval [DoD, 2008].The applications 
that actually have a need of a reliable GNSS navigation with integrity monitoring are not restricted to 
the civil aviation field, and a number of them take place in urban environments. These integrity-driven 
applications are classified as SoL if undetected navigation errors may endanger life, and as liability-
critical if positioning errors may have negative legal or economic consequences. Studies like 
[RacalTracs, 2000] have addressed the use of GNSS integrity in different sectors. Examples of these 
applications are train control, surveying the transport of dangerous or valuable goods, emergency calls, 
tracking bracelets, etc. Each application needs a GNSS integrity monitoring technique adapted to its 
specific requirements. 
The targeted application in this thesis is the Electronic Toll Collection by means of GNSS (GNSS 
ETC) in rural and urban environments. The reason of this choice is that GNSS ETC are highly 
flexible, free-flow toll systems with a reduced quantity of roadside infrastructure; these advantageous 
characteristics make GNSS an interesting alternative to other road pricing mechanisms, and satellite 
navigation is one of the technologies recommended by the EU for the European Electronic Toll 
Service (EETS) [EU, 2004]. GPS is already used as the primary technology to toll freight transport in 
German and Slovak highways and certain national roads, reaching a toll collection efficiency of 
99.75% and 98.99% respectively [TollCollect, 2008], [NDSAS, 2010], [Toll Collect, 2011 (a)], 
[SkyToll, 2011 (b)]. France will establish from 2013 a mileage-based eco-tax for heavy goods vehicles 
in the national road network relying on satellite navigation [MEEDAT, 2009]. 
The main equipment required in GNSS-ETC systems is an on-board unit (OBU) installed at each 
vehicle, capable to perform GNSS navigation and to communicate with the central unit that manages 
2 Chapter 1 
 
 
the toll invoices of the different users. Compared to other technologies used in electronic toll like 
Dedicated Short Range Communications (DSRC), which require roadside infrastructure to monitor the 
presence of users at different checkpoints distributed along the tolled road network or area, GNSS 
ETC equipment is limited, generally resulting in lower installation and maintenance costs per tolled 
kilometre. The absence of roadside infrastructure confers a high flexibility that allows to quickly 
update or modify the tolled area. For instance, around 30 monthly modifications were made to the 
German toll network [TollCollect, 2008], and the deployment of a pilot GNSS-ETC covering more 
than 250 km. of national roads in Czech Republic took only 16 days [SkyToll, 2010]. 
Since GNSS integrity requirements and monitoring techniques have been originally defined and 
developed in the civil aviation framework, they have to be reformulated and adapted to satisfy the 
particular needs of urban toll applications. The derivation of the GNSS integrity requirements and the 
most suitable integrity monitoring techniques needs a deep knowledge of the targeted application 
scheme its needs. In particular, since electronic toll is a liability critical application, its top level 
integrity requirements is not a target level of safety as in civil aviation, but rather a maximum quantity 
of missed revenues (undercharging) and incorrectly high invoices that may cause user complaints 
(overcharging). 
From the possible augmentation systems capable of monitoring GNSS integrity, this work focuses on 
ABAS because it is proven to be the most appropriate one for electronic toll applications. ABAS 
provides user autonomous integrity monitoring for the estimated position based on redundant 
information provided by the range measurements. The use of SBAS augmentation will be considered, 
not for integrity monitoring, but as a means of correcting and reducing pseudorange errors. 
To sum up, the aim of this thesis is to provide the GNSS integrity requirements and integrity 
monitoring techniques for electronic toll collection applications in rural and urban environments. This 
objective needs a thorough analysis of GNSS ETC systems and of GNSS navigation in urban 
environments, in order to identify their needs and constraints to which adapt the integrity concepts and 
systems originally conceived for civil aviation. 
1.2. Organization of the dissertation 
This PhD dissertation is organized as follows. 
Chapter 1 contains the motivation and objective of the thesis and a brief explanation of each chapter. 
Chapter 2 introduces the concept of GNSS integrity in civil aviation in order to set the objectives and 
constraints with which have been designed the existing integrity monitoring solutions. The GNSS 
Signal-in-Space (SIS) requirements standardized by the ICAO for various operations are shown, and 
the different augmentation systems (GBAS, SBAS, ABAS) are presented with emphasis in their 
integrity monitoring capability. 
Chapter 3 presents the main characteristics of Electronic Toll Collection systems based on GNSS. 
Existing toll systems are analyzed and the road network segmentation into pricing areas using the geo-
fencing method is defined. The impact of the road network topology on the integrity requirements is 
studied. Finally, the toll system under study is defined, which includes the identification of the most 
suitable GNSS receivers (signals, receiver configuration, hybridization of external data), GNSS 
integrity monitoring system, and the algorithm that charges a pricing section using GNSS positioning 
data. 
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Chapter 4 establishes the pseudorange measurement error model in road urban environments for the 
GNSS signals and receivers configurations selected in the previous chapter. First, the nominal error 
model is obtained splitting the total pseudorange error into independent error sources that can be 
modeled individually. Afterwards, the correlation time of the nominal errors is presented for different 
receiver types. Finally, the faulty model is presented, which in this thesis consists only of major 
service failures. 
Chapter 5 calculated the GNSS integrity requirements needed in the design of the integrity monitoring 
algorithms for ETC systems. These specifications are derived from the top level requirements of the 
toll system, i.e. the overcharging and undercharging ratios, directly related to the revenues and 
potential user complaints due to erroneous charges. 
Chapter 6 addresses the design of RAIM algorithms. First the WLSR RAIM, a well known algorithm 
frequently used in civil aviation is presented including the rationale of its design and limitations. The 
second part of the chapter introduces a novel algorithm based on the WLSR RAIM, explaining its 
motivation and its suitability to toll applications in urban environments, as well as the justification of 
its design and limitations. 
Chapter 7 presents the results of the simulations run in MATLAB to evaluate the toll system 
performance in rural and urban environments. First, the statistics of certain parameters such as 
positioning errors or satellite visibility and position are shown. Afterwards, the RAIM performance 
and the overall toll system performance are analyzed with different GNSS receivers. 
Finally, Chapter 8 summarizes the main results obtained along this PhD thesis and lists the original 
contributions. Several propositions of continuation of the present work conclude the manuscript. 
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Chapter 2  GNSS Integrity Monitoring in Civil Aviation 
2.1. Introduction 
GNSS worldwide positioning has been identified by the International Civil Aviation Organization 
(ICAO) as one of the possible navigation aids of the Communications, Navigation, and Surveillance / 
Air Traffic Management (CNS/ATM) system [ICAO, 2002], [ICAO, 2006]. 
Civil aviation navigation is a safety-of-life (SoL) application, meaning that large and undetected 
positioning errors may lead to unsafe situations. Therefore, it needs accurate and strongly reliable 
navigation aids. The ICAO is the authority responsible of setting the standards that radio navigation 
systems, including GNSS, must fulfill in order to be suitable for civil aviation applications. This is the 
framework in which the concept of GNSS integrity has been developed, defined as a measure of the 
trust that can be placed in the correctness of the information supplied by the total system, including the 
ability of providing alerts to the user when the requirements are not assured to be met [RTCA, 2006]. 
Since standalone GPS does not meet the ICAO requirements, different augmentation systems have 
been developed to fulfill them. In particular, all augmentation systems provide GNSS integrity 
services. Consequently, most of the integrity monitoring systems, techniques and algorithms have 
been designed to support civil aviation operations within the ICAO specifications. 
Before dealing with integrity monitoring systems in other applications and environments, this chapter 
introduces the GNSS integrity in the civil aviation framework in order to understand the objectives 
and constraints with which have been designed the existing integrity monitoring solutions. First, the 
ICAO requirements for GNSS navigation are defined; afterwards, the different integrity monitoring 
systems are presented. 
2.2. GNSS Signal-in-Space Performance Requirements 
The Area Navigation (RNAV) method allows aircraft operation on any desired flight path within the 
coverage of station-referenced navigation aids or within the limits of the capability of self-contained 
navigation aids, or a combination of these [RTCA, 2003]. The Performance Based Navigation (PBN) 
specifies the aircraft RNAV system performance requirements needed for the proposed operations in a 
particular airspace. 
The Required Navigation Performance (RNP) is the statement of the navigation performance 
necessary for operation within a defined airspace. GNSS is the primary navigation system to support 
currently defined RNP standards. 
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The RNP is a set of requirements on the Total System Error (TSE), which is made of the Path 
Definition Error (PDE), Flight Technical Error (FTE) and the Navigation System Error (NSE) (Figure 
2.1). 
 
Figure 2.1. Total System Error. 
 
The entire set of GPS code-plus-data sequences and carriers is referred to as the Precise Positioning 
Service (PPS) Signal in Space (SIS) [DoD, 2008]. A subset of the PPS SIS, the Standard Positioning 
Service (SPS) SIS, comprises only the 1.023 MHz code-plus-data sequence on the L1 carrier. 
Collectively, the PPS SIS and the SPS SIS are known as the satellite's navigation signals (or 
navigation SIS or GPS SIS). The GNSS Signal-in-Space (SIS) performance requirements, responsible 
of the Navigation System Error, are standardized by the ICAO. Civil aviation standards define GNSS 
SIS performance requirements for different operations in terms of accuracy, integrity, continuity and 
availability [ICAO, 2006] [RTCA, 2006]: 
 Accuracy: The accuracy of a navigation system is a measurement of the degree of conformance 
between estimated and true positions, i.e. the position error. Accuracy requirements are given as 
the maximum allowable 95% percentile of the position error. If the position error is modelled 
with a zero-mean normal distribution, the accuracy is approximately twice the maximum 
allowable standard deviation     . 
 Availability: The availability of a navigation system is the ability of the system to provide usable 
service within the specified coverage area, i.e. the ability to provide the required function and 
performance at the initiation of the intended operation. Signal availability is the percentage of 
time that navigational signals transmitted from external sources are available for use. Availability 
is a function of both the physical characteristics of the environment and the technical capabilities 
of the transmitter facilities. 
 Continuity: The continuity of a system is the ability of the total system (comprising all elements 
necessary to maintain aircraft position within the defined airspace) to perform its function without 
interruption during the intended operation. More specifically, continuity is the probability that the 
specified system performance will be maintained for the duration of a phase of operation, 
presuming that the system was available at the beginning of that phase of operation and was 
predicted to operate (to exist) throughout the operation. 
 Integrity: The integrity is a measure of the trust that can be placed in the correctness of the 
information supplied by the total system. Integrity includes the ability of a system to provide 
timely and valid warnings to the user (alerts). Integrity requirements consist of four terms: 
o Integrity Risk       : The integrity risk is the probability of providing a position that is out 
of tolerance without warning the user within the time-to-alert. 
Path Definition Error 
Flight Technical Error 
Navigation System Error 
Total System Error 
Real Path 
Desired Path 
Defined Path 
Estimated Path 
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o Horizontal Alert Limit (HAL): The     is the radius of a circle in the horizontal plane (the 
local plane tangent to the WGS-84 ellipsoid), with its center being at the true position, that 
describes the region that is required to contain the indicated horizontal position with the 
required probability for a particular navigation mode (e.g.      per flight hour for en route), 
assuming the probability of a GPS satellite integrity failure being included in the position 
solution is less than or equal to      per hour. 
o Vertical Alert Limit (VAL): The     is half the length of a segment on the vertical axis 
(perpendicular to the horizontal plane of WGS-84 ellipsoid), with its center being at the true 
position, that describes the region that is required to contain the indicated vertical position 
with a probability of          per approach, for a particular navigation mode, assuming 
the probability of a GPS satellite integrity failure being included in the position solution is 
less than or equal to      per hour. 
o Time to Alert (TTA): The TTA is the maximum allowable elapsed time from the onset of a 
positioning failure until the equipment annunciates the alert. 
2.2.1. ICAO SARPS Annex 10 
The ICAO SARPS Annex 10 [ICAO, 2006] specifies that the combination of GNSS elements and a 
fault-free receiver shall meet the SIS performance requirements contained in Table 2.1 for different 
operations. A fault-free receiver is assumed to have no failures that affect the integrity, availability and 
continuity performance, so the requirements concern only to GNSS failures. 
Ranges of continuity values are given for some operations because this requirement is dependent upon 
several factors including the intended operation, traffic density, complexity of airspace and availability 
of alternative navigation aids. The lower value given is the minimum requirement for areas with low 
traffic density, while higher values are appropriate for areas with higher traffic density. 
Ranges of availability values are given because this requirement is dependent upon several factors 
including the frequency of operations, weather environments, the size and duration of the outages, 
availability of alternate navigation aids, radar coverage, traffic density and reversionary operational 
procedures. With the lowest availability values, GNSS is considered to be practical but not adequate to 
replace non-GNSS navigation aids, while higher values are adequate for GNSS to be the only 
navigation aid for en-route navigation. 
2.2.2. Cat-II and Cat-III Precision Approaches 
Cat-II and Cat-III approaches are GBAS-based precision approaches, currently under development, 
that provide Decision Heights (DH) between 60 m in the case of Cat-II down to 0 m in the case of Cat-
III C [ICAO, 2001]. The GBAS Approach Service Type D (GAST D) described in [RTCA, 2008]. 
supports Cat-II/III approaches enabling the user to compute an accurate differentially corrected 
position solution, including the definition of a reference path so that the airborne equipment can 
compute guidance information (deviations) relative to the reference path. The GAST D vertical alert 
limit is is a function of the Final Approach Segment Vertical Alert Limit (FASVAL). GAST D has 
been evaluated with an integrity risk of 0.5×10-7 per approach and a FASVAL of 10 meters 
[Dautermann et al., 2011]. 
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2.3. GNSS Integrity Monitoring with Augmentation Systems 
2.3.1. GPS SPS Performance and need of Augmentation Systems 
The accuracy and integrity levels guaranteed by standalone single-frequency L1 C/A are defined in the 
GPS SPS performance standard [DoD, 2008]: 
 The 95% global average code User Range Error (URE) during normal operations over all ages of 
data (AODs) is lower than or equal to 7.8 m. This performance standard is statistically equivalent 
to a ≤ 4.0 m rms SPS SIS URE performance standard, assuming a normal distribution with zero 
mean. 
 The probability over any hour of the SPS SIS instantaneous URE exceeding the not-to-exceed 
tolerance of          without a timely alert during normal operations is lower or equal to     . 
 
Standalone GPS capabilities as captured in the GPS SPS performance standard cannot meet certain 
civil aviation signal-in-space performance requirements like the accuracy for precision approaches or 
integrity monitoring for any operation. For this reason different augmentation systems have been 
implemented to enhance GPS performance and allow its use in civil aviation operations within the 
ICAO requirements. Among other services, augmentation systems provide GNSS integrity 
monitoring. 
Augmentation systems are classified into three types according to the source from which the user 
receives the augmentation information:  
 Ground Based Augmentation System (GBAS): the augmentation information is sent from a 
ground-based transmitter 
 Satellite Based Augmentation System (SBAS): the augmentation information sent is from a 
satellite-based transmitter 
 Aircraft Based Augmentation System (ABAS): the augmentation information is autonomously 
calculated within the aircraft equipment 
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Table 2.1. GNSS signal-in-space performance requirements for civil aviation [ICAO, 2006]. 
Typical operation 
Accuracy (95%) Integrity 
Continuity Availability 
Horizontal Vertical      HAL VAL TTA 
En-route 3.7 km N/A        
7.4 km (oceanic) 
3.7 km (continental) 
N/A 5 min 
         
to 
         
0.99 
to 
0.99999 
En-route, 
terminal 
0.74 km N/A        1.85 km N/A 15 s 
         
to 
         
0.99 
to 
0.99999 
Initial approach, 
Intermediate approach, 
Non-precision Approach (NPA), 
Departure 
220 m N/A        556 m N/A 10 s 
         
to 
         
0.99 
to 
0.99999 
Approach Operations 
with vertical Guidance (APV-I) 
16 m 20 m 
       
in any 
approach 
40 m 50 m. 10 s 
         
per 15 s 
0.99 
to 
0.99999 
Approach Operations 
with vertical Guidance (APV-II) 
16 m 8 m 
       
in any 
approach 
40 m 20 m. 6 s 
         
per 15 s 
0.99 
to 
0.99999 
Category I Precision Approach 16 m 
6 m 
to 
4 m 
       
in any 
approach 
40 m 
35 m 
to 
10 m 
6 s 
         
per 15 s 
0.99 
to 
0.99999 
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2.3.2. Protection Levels and Integrity Monitoring Availability 
Integrity monitoring techniques currently employed in civil aviation check the compliance with the 
integrity requirements calculating statistical bounds of the position error denoted protection levels 
[RTCA, 2006]: 
 Horizontal Protection Level (HPL): The HPL is the radius of a circle in the horizontal plane 
(the local plane tangent to the WGS-84 ellipsoid), with its center being at the true position, that 
describes the region assured to contain the indicated horizontal position. 
When autonomous fault detection is used (ABAS), the HAL is a horizontal region where the 
missed alert and the false alert are met for the chosen set of satellites. It is a function of the user 
geometry and the expected error characteristics: it is not affected by actual measurements. Its 
value is predictable given reasonable assumptions regarding the expected error characteristics. 
When the HAL is based upon the error estimates provided by SBAS, it is the horizontal region 
where the missed alert requirement can be met. 
 Vertical Protection Level (VPL): The VPL is half of the length of a segment on the vertical axis 
(perpendicular to the horizontal plane of WGS-84 ellipsoid), with its center being at the true 
position, that describes the region assured to contain the indicated vertical position. 
When autonomous fault detection is used (ABAS), the VAL defines the vertical region where the 
missed alert and the false alert are met for the chosen set of satellites. 
When the VAL is based upon the error estimates provided by SBAS, it defines the vertical region 
where the missed alert requirement can be met. 
  
The system assures that, in the absence of an integrity alert, the estimated position is within the 
volume defined by the HPL and VPL in compliance with the integrity risk: 
                                                   (2.1) 
where    and    are the horizontal and vertical positioning errors. 
When any of the protection levels exceeds the alert limit, the integrity monitoring system is declared 
unavailable because it is not able to assure that the estimated position is within the volume defined by 
the HAL and VAL specified in the SIS requirements (Figure 2.2): 
                                                       (2.2) 
                                                        (2.3) 
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Figure 2.2. Relationship between alert and protection levels: a) available integrity monitoring system, b) 
unavailable integrity monitoring system. 
 
2.3.3. Ground Based Augmentation System (GBAS) 
GBAS is a local-area safety-critical system that enhances standalone GNSS to support civil aviation 
operations in the airport area (within a recommended 23-mile coverage radius), in which the user 
receives the augmentation information directly from a ground-based transmitter. It must support at 
least Cat-I approaches. An example of GBAS is the Local Area Augmentation System (LAAS) 
deployed in the USA. 
GBAS infrastructure is composed of a ground subsystem installed at the airport premises (reference 
receivers, a ground station and a VHF transmitter), and an on-board subsystem capable to receive and 
process the augmentation information. 
GBAS integrity monitoring relies on local-area differential corrections computed thanks to the 
reference receivers, and it is transmitted to the users by the ground transmitter in the VHF-NAV band 
(108 MHz – 118 MHz). Apart from integrity monitoring, GBAS provides additional information like 
path definition and local-area differential pseudorange corrections. 
2.3.4. Satellite Based Augmentation System (SBAS) 
SBAS is a wide-area safety-critical system that enhances standalone GNSS in which the user receives 
the augmentation information from a satellite-based transmitter. 
Various SBAS have been deployed to augment GPS civil signals in order to allow civil aviation 
operations over different regions: WAAS in USA, EGNOS in Europe and MSAS in the Asia and 
Pacific region. EGNOS is operational for civil aviation since March 2011 and will support all ICAO 
Performance Based Navigation (PBN) applications with a decision minima compared to conventional 
non-precision approaches [Eurocontrol, 2011]. 
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SBAS is divided into three subsystems: the ground subsystem, composed of a reference station 
network, master stations and ground transmitters, the space subsystem, comprising geostationary 
satellites, and the user subsystem. 
SBAS augmentation information relies on differential measurements calculated with the reference 
station network and the master stations. The ground transmitters send these data to the GEO satellites, 
that finally broadcast the augmentation information over the coverage area. 
Among other data, the augmentation information contains pseudorange differential corrections and 
integrity flags that indicate faulty satellites. With this information, users estimate the position and 
compute the protection levels. 
2.3.5. Aircraft Based Augmentation System (ABAS) 
ABAS is an augmentation system that uses exclusively information available on board the aircraft. It 
may employ only GNSS information or provide a hybridized navigation solution that integrates other 
sensors like barometric altimeters or inertial navigation systems (INS). 
The ABAS integrity monitoring scheme, denoted fault detection and exclusion (FDE), is a set of 
algorithms that autonomously monitors integrity using redundant range measurements. The FDE 
performs two separate functions: first, the fault detection process detects the presence of unacceptable 
large position errors; second, the fault exclusion algorithm isolates and eliminates the source of the 
error, allowing the navigation service to continue within the required performances without 
interruption. 
Autonomous integrity monitoring techniques are classified as receiver autonomous integrity 
monitoring (RAIM) when they use exclusively GNSS information, and as aircraft autonomous 
integrity monitoring (AAIM) if they include additional on-board sensors [ICAO, 2006]. Nevertheless, 
the term RAIM may also refer to the fault detection process of the FDE [RTCA, 2006]. 
2.3.5.1. Fault Detection and Exclusion (FDE) 
The following events, depicted in Figure 2.3, can occur throughout the FDE process [RTCA, 2006]: 
 A positioning failure occurs whenever the difference between the true position and the estimated 
position exceeds the applicable alert limit: 
                                              (2.4) 
 
If the equipment is not aware of the alert limit, a positioning failure is defined to occur whenever the 
difference between the true position and the estimated position exceeds the applicable protection level 
(HPL, VPL). 
 A false detection is defined as the detection of a positioning failure when a positioning failure 
has not occurred. 
 A missed detection occurs whenever a positioning failure is not detected. 
 A failed exclusion occurs whenever a true position failure is detected and the detection condition 
is not eliminated within the time-to-alert (from the onset of the positioning failure). A failed 
exclusion would cause a navigation alert. 
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 A wrong exclusion is defined to occur when a detection occurs, and a positioning failure exists 
but is undetected after exclusion. 
 A missed alert is a positioning failure that is not annunciated as an alert within the time-to-alert 
are defined to. Both missed detection and wrong exclusion can cause missed alerts after the time-
to-alert expires. 
 A false alert is defined as the indication of a positioning failure when a positioning failure has 
not occurred (a result of false detection). A false alert would cause a navigation alert. 
 
The probability of the previous events, specially the probability of missed and false alert, define the 
FDE performance. In order to meet the ICAO specifications, the FDE must have a maximum 
probability of missed alert of       
   per test and a maximum probability of false alert of 
           
   per test for operations from en-route to NPA, while APV operations require 
          
   per test [RTCA, 2006]. 
 
 
Figure 2.3. Diagram of possible FDE events [RTCA, 2006] 
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2.4. Conclusions 
Civil aviation is a safety-of-life application that needs reliable navigation aids with performance 
within the requirements standardized by the ICAO.  
The concept of GNSS integrity, defined as a measure of the trust on the correctness of the information 
supplied by the navigation system, has been originally defined in the framework of civil aviation. 
Consequently, the integrity monitoring systems have been conceived to meet the ICAO specifications. 
Standalone GPS does not meet the requirements, so three different types of augmentation systems 
(GBAS, SBAS, ABAS) have been developed with the aim of allowing the use of GNSS positioning in 
civil aviation applications. GBAS and SBAS rely on local and wide area differential measurements, 
while ABAS is calculated with equipment on board the aircraft. 
The integrity monitoring information the user computes thanks to augmentation systems consists of 
horizontal and, if applicable, vertical protection levels, which are statistical bounds of the  position 
error, and integrity alerts or flags. 
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Chapter 3  GNSS-based Electronic Toll Collection 
3.1. Introduction 
A number of applications that take place in urban environments need reliable navigation by means of 
GNSS integrity monitoring: route guidance for special vehicles (ambulances, police, etc.), transport of 
dangerous or very valuable goods, bracelet trackers, emergency calls, electronic toll collection (ETC), 
etc. The most appropriate GNSS integrity monitoring technique and its required performance must be 
adapted to the application needs, so the scope of this work focuses on one particular application: 
GNSS-based ETC (GNSS ETC). 
Most of European states are deploying ETC systems. In order to assure the interoperability among 
them, the EU Directive 2004/52/EC [EU, 2004] establishes a European Electronic Toll Service 
(EETS) where new ETC are recommended to use GNSS and/or 5.8 GHz Dedicated Short-Range 
Communications (DSRC), together with GSM-GPRS mobile communication technologies. 
Electronic toll collection systems based on GNSS positioning (GNSS-ETC) have been studied in 
numerous projects [Racal Tracs, 2000] [ARS, 2006] [MEEDAT, 2009] [Gutierrez-Lanza et al., 2011] 
and are already operational in non-urban environments [TollCollect, 2008] [NDSAS, 2010].  
Because of these reasons, the chosen target application is GNSS-ETC in urban environments. This 
chapter presents the characteristics of this type of electronic toll systems. 
Charging road infrastructures is a tool used for controlling traffic congestion and pollution, as well as 
for generating revenues, usually reinvested in road infrastructure. The different road pricing 
mechanisms include tolls, fuel taxes, etc. 
Among the various road pricing methods, road user charging (RUC) systems are responsible for 
collecting the fee that vehicles pay for using tolled areas or roads. Various implementations are 
possible: tollbooths, number plate recognition cameras, tachometer logs, dedicated short-range 
communications (DSRC), satellite navigation, etc. Systems relying on electronic technologies are also 
called electronic toll collection (ETC) or electronic fee collection (EFC) systems. 
Satellite navigation provides a worldwide positioning service independent from the ETC 
infrastructure, which gives GNSS-ETC some advantageous properties. One of the most important is 
the fact that the quantity of roadside infrastructure is reduced in comparison with other toll collection 
mechanisms. Indeed, the main equipment needed is an on-board unit (OBU) installed at the vehicle, 
which principal component is a GNSS receiver, so the investment and maintenance cost per kilometre 
of tolled road is reduced. This results in a highly flexible system, where updates of the tolled road 
network or of the toll rates can be made simply and fast because they do not require modifying or 
installing new roadside infrastructure. It is also possible to cover any area, even where setting up 
infrastructure would be difficult or unpractical. Moreover, the toll system is free-flow and do not 
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require users to slow down or drive in specific lines at any moment. Additionally, GNSS positioning 
information obtained for ETC may be also used in other services like emergency calls, distance-based 
insurance or car rental applications, etc. 
The OBU may contain, in addition to a GNSS receiver, the meanings for calculating the toll from the 
positioning data, as well as a communication link with the central invoice managing centre. 
The structure of the chapter is the following. First, GNSS-ETC projects and already operational 
systems are presented. The need of GNSS integrity and the most adequate monitoring systems are 
studied afterwards. Then, the geo-fencing technique is explained, and the OBU characteristics are 
derived. Finally, an appropriate road segment detection algorithm is proposed.  
3.2. Current state of GNSS-based ETC systems 
Satellite navigation technologies are already being used in electronic road toll systems. As of 2011, 
two ETC systems for freight transport vehicles using GPS are already deployed in Germany and 
Slovakia, and several road toll projects envisage relying on GNSS. Moreover, some ETC whose 
primary technology is not satellite navigation use it as support. 
Toll Collect GmbH operates the electronic toll system for heavy commercial vehicles on German 
federal motorways and certain roads since 1 January 2005 [TollCollect, 2008]. The levied toll is a 
function of the distance travelled and the vehicle characteristics like weight, number of axis or the 
emission category. 
Vehicles are equipped with an on-board unit (OBU) which has stored in memory the digital map of 
more than 13000 km of motorways and tolled roads divided in more than 2800 segments, as well as 
the toll rates in force. The digital map includes non-tolled roads running within a 250 m distance from 
the motorway, which represent critical areas where user monitoring mechanisms must be specially 
reliable in order not to incorrectly charge users circulating on non-tolled road. 
All along the trajectory, the OBU estimates user's position with GPS and compares it with the digital 
map to detect whether the vehicle is on a tolled road segment and determine which segments have 
been used. Around 60 support radio beacons have been installed to guarantee correct positioning in 
critical areas where GNSS may not be sufficient for a trustful vehicle detection, like long tunnels or 
sectors with non-toll roads running parallel to the motorway. Portable support beacons can be 
temporary installed at specific points, for instance, during road works. 
Once toll charges have reached a certain amount or a specific time period has elapsed, the OBU 
transmits the collected information to the computing centre via GSM. Finally, the toll collection centre 
assigns the charges to the user according to the vehicle license plate number and sends him the 
corresponding monthly toll statement. 
Since 1st September 2011, Toll Collect and the Austrian operator ASFINAG provide a cross-system 
ETC service that allows truck drivers to pay tolls in Germany and Austria with the same OBU 
installed in the vehicle. ETC in Austria is based on microwave technology; thus, the OBU uses GPS in 
Germany and DSRC in Austria. Toll invoices by the two companies remain separate [TollCollect, 
2011 (b)]. 
Slovakia has also deployed a freight transport toll system based on GNSS which follows a similar 
approach as the implemented in Germany, consisting on comparing GPS positioning information with 
a digital map of the segmented road network [NDSAS, 2010]. SkyToll operates the ETC for heavy 
vehicles on Slovak federal motorways and certain roads since 1 January 2010. The toll is computed 
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upon the distance driven and the vehicle characteristics. The system covers more than 2300 km of 
motorways and national roads divided into more than 1600 segments, and user monitoring and toll 
computation rely on GPS positioning computed by the OBU installed in the trucks. 
Flexibility is one of the key features of GNSS-supported ETC: toll network and fee updates are 
possible without additional roadside infrastructure. Flexibility ensures quick adaptation to new 
scenarios and ETC feasibility in national road networks more intricate than motorway ones. Examples 
of the flexibility advantages are the around 30 modifications made to the German toll network per 
month, including the addition of federal roads [TollCollect, 2008], and the deployment of a pilot ETC 
covering more than 250 km. of national roads in Czech Republic in 16 days [SkyToll, 2010]. 
France will establish from 2013 a mileage-based eco-tax for heavy goods vehicles in the national road 
network [AFIFT, 2011]. The ETC must be compatible with the future European Electronic Toll 
System defined in the EU directive 2004/52/EC and technologically will rely on GNSS, DSRC, or a 
combination of both [MEEDAT, 2009]. The road network, comprising between 10000 and 15000 km 
of national roads, will be split into pricing sections, each one controlled by a pricing point. The pricing 
sections are defined as segments of taxed route between two consecutive intersections with other 
roads. The passage of a vehicle by a charging point is the trigger that charges the user the fee 
corresponding to the predetermined length of the segment. About 3000 segments are envisaged, with 
an average length from 4 to 5 km. Nevertheless, a taxed road with intersections close to each other will 
be divided into much shorter sections, more challenging to detect. In order to avoid an excessive 
complex detection system with a cost disproportional to the generated revenues, the law permits 
joining several adjacent charging sections. 
Dutch authorities studied to charge on a driven distance basis all vehicles on the whole national road 
network with a toll system using GNSS [Tierolf, 2010]. Nevertheless, the government discontinued 
the project in October 2010 in favour of investigating the effects of general fuel tax raise. 
Switzerland's ETC uses satellite navigation as support technology. The performance-related heavy 
vehicle fee HVF, also known by its acronym in German LSVA, levies a distance-based toll to freight 
transport vehicles on all public highways in Switzerland since 1st January 2001 [FDF, 2011]. Vehicles' 
mileage is directly read from the vehicle's tachometer, connected to the OBU, while GPS and motion 
sensors are used as support technologies to control if the tachometer signal is interrupted or 
manipulated. The mileage counter is automatically switched on or off thanks to DSRC radio beacons 
installed at the highway borders. 
3.3. GNSS Integrity 
3.3.1. Liability 
GNSS liability-critical applications are defined by the fact that excessive and uncontrolled positioning 
errors may have negative legal or economic consequences. In these type of applications, as in safety-
of-life (SoL) ones, error control by means of GNSS integrity monitoring modules plays a major role. 
ETC is considered a liability-critical application because erroneous positioning may lead to an 
incorrect toll computation. According to their effects, wrong toll invoices are classified in two groups, 
undercharging and overcharging: 
 Undercharging is defined to occur when the levied toll is lower than it should. It is directly 
translated as a loss of revenue of the toll system operator. 
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 Overcharging is defined to occur when the levied toll is higher than it should. It may cause user 
claims and their associated legal and economic implications. 
Toll systems are usually designed with specifications that limit the maximum allowable overcharging 
and undercharging, which implicitly requires monitoring of positioning errors. 
For this reason, GNSS integrity monitoring is a key element in ETC that assures that position errors, 
and the consequent equivalent toll computation errors, are within the allowed limits. 
3.3.2. GNSS integrity monitoring systems 
Integrity monitoring systems have been originally designed for civil aviation, which requirements may 
be different from those of urban electronic toll services. Suitable integrity monitoring mechanisms for 
ETC applications should have the following characteristics: first, they must be flexible in order to tune 
their performance to the ETC requirements; second, they have to operate properly in urban 
environments. This means that they must attain acceptable availability rates even in challenging urban 
scenarios with limited satellite visibility, and should be able to deal with failures of different origins, 
including those  caused by the user's local environment, like non-line-of-sight (NLOS) multipath. Only 
integrity in the user's horizontal plane is considered. 
The level of integrity provided in current standalone GPS by means of the user range accuracy (URA) 
is insufficient for SoL and liability critical applications, which require GNSS integrity monitoring 
services based on augmentation systems. The application of the three augmentation systems inherited 
from civil aviation (GBAS, SBAS and ABAS) to electronic toll applications is studied. Integrity 
services that may offer future standalone GNSS are not considered because of their immature 
development stage. 
 
1) GBAS  
GBAS has been originally conceived to support aviation operations in the airport vicinity, transmitting 
integrity information and local area differential corrections computed by the ground subsystem 
installed at the airport. For that reason, GBAS integrity information is limited to an area within about 
20 miles from the ground infrastructure. 
Current GBAS systems augment GPS L1 signals, although a future extended service to other 
frequencies and GNSS is expected.  
Because of its limited coverage area, toll systems should deploy several GBAS ground segments - 
composed of reference receivers, a ground station and a VHF emitter - in order to provide integrity 
throughout the whole road network. All this roadside infrastructure would increment the cost and 
reduce the flexibility of the toll system. Moreover, differential corrections only apply to errors that 
affect equally to GBAS reference receivers and the user, so they cannot deal with failures generated by 
the user's immediate environment, like multipath. 
In consequence, GBAS-like local area augmentation systems are not recommended for urban 
ETC applications. 
 
2) SBAS 
SBAS broadcasts augmentation information that allows error correction and integrity monitoring in a 
wide area, typically a continent. Any user with an SBAS receiver can obtain the augmentation 
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information throughout the coverage area. Toll systems just need to equip vehicles with the adequate 
receiver to be able to use SBAS corrections and integrity, without any additional infrastructure.  
SBAS satellites are typically in a geostationary orbit, which results in relatively low elevation angles 
at high latitudes like those of the European territory. This fact may cause signal masking in scenarios 
with important obstacles such as urban environments. This problem of satellite visibility is solved with 
technologies like SISNeT that uses internet as a complementary transmission link of EGNOS 
messages, allowing the access to augmentation information in environments were SBAS satellites are 
likely to be blocked. In this case the receiver is not required to receive the SBAS signals, being enough 
with an internet connexion. 
Current SBAS systems augment only GPS L1 signals, although SBAS evolution studies point towards 
enhanced services based on dual frequency, multi-constellation navigation solutions [EU-UE CSN, 
2010]. 
SBAS integrity as defined in [RTCA, 2006] has been conceived under civil aviation requirements and 
assumptions. For example, because the shape of residual error distributions strongly depends on the 
SBAS system architecture and algorithms and no general overbounding method has been identified, 
the SBAS system designer is responsible of providing a method to compute UDRE and GIVE 
variances in compliance with the civil aviation integrity risk of          
            [Roturier, 
2001]. Furthermore, SBAS integrity monitoring cannot detect failures generated in the user's 
immediate environment, NLOS multipath for example, because it relies on differential corrections 
computed by a network of reference stations. 
The conclusion is that it is not recommended to apply directly SBAS integrity in urban ETC 
applications, but SBAS error corrections and their residual error models are still applicable. If SBAS 
corrections are used for applications with integrity requirements different from the civil aviation ones, 
their residual error distributions are assumed to overbound always the real error (and not to be 
designed only to assure the civil aviation integrity risk). 
 
3) ABAS 
ABAS integrity monitoring involves algorithms, run at the receiver, that process redundant GNSS 
measurements and, optionally, information from other sensors installed in the vehicle. Following the 
ICAO notation, RAIM denotes the particular case where only GNSS signals are used, and AAIM the 
hybridized solution with other on-board sensors. 
ABAS presents a number of characteristics that make it an appropriate integrity monitoring scheme for 
ETC. First, toll systems do not need additional roadside infrastructure because integrity is monitored at 
the receiver via software and, if sensors are used, these are on board the vehicle. Second, ABAS deals 
directly with GNSS user's measurements which procure information about all errors and failures 
affecting vehicle positioning, including those that cannot be detected by other systems based on 
reference receivers. Third, ABAS performance can be easily tuned to ETC needs modifying the 
algorithm run at receiver. Finally, ABAS can be easily adapted to multi-constellation receivers and to 
signals broadcasted in any frequency band. 
Hence, autonomous integrity monitoring algorithms of the type RAIM (or AAIM) are suitable for 
electronic road applications. 
Table 3.1 summarizes the key characteristics of the integrity monitoring provided by each 
augmentation systems concerning the needs of ETC applications. 
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Table 3.1. Characteristics of augmentation systems for ETC applications. 
Characteristics 
Augmentation system 
GBAS SBAS ABAS 
Flexible integrity performance 
(integrity monitoring adapted to ETC 
requirements) 
x x ✔ 
Flexible toll system 
(no additional roadside infrastructure) x ✔ ✔ 
Deal with all kind of failures 
(including those generated by the user's local 
environment) 
x x ✔ 
Extensible to multi-constellation 
receivers and to different frequency 
bands 
x x ✔ 
 
The conclusion is that autonomous integrity monitoring schemes like RAIM or AAIM is chosen for 
GNSS-ETC systems, with the possible aid of SBAS pseudorange error corrections. 
3.3.3. ABAS scheme 
An ABAS can be constituted by different combinations of sensors and FD or FDE algorithms. 
Hybrid positioning systems merge satellite navigation with other sensors with the aim of improving 
the performance of standalone GNSS, specially in environments of reduced satellite visibility. 
Different sensors can be included in a hybrid system: inertial sensors, odometer, pressure sensors that 
estimate the altitude, laser, cameras, etc. Inertial measurement units (IMU), composed of 
accelerometers and gyroscopes, are one of the most common sensors used in civil aviation, road and 
urban applications. There are several hybridization techniques for integrating GNSS with the external 
sensors; depending on the type of data used and the stage of the positioning process where the 
information is merged, they can be divided into loose, tight and ultra-tight coupling. Loose coupling 
techniques correct sensor measurements with user positions estimated using exclusively GNSS data. 
They do not increment positioning availability because they need standalone GNSS positioning, and 
usually require a sensor set capable of estimating the user position by itself, like an IMU. Tight 
coupling combine GNSS raw measurements (pseudoranges in our case) and sensor measurements to 
estimate the position. Ultra-tight coupling uses more basic data from the GNSS receiver structure like 
the tracking loops, which may not be accessible in commercial receivers. 
Hybridization techniques are usually implemented with Kalman filters, which are recursive loops. 
Although they are a powerful tool for integrating data from different sensors, integrity analysis with 
Kalman filters are complicated because once a faulty measurement with a large error enters the 
system, it contaminates the rest of the measurements and remains in the recursive loops. This fact 
makes difficult to predict the performance of the integrity monitoring system at a given instant. 
In order to have full control on the performance of the integrity monitoring algorithm at each instant, 
including the capability of predicting it, a receiver structure with no Kalman filter is chosen. The 
navigation solution is calculated applying the weighted least squares (WLS) estimator to the 
pseudorange linear measurement model. This fact limits the sensors that can be hybridized. 
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Height information issued from sensors can be expressed as the equivalent pseudorange measured 
from a satellite situated at the user's zenith. Thus, height sensors can be introduced in the WLS 
estimator in a tight coupling scheme. Height information can be obtained from a barometer or a digital 
map. 
RAIM algorithms may be sequential or snapshot. Snapshot algorithms monitor integrity using only 
current measurements, while sequential RAIM also uses data of previous epochs. In order to avoid 
recursive loops, a snapshot algorithm will be chosen in this study. 
3.4. Road segmentation 
The tolled road network is segmented into sections that constitute the basic charging units: each road 
segment has an associated price that the toll system charges to users for crossing it. Then, the 
trajectory of any user can be expressed as the list of crossed road segments, and the total levied toll 
can be computed as the sum of the price of the segments in the trajectory. If road segments are defined 
as road portions between consecutive intersections, with only one entrance and one exit, their charge 
can be proportional to the distance travelled by the user, leading to a distance-based toll where the 
distance is the sum of the predefined lengths of the road segments the vehicle has traversed. The toll 
rates can also be adapted to the daytime, traffic density, vehicle type, etc. Road segmentation in 
pricing sections is being used in the German and Slovak GNSS-ETC systems, and is the proposed 
approach for the French EcoTax. 
Toll systems based on DSRC technologies usually monitor the use of road segments with a checkpoint 
scheme in which each segment is managed by a control point equipped with a DSRC transceiver. 
Users are charged the whole segment's price when they cross the control point. The checkpoint scheme 
is the result of the need of installing dedicated roadside infrastructure with limited coverage area 
(microwave transceivers) at each road segment. 
GNSS positioning has worldwide coverage and does not need additional roadside infrastructure. This 
fact allows to monitor road segment crossings by means of user positions calculated along their whole 
trajectory and not only at fixed checkpoints. Moreover, GNSS positioning may be unavailable at 
certain locations and instants in urban scenarios because of the reduced satellite visibility; a system 
capable of detecting segment crossings with user positions estimated all along its trajectory throughout 
the segment contributes to overcome the problem of punctual satellite outages. 
For these reasons, the use of road segments in GNSS-ETC will be managed following a geo-fencing 
method. This approach assigns each road segment a virtual perimeter, called geo-object. Geo-objects 
are defined in a way that, if a user's estimated position      lies inside it, the true position      is 
assured to be inside the road segment with a probability equal to or higher than        , where     
is the probability of missed detection of the RAIM. This relationship is done thanks to the HPL 
associated to    by the GNSS integrity monitoring system, and the HAL derived from the geo-object 
boundaries. Considering only horizontal positions: 
                                                                                     
        (3.1) 
 
The toll system is allowed to use an estimated position only if the GNSS integrity system does not rise 
an alert and the HPL is lower than or equal to the HAL: 
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                                                                (3.2) 
 
The geo-object boundaries and    determine the HAL. Before deriving the value of the HAL, let us 
recall the relationship between the position error and the HPL: 
                                    (3.3) 
 
Civil aviation standards define the HPL as the radius of the circle in the horizontal plane centred at   , 
which is assured to contain    with a probability equal to or higher than         when the RAIM 
has not detected a failure (Figure 3.1-a). The HPL can be equivalently interpreted as the radius of the 
circle centred at   , which is assured to contain the true horizontal position    with a probability 
equal to or higher than         when the RAIM has not detected a failure (Figure 3.1-b). 
 
 
Figure 3.1. Different interpretations of the HPL. 
 
When the true position    can be anywhere within the geo-object, the HAL associated to an estimate 
   that is inside the geo-object is the distance to the closest geo-object's boundary, so the circle 
centred at    that is assured to contain    is contained inside the geo-object. (Figure 3.2). The HAL 
decreases as    approaches the geo-object's limits, being null on the perimeter. When the HPL is 
larger than the HAL, the geo-object is not assured to contain    with the required probability. 
 
Figure 3.2. Examples of the relationship between geo-object boundaries, the estimated position and the HAL 
when the real position can be anywhere inside the geo-object. 
 
Let us consider the case of a road network where vehicles are restricted to circulate on the roads. 
Although estimated positions    can lie anywhere, even where users cannot drive (e.g. in a building), 
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acceptable values of    are limited to be inside the road segment. In this case, the geo-object 
boundaries can be established as the lines equidistant to the closest road limits (Figure 3.3). 
In other words, the geo-object of a road segment can be defined as the area comprising all the points 
that are closer to the associated road segment than to any other. Any estimate    inside the geo-object 
with an appropriate value of HPL assures that the real position    lies on the road segment. In this 
case, the HAL can be defined as the distance between the estimated position and the closest segment 
(Figure 3.4). Thus, the HAL becomes zero at the intersections with other road segments. Additionally, 
when the circle defined by the HPL and    does not include the road segment, it can be deduced that a 
missed detection has occurred. 
 
Figure 3.3. Example of geo-object defined as the area of points closer to the road segment than to any other. 
 
Figure 3.4. Example of HAL computation in a road network (Positions 1 and 2). Example of undetected 
positioning failure (Position 3). 
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This method obtains the maximum possible HAL for each    and attains the highest availability rate 
of the integrity monitoring system, that is, the maximum number of estimated positions that are valid 
for being used by the toll system. Nevertheless, its computation is somewhat laborious, must be 
recalculated for each    and needs the exact map of the adjacent roads, regardless they are part of the 
tolled network or not. In order to simplify the process, a constant HAL independent from    and the 
neighbouring roads is proposed. With that purpose, the geo-object is redefined as the region situated at 
distance equal to or lower than the desired HAL from the road segment, and at a distance higher than 
the HAL to any other segment (Figure 3.5). 
Then, any    lying within the geo-object boundaries assures that    is inside the road segment if the 
HPL is lower than the fixed HAL. The HAL value is a design parameter that depends on the road 
pattern, but generally a suitable choice is half of the distance from the road segment to the closest road 
that runs approximately parallel to it. Note that a constant HAL is provided at the expense of reducing 
the area covered by the geo-object, i.e. the zone that contains the estimated positions that can be 
processed by the toll system, and reducing in most cases the HAL, which decreases the availability of 
the integrity monitoring system. 
 
Figure 3.5. Geo-object that allows a constant HAL. 
 
The process of deciding whether a vehicle has driven throughout a road segment or  not will be 
denoted geo-object recognition or segment recognition. The size of the segment is one of the main 
parameters that affect the performance of the geo-object recognition process. Long segments where 
users have longer trajectories are more robust against unavailability of GNSS positioning and integrity 
monitoring systems. 
The segment size depends on the route type: motorways with spaced exits are likely to be divided in 
long segments, while national roads with frequent crossroads require short segments. For example, 
motorways represent the majority of the German ETC network, and national roads predominate in the 
Slovak one. As a consequence, the Slovakian ETC has to deal with shorter segments (Figure 3.6, 
Figure 3.7). For example, road segments shorter that 300 meters represent 20% of the Slovakian ETC 
network, and less than 3% of the German one. Urban road networks are expected to be segmented in 
short sections with numerous intersections. 
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Figure 3.6. Segment length histogram and CDF of German and Slovak freight transport ETC. 
 
 
Figure 3.7. Segment length histogram and CDF of German and Slovak freight transport ETC (zoom). 
 
In general, geo-fencing is a versatile technique that can also be applied in other ETC schemes apart 
from mileage-based tolled roads, like area-based tolls established around city centre perimeters or 
specific infrastructures such as bridges.  
3.5. On-board GNSS receiver 
The GNSS receiver is the main element of the on-board unit installed at each vehicle. This section 
identifies the characteristics of suitable GNSS receivers for GNSS-ETC systems, that is, the GNSS 
signals to be tracked and the receiver configuration. 
3.5.1. GNSS signals 
The following receiver types are studied according to the type and number of tracked signals: 
 Single constellation GPS, single constellation Galileo and dual constellation GPS/Galileo. 
 Single and dual-frequency receivers. 
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Current and future civil signals are studied. GPS and Galileo will broadcast various signals with 
different modulations at several frequency bands. The main characteristics of current and future GPS 
and Galileo signals are summarized in Table 3.2, and their baseband power spectral density are 
depicted in Figure 3.8. The Galileo commercial service is not considered. 
 
Table 3.2. Characteristics of the considered GNSS signals. 
GNSS Signal F (MHz) 
BW 
(MHz) 
ARNS 
Band 
Modulation 
GPS 
L1 C/A 
1575.42 
20.46 
Yes 
BPSK(1) 
L1Cd 
30.69 
BOC(1,1) MBOC(6,1,1/11) 
(25% L1Cd, 
75% L1Cp) L1Cp TMBOC(6,1,4/33) 
L2C 1276.6 20.46 No 
BPSK(1) with Time Division Multiplexing 
(TDM) of Civilian Moderate (CM) and 
Civilian Long (CL) codes 
L5-I 
1176.45 24 Yes 
BPSK(10) 
QPSK (50%) 
L5-Q BPSK(10) 
Galileo 
E1B 
1575.42 24.552 Yes 
CBOC(6,1,1/11,+)  MBOC(6,1,1/11) 
(50%) E1C CBOC(6,1,1/11,-) 
E5a-I 
1176.45 20.46 Yes 
BPSK(10) 
QPSK (50%) 
E5a-Q BPSK(10) 
E5b-I 
1207.14 20.46 Yes 
BPSK(10) 
QPSK (50%) 
E5b-Q BPSK(10) 
E5 1191.795 51.15 Yes AltBOC(15,10) 
 
Figure 3.8. Spectra of GNSS signals. 
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All frequency bands except GPS L2C are aeronautical radio navigation system (ARNS) bands and are 
regulated by the stringent aviation requirements. ARNS bands limit the in-band interference 
environment because any new system generating in-band emissions has to go through interference 
studies supervised by an aviation regulatory authority. 
Since RAIM is based on redundant range information, it needs at least one visible satellite more than 
the minimum necessary to estimate the navigation solution. As it is proven in Chapter 7, dual 
constellation receivers are needed to attain acceptable rates of visible satellites in urban environments 
with high probability of signal masking. For this reason, only signals adequate for dual constellation 
GPS/Galileo receivers will be considered. 
Modernized GPS and Galileo signals transmitted in the frequency bands L1/E1 and L5/E5a are 
compatible and interoperable, so they can be easily received and processed by multi-constellation 
equipments. Consequently, L1/E1 and L5/E5a are the a selected frequency bands for GNSS receivers 
in GNSS-ETC applications, and the use of GPS L2C, Galileo E5b and E5 AltBOC will not be further 
studied. 
Modernized L1/E1 and L5/E5a signals are transmitted in phase-quadrature (I-Q) pairs. Only one signal 
of the pair, the data component, contains the navigation message. This fact allows to receive the 
dataless signal, known as pilot, with longer integration periods and thus a better tracking performance. 
Nevertheless, processing pilot signals requires the navigation message, which could be obtained from 
the data component or by means of assisted GPS (AGPS) services, for instance. 
The GPS L1C pair is composed of the data component L1Cd, which has a BOC(1,1) modulation and 
25% of the total power of the pair, and the pilot component L1Cp, which has a TMBOC(6,1,4/33) 
modulation and the remaining 75% of the power. The modulation TMBOC(6,1,4/33) is a time division 
multiplex of BOC(1,1) and BOC(6,1) chips in a way that the last ones represent 4/33 of the signal 
power [SAIC, 2008]. 
The Galileo E1 pair divides equally the power between the data component E1B, which has a 
CBOC(6,1,1/11,+) modulation, and the pilot component E1C, which has a CBOC(6,1,1/11,-) 
modulation. The modulation CBOC(6,1,1/11) adds BOC(1,1) and BOC(6,1) chips in a way that the 
last ones represent 1/11 of the signal power. CBOC(6,1,1/11,+) introduces BOC(6,1) chips in phase, 
and CBOC(6,1,1/11,+) in anti-phase [EU, 2010]. 
GPS L5 [ARINC, 2005] and Galileo Ea signals have a BPSK(10) modulation. 
Apart from the selected signals because of their interoperability in dual constellation  GPS/Galileo 
receivers, GPS L1 C/A signals are also considered with the aim of studying the performance attainable 
in GNSS-ETC systems with current GPS receivers. 
The same signal can be received and processed with different receiver configurations, resulting in 
diverse degrees of performance, complexity and computation costs. The main parameters to be tuned 
are the front-end bandwidth (BW) and the discriminator chip spacing     . A receiver configuration is 
defined to receive each signal modulation except for L1 C/A signals, for which two receiver 
configurations are proposed (Table 3.3): 
1) A narrowband BPSK(1) receiver with         that only processes the main lobe. A value of 
           is chosen; even if a narrower chip spacing would be possible, it would not offer 
significant improvements because only the main lobe is being tracked. 
2) A wideband BPSK(1) receiver with          capable of processing the main and secondary 
lobes. A narrow chip spacing of        is chosen. 
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3) A BPSK(10) receiver with          that only processes the main lobe. A value of    
           is chosen; narrower values would not offer significant improvements because only the 
main lobe is being tracked. 
4) A BOC(1,1) receiver with         that only processes the main lobe. The discriminator 
chip spacing is             . The value of    is located distant from the nulls of the 
autocorrelation function that could lead to false lock situations and, consequently, erroneous 
pseudorange measurements. Narrower    would not provide significant improvements because 
only the main lobe is being tracked. 
5) A TMBOC/CBOC receiver with          that processes up to the main lobe of the BOC(6, 
1) component. The value of        has been chosen because it is situated in a suitable point of 
the autocorrelation function, distant from the nulls. 
The selected values of BW and    for each modulation are similar to those typically proposed in other 
applications like civil aviation. 
The best tracking performance of TMBOC and CBOC signals is obtained with receivers that generate 
the local replica of the code corresponding to their modulation [Julien et al., 2007]. These receivers 
require a minimum bandwidth of 14 MHz in order to receive the primary lobe of the BOC(6,1) 
component, which require a high computational rate. Nevertheless, their BOC(1,1) component can be 
filtered and processed with a BOC(1,1) receiver, which is more simple and has a narrower bandwidth. 
The drawback of this technique is the lost of the useful signal power allocated to the BOC(6,1) 
component. 
Dual constellation GPS/Galileo receivers are necessary in urban scenarios with degraded satellite 
visibility. However, single constellation receivers will be also studied because they are practical in less 
stringent environments like rural areas or highways. 
Table 3.4 - Table 3.9 are a wrap-up of the selected GNSS receivers to be studied in GNSS-ETC 
systems. 
 
Table 3.3. Single frequency receiver configurations. 
Receiver configuration Local replica 
Two-sided front-end 
bandwidth  
BW (MHz) 
Two-sided chip 
spacing  
   (chips) 
narrowband BPSK(1) BPSK(1) 2 1 
wideband BPSK(1) BPSK(1) 16 0.1 
BPSK(10) BPSK(10) 20 0.25 
BOC BOC(1,1) 4 0.2 
TMBOC/CBOC 
TMBOC(6,1,4/33) 
14 0.1 CBOC(6,1,1/11, -) 
CBOC(6,1,1/11, +) 
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Table 3.4. Single frequency GPS receivers under study. 
Single frequency GPS receivers 
Receiver type Signal   Modulation Receiver configuration 
Narrowband L1 C/A L1 C/A  BPSK(1) narrowband BPSK(1) 
Wideband L1 C/A L1 C/A BPSK(1) wideband BPSK(1) 
GPS L1 BOC 
L1Cd BOC(1,1) 
BOC 
L1Cp TMBOC(6,1,4/33) 
GPS L1 TMBOC L1Cp TMBOC(6,1,4/33) TMBOC/CBOC 
GPS L5 BPSK(10) 
L5-I 
BPSK(10) BPSK(10) 
L5-Q   
 
Table 3.5. Dual frequency GPS receivers under study. 
Dual frequency GPS L1/L5 receivers 
Dual frequency Receiver Receiver L1 Receiver  L5 
GPS L1/L5 narrowband C/A narrowband L1 C/A GPS L5 BPSK(10) 
GPS L1/L5 wideband C/A wideband L1 C/A GPS L5 BPSK(10) 
GPS L1/L5 BOC GPS L1 BOC GPS L5 BPSK(10) 
GPS L1/L5 TMBOC GPS L1 TMBOC GPS L5 BPSK(10) 
 
Table 3.6. Single frequency Galileo receivers under study. 
Single frequency Galileo receivers 
Receiver type Signal   Modulation Receiver configuration 
Galileo E1 BOC 
E1B CBOC(6,1,1/11,+) 
BOC 
E1C CBOC(6,1,1/11,-) 
Galileo E1 CBOC+ E1B CBOC(6,1,1/11,+) TMBOC/CBOC 
Galileo E1 CBOC- E1C CBOC(6,1,1/11,-) TMBOC/CBOC 
Galileo E5a BPSK(10) 
E5a-I 
BPSK(10) BPSK(10) 
E5a-Q   
 
Table 3.7. Dual frequency Galileo receivers under study. 
Dual frequency Galileo E1/E5a receivers 
Dual frequency Receiver Receiver E1 Receiver  E5a 
Galileo E1/E5a BOC Galileo E1 BOC Galileo E5a BPSK(10) 
Galileo E1/E5a CBOC+ Galileo E1 CBOC+ Galileo E5a BPSK(10) 
Galileo E1/E5a CBOC- Galileo E1 CBOC- Galileo E5a BPSK(10) 
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Table 3.8. Single frequency dual constellation GPS/Galileo receivers under study. 
Single frequency GPS/Galileo receivers 
GPS/Galileo Receiver Receiver GPS Receiver Galileo 
L1/E1 BOC GPS L1 BOC Galileo E1 BOC 
L1/E1 TMBOC/CBOC+ GPS L1 TMBOC Galileo E1 CBOC+ 
L1/E1 TMBOC/CBOC- GPS L1 TMBOC Galileo E1 CBOC- 
L5/E5a BPSK(10) GPS L5 BPSK(10) Galileo E5a BPSK(10) 
 
Table 3.9. Dual frequency dual constellation  GPS/Galileo receivers under study. 
Dual frequency GPS/Galileo receivers 
GPS/Galileo Receiver Receiver GPS Receiver Galileo 
L1/L5a - E1/E5a BOC GPS L1/L5 BOC Galileo E1/E5a BOC 
L1/L5a TMBOC- E1/E5a CBOC+ GPS L1/L5 TMBOC Galileo E1/E5a CBOC+ 
L1/L5a TMBOC- E1/E5a CBOC- GPS L1/L5 TMBOC Galileo E1/E5a CBOC- 
 
3.5.2. Navigation solution 
Four receiver types are envisaged according to their navigation solution (Table 3.10). The first one 
estimates a 2D position plus the time shift between the receiver and the GNSS time. This model 
applies to single constellation receivers and dual constellation receivers with known inter-system time 
shift. 
Estimating the navigation solution requires a minimum number of range measurements  
equal to the number of unknowns, whereas one or two additional measurements are needed to attain 
the redundancy required for RAIM fault detection (FD) and exclusion (FDE) respectively. Generally, 
the higher is the additional number of range measurements, the better is the positioning and RAIM 
performance. Therefore, receivers with the lowest number of unknowns are expected to have the best 
performance. 
  
Table 3.10. Minimum number of range measurements needed for various GNSS receiver types according to 
their navigation solution unknowns. 
 Navigation solution unknowns 
 2D position 
           
 2D position 
          
              
 3D position 
           
 3D position 
          
              
     
  3 4 4 5 
FD 4 5 5 6 
FDE 5 6 6 7 
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3.6. Geo-object Recognition 
One of the main tasks of GNSS toll systems consists in deciding whether a user has driven through a 
road segment or not in order to charge him. This decision, known as segment detection or geo-object 
recognition, is taken using exclusively vehicle GNSS horizontal positioning data, augmented with 
integrity monitoring, and the segmented road map. 
3.6.1. Map-matching algorithms 
Map-matching algorithms are techniques commonly used in road transportation systems to identify the 
correct road link on which a vehicle is travelling, combining positioning data with cartographic 
information. They can additionally estimate the user's position on the link. 
According to their approach, map-matching algorithms can be classified into geometric, topological, 
probabilistic and based on other advanced techniques [Quddus et al., 2007]. Geometric algorithms use 
the geometric information of the spatial road network data by considering only the shape of the links, 
while topological ones also take into account the connectivity and contiguity between links. The 
probabilistic algorithms rely on a confidence region around the position fix obtained from a navigation 
sensor, and other map-matching algorithms rely in other advanced techniques like fuzzy logic. 
Only a few map-matching algorithms offer an indicator of the trust that can be placed on the provided 
user position [Velaga et al., 2012] [Jabbour et al., 2008] [Fouque et al., 2008] [Quddus et al., 2006]. 
The techniques proposed to measure the trust of the map-matching solution include the use of classic 
RAIM algorithms with positions estimated integrating GNSS and GIS in a tight-coupling scheme 
(simplifying road links by their centre lines), the comparison between the user heading against the 
road link direction (which suffers from noisy user heading estimates at low velocity), and the 
difference between the distance of consecutive map-matched fixes on the link and the real distance 
travelled by the user obtained from its speed. 
The most performing algorithms commonly hybridize GNSS with external sensors and make use of 
other information like user velocity and heading, road links connectivity, proximity or turn restrictions 
according to a number of criteria based on empirical studies. The use of this amount of non-GNSS 
data makes difficult to assure the positioning integrity at each instant. Furthermore, road segments are 
simplified by their centre lines and the map-matching algorithms assume that the user is always on one 
of these road links, which is not the case. For these reasons, instead of using map-matching algorithms 
designed for road navigation, this work proposes a geo-object recognition algorithm for GNSS-based 
toll collection systems relying exclusively on the geo-objects and the estimated positions, checked by 
a RAIM algorithm. 
3.6.2. Valid Estimated Positions for ETC 
GNSS receivers installed at each vehicle estimate the user position at each epoch. Afterwards, the 
integrity monitoring system (the RAIM algorithm) decides whether an estimate is valid for being used 
in the geo-object recognition process or not, in order to discard unacceptably large errors. The RAIM 
is assumed to perform only fault detection (it has no fault exclusion capabilities). An estimate    is 
declared valid for ETC when, according to the RAIM, meets the GNSS integrity requirements: 
                                            (3.4) 
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That is, valid estimates are those positions in which the RAIM has not detected a horizontal 
positioning failure (PF). Recalling the civil aviation definition of horizontal positioning failure: 
                                       (3.5) 
 
Integrity monitoring systems cannot detect 100% of the positioning failures, so there is a probability, 
lower than the probability of missed detection     specified during the RAIM design, that an 
estimated position containing a positioning failure is declared valid. Valid positions can be classified 
as reliable positions when         , and as undetected positioning failures if         . 
An estimate    can be declared non-valid for two reasons: RAIM unavailability and integrity alerts. 
When the RAIM is not available,    has no integrity information associated and cannot be guaranteed 
to be free of positioning failures. Integrity alerts indicate that the estimate is likely to contain a 
positioning failure, so    must be discarded. 
In environments with reduced visibility the number of tracked satellites may not be sufficient to 
provide GNSS positioning at certain instants. In that cases, the user's position cannot be estimated and 
no data is provided to the geo-object recognition algorithm. 
The scheme followed to select the estimated positions valid for geo-object recognition is summarized 
in Figure 3.9. 
 
Figure 3.9. Scheme of the possible outputs of the GNSS positioning & integrity system at a given instant, 
indicating when an estimated position is declared valid to be used in the geo-object recognition algorithm. 
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3.6.3. Independent positions 
Positioning errors have a certain correlation time      that depends on the correlation time of 
pseudorange measurement errors         and the satellite/user geometry, which may vary in time. 
Consequently, the outputs of the RAIM fault detection (FD) algorithm are also correlated. 
Depending on the position error, FD outputs give place to four possible events: correct detection, false 
detection, correct non-detection and missed detection (Figure 2.3). The occurrence of this events have 
a correlation time derived from the position error correlation. 
In the context of this work, two estimated positions are independent if they provide independent 
RAIM outputs. 
Correlated positions do not provide additional information. Thus, geo-object recognition algorithms 
only process independent positions. 
Table 3.11. Events related to the Fault Detection process. 
 
FD output 
No Detection Detection 
Positioning 
Error 
No Positioning failure 
           
Correct Non-Detection False Detection 
Positioning failure 
           
Missed Detection Correct Detection 
3.6.4. Geo-object Recognition Algorithm 
The inputs of the segment detection algorithm are the estimated positions with their integrity 
information and a digital map with the geo-object boundaries. 
Figure 3.10 represents the two cases the algorithm has to deal with: detecting users when they cross a 
road segment, and not charging them for unused segments even when they drive close to them. In both 
cases, estimated positions can be declared valid or non-valid by the RAIM and may contain 
positioning failures that can mislead the recognition algorithm. 
The geo-object recognition algorithm will use only positions declared valid by the RAIM. This 
selection process assures that the probability that a chosen sample contains an undetected position 
failure is below a certain limit. The following detection rule is proposed. The algorithm decides that a 
user has been inside the road segment if the number of independent positions declared valid by the 
RAIM inside the geo-object                       is equal to or higher than a threshold: 
                                                    (3.6) 
where the threshold     is tuned according to the application requirements. Indeed, incrementing the 
    decreases the probability of false segment recognition, but increments the probability of missed 
detection, as more valid positions are needed.  
In this algorithm, an valid position inside a geo-object triggers the recognition process. Then, all the 
independent valid positions lying inside the geo-object, that can be considered from the same 
trajectory of the user through the road segment, are collected in a position set (Figure 3.11). When the 
position set is closed because next estimated positions cannot be considered of the same user trajectory 
along the road section under study, the number of positions in the set is compared with the threshold to 
decide whether the user has been inside the road segment or not. 
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Figure 3.10. Examples of user trajectories and GNSS positioning & integrity data provided. 
 
Figure 3.11. Creation of the position set used in the geo-object recognition algorithm. 
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The probability of a missed or false geo-object recognition depends on the probability of positioning 
failures and upon the number of independent valid positions per segment, which in turns depends on 
the user trajectory, the positioning error correlation time, the RAIM algorithm and the user/satellite 
geometry. 
Other geo-object recognition algorithms could be proposed, for example: 
                             
                    
                     
  (3.7) 
Nevertheless, algorithm (3.7) poses the problem of proving which estimated positions can be included 
in the position set used in the recognition process of a given road segment. For instance, the positions 
estimated between the first and last ones lying inside the geo-object could be taken, but this method 
could lose some valid samples outside the geo-object. 
Other algorithms could integrate other information like direction of the vehicle, route segments 
previously used, etc. 
The road segment recognition algorithm of eq.(3.6) is chosen because of its versatility due to the 
possibility of adapting the threshold to the application needs, and the simple selection of the positions 
used by the recognition process. 
3.7. Conclusions 
Different applications need different GNSS integrity monitoring techniques and requirements; 
therefore, a general GNSS integrity solution for any application in urban environments cannot be 
provided. Electronic toll collection systems based on GNSS positioning (GNSS-ETC) in urban 
environments has been chosen as the target application of this work because of the interest that has 
attracted, as proves the EU Directive 2004/52/EC that establishes the bases of European Electronic 
Toll Services (EETS). 
GNSS-ETC is a liability critical application that needs GNSS integrity in order to limit the effects of 
undercharging and overcharging toll invoices. 
The different augmentation systems capable of providing GNSS integrity monitoring have been 
analyzed, concluding that ABAS is the most adequate because it is easily extensible to multi-
constellation receivers, it does not require additional infrastructure, and it is capable of detecting 
failures generated in the user's immediate environment. 
A snapshot WLS navigation solution estimator with snapshot RAIM algorithms are chosen in this 
thesis in order to avoid recursive loops and to assure full control of the integrity monitoring process at 
each instant. External altitude information can be incorporated by means of a barometer or 
cartographic information. Although SBAS integrity as defined in civil aviation standards will not be 
directly used in the electronic toll application, SBAS corrections are still applicable. 
The toll computation is based on a segmentation of the road network, so the total amount charged to a 
user is the sum of the price of the segments contained in its trajectory. Geo-fencing has been proven to 
be a suitable segmentation technique. The relation between the road network, the geo-object 
boundaries and the HAL has been explained. 
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A dual constellation  GPS/Galileo receiver is proposed for urban environments. Single constellation 
receivers are also considered in less stringent scenarios. Different GNSS signals and several suitable 
receiver configurations have been proposed, including single and dual frequency receivers. 
Geo-object recognition is one of the main tasks of GNSS toll systems, consisting in deciding whether 
a user has driven through a road segment or not in order to charge it. The RAIM decides which 
estimated positions are valid to be used in the algorithm in order to obtain reliable segment 
recognitions. A geo-object recognition algorithm based on the number of independent positions inside 
the geo-object is proposed. 
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Chapter 4  Pseudorange Measurement Model 
4.1. Introduction 
The pseudorange measurement model is a mathematical description of pseudorange measurements that 
characterizes their nominal errors and faults. The measurement model is a key input in the design of 
GNSS integrity monitoring mechanisms and their posterior performance prediction. 
Pseudorange measurement degradations are classified into two categories: nominal errors and faults. 
Nominal errors are those present when all GNSS segments are working according to their 
specifications and the magnitudes of other external error sources are within their typical range. Faults 
are those errors not considered in the nominal case. For example, pseudorange errors due to residual 
ionospheric delays within their regular values (the ionosphere is not disturbed, for instance, by a 
magnetic storm) are nominal errors, while pseudorange biases caused by a satellite clock malfunctions 
are faults. 
Pseudorange measurements are expected to be constantly contaminated by nominal errors, while 
pseudorange faults are punctual events. 
This chapter presents a pseudorange measurement model suitable for integrity applications in urban 
road environments. First, the linear equations that link pseudorange measurements with the navigation 
solution are presented. Afterwards, nominal errors are presented and derived. Finally, the faulty 
measurement case is described. 
4.2. Measurement Equation System 
The relationship between pseudorange measurements and the navigation solution at a given instant is 
non-linear, but can be approximated with the following linear equation system (Appendix A): 
           (4.1) 
where: 
 Δ  : pseudorange measurement vector after linearization [Nx1] 
 Δ : navigation solution vector after linearization [Nux1] 
   : observation matrix [NxNu] 
  : pseudorange measurement error vector [Nx1] 
with: 
  : number of pseudorange measurements 
   : number of unknowns in the navigation solution 
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Pseudorange measurement errors are the addition of nominal errors and other faults not included in the 
nominal model: 
       (4.2) 
where 
  : nominal error vector [Nx1] 
  : fault vector [Nx1] 
 
The observation matrix   is a function of the user/satellite geometry and the navigation solution vector 
(Appendix A). It can be designed to describe the user position either in latitude, longitude and height 
coordinates, or in the north, east and up coordinates of the user's local frame. 
4.3. Nominal Error Model 
The nominal error model characterizes the pseudorange measurement errors that are present when all 
GNSS segments are working according to their specifications and the magnitudes of other external 
error sources have typical values. 
Nominal errors are modelled as zero-mean independent Normal distributions in civil aviation 
standards, and GNSS integrity mechanisms are commonly designed under this assumption. For 
instance, residual pseudorange error models provided by SBAS describe zero-mean Gaussian 
distributions. Nominal errors in urban environments will also be modelled as zero-mean independent 
normal distributions because of the following reasons: first, the reliability of this type of model has 
been validated with the stringent requirements of civil aviation, so it is suitable for integrity 
applications; second, it is the assumed error distribution of civil aviation integrity monitoring systems; 
third, it is compatible with SBAS residual error models.  Therefore, the mathematical model of 
nominal errors in urban environments is: 
          (4.3) 
where 
          
 
 
 
  
    
   
  
   
     
 
 
 
 
 (4.4) 
 
Because nominal pseudorange errors are not exactly described by zero-mean normal random variables, 
the model provides instead a conservative normal distribution, obtained with overbounding 
techniques, that bounds the real error distribution. For instance, the definition of a CDF overbounding 
distribution is [De Cleene, 2000]: 
 
                         
                         
 (4.5) 
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where      is the overbounding CDF (zero-mean normal distribution) and      is the real CDF of the 
error. CDF overbounding requires the original error distribution to be symmetric and unimodal. 
Summarizing, the nominal pseudorange error model consist of independent, overbounding zero-mean 
normal distributions, so it can be described by the variance. For the     pseudorange measurement: 
           
   (4.6) 
4.3.1. Error Sources 
Following a similar approach as in civil aviation [RTCA,2006], pseudorange nominal errors are 
formulated as the result of various independent error sources that can be analyzed separately. 
Five error sources have been identified in road urban environments in the nominal case: inaccuracy of 
the broadcasted satellite clock corrections and ephemeris errors, ionospheric delay, tropospheric delay, 
receiver thermal noise (plus interferences) and multipath. The error sources are independent from each 
other because of their different nature. 
The pseudorange errors caused by each independent source are modelled with a zero-mean normal 
distribution that overbounds the real error distribution. For the     satellite: 
                            
   (4.7) 
                    
   (4.8) 
                      
   (4.9) 
                      
   (4.10) 
                
   (4.11) 
where: 
             is the model of pseudorange errors at the     satellite due to the inaccuracy of 
the broadcasted satellite clock and ephemeris, with variance            
  
         is the model of pseudorange errors at the     satellite due to the ionospheric delay 
residual error, with variance        
  
          is the model of pseudorange errors at the     satellite due to the tropospheric delay 
residual error, with variance         
  
          is the model of pseudorange errors at the     satellite due to thermal noise and 
interferences, with variance         
  
       is the model of pseudorange errors at the     satellite due to multipath, of variance 
     
  
 
The total pseudorange nominal error is the convolution of the five independent error sources, so its 
model is an overbounding zero-mean normal distribution of variance equal to the sum of the variances 
of each error component. The nominal error model of the     satellite is: 
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                                                 (4.12) 
               
   (4.13) 
       
             
         
          
          
       
  (4.14) 
 
The different error sources are studied in the following subsections in order to obtain the total 
pseudorange error model. 
Certain nominal error sources identified in urban environments are also present in aviation and have 
standardized models in the civil aviation framework. In these cases, the aviation models will be 
applied because they have been thoroughly tested for safety-of-life applications. 
Other nominal error sources depend on the environment or on the receiver characteristics and need to 
be modeled specifically for urban road applications.  
4.3.2. Satellite Clock and Ephemeris Errors 
The inaccuracy of data provided by the GNSS space and control segments, principally of the satellite 
clock corrections and the ephemeris, constitute a nominal pseudorange error source. Despite the use of 
high performance clocks on board of satellites, clock drifts cause discrepancies between the GNSS 
time estimated by the user and the real one. Satellite clock corrections supplied in the navigation 
message contribute to reduce this time error, although a residual error remains. Moreover, satellite 
trajectories calculated by users from the ephemeris broadcasted in GNSS navigation messages are not 
exact. The error model           describes pseudorange errors due to the joint effect of inexact 
ephemeris and satellite clock residual errors. 
The accuracy of the ephemeris and satellite clock corrections depends on the GNSS, which in this 
study can be GPS or Galileo. Besides, GNSS ground and space segments performance is expected to 
improve in time, so different modernization levels have different error models. Additionally, SBAS 
provides corrections to reduce ephemeris and satellite clock errors. 
Thus, the error model has to be adapted to the following three cases: 
1) GPS (different modernization stages) 
2) Galileo 
3) SBAS corrections 
4.3.2.1. GPS 
The User Range Accuracy (URA) is a statistical measure of the GPS range errors for which the space 
and control segments are responsible, excluding errors due to the user equipment and transmission 
media [ARINC, 2006], [ARINC, 2005], [SAIC, 2008]. It is broadcasted in the GPS navigation 
message for each satellite. In particular, the URA is a one-sigma      estimate of the satellite's signal-
in-space (SIS) user range error (URE), applicable to every signal transmitted by the satellite. GPS 
sends an alert flag whenever the URA may be worse than indicated. 
The GPS SPS SIS integrity standard concedes the URA certain integrity significance. In particular, the 
SIS URE of single frequency C/A code measurements from healthy satellites are assured to surpass 
the not-to-exceed (NTE) tolerance, without a timely warning during any hour of normal operations, 
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with a probability lower than                    . The NTE tolerance is defined to be       times 
the upper bound of the currently transmitted URA [DoD, 2008]: 
                                           (4.15) 
 
Future GPS-III will reduce the probability to                     with a NTE tolerance of       
    and a TTA of 5.2 seconds [Kovach, 2008]. 
The URA of modernized GPS signals has been interpreted as the standard deviation of the zero-mean 
normal distribution that overbounds the satellite's range error up to the        quantile [Lee and 
McLaughlin, 2007]. In fact, the probability that a zero-mean normal variable exceeds       times its 
standard deviation is     , and to exceed      times its standard deviation is     : 
                                                    (4.16) 
 
For these reasons, the standard deviation of the pseudorange error model due to satellite clock and 
ephemeris inaccuracies is set to be equal to the satellite's URA.  
A URA index indicating a URA range is transmitted for each satellite. Sixteen pre-fixed intervals have 
been defined for current L1 C/A signals, being the lowest one             . Since the error 
model must overbound the real error distribution, the upper bound is taken. Therefore, the minimum 
possible error model of current L1 C/A receivers is                metres. 
Modernized GPS signals broadcast satellite clock URA and ephemeris URA independently. In order to 
account for improved ranging performance, 16 new segments below 2.4 metres have been added to the 
segments already defined for L1 C/A, being the lowest one             . 
The user is assumed to use the most recent clock corrections, so additional parameters that degrade 
clock-URA according to the time elapsed since the last correction are neglected. 
The nominal error is used to design the RAIM algorithm and to predict its performance, so it should 
depend on nominal values of the URA and not on the particular value assigned to a satellite at a given 
instant. 
Several nominal values of URA have been proposed in various studies. A nominal URA of 3.9 meters 
has been proposed for RAIM analysis with current L1 C/A signals [Have, 2003]. A URA of 1.5 meters 
has been derived from the modernized GPS specifications [Kovach, 2000]. The GPS evolutionary 
architecture study (GEAS) used URA values between 1 and 0.3 meters to predict the performance of 
RAIM in the future [Lee and McLaughlin, 2007]. Assuming that modernized GPS and Galileo 
performance will be equivalent, the standard deviation of the model is set to be equal to 0.85 metres, 
the maximum allowed Galileo SISA (although URA and SISA definitions are somewhat different). 
Summing up, the standard deviation of the nominal error model is: 
             
                                                            
                                              
                                       
  (4.17) 
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4.3.2.2. Galileo 
The Galileo integrity concept defines the SISA (Signal In Space Accuracy) as the predicted minimum 
standard deviation of the normal distribution that overbounds the SISE (Signal In Space Error) 
distribution for fault-free SIS [Oehler et al., 2004].  
Although Galileo OS navigation messages have the capability of transmitting the SISA, a SISA for 
Galileo OS has not been defined yet. Despite this fact, Galileo OS performance will be assumed to be 
described by the SISA.  
The SISA accounts for ephemeris and satellite clock errors, so the standard deviation of the 
pseudorange error model due to satellite clock and ephemeris inaccuracies is set to be equal to the 
satellite's SISA. 
The SISA must be lower than 0.85 metres in order to meet the Galileo RAMS (Reliability, 
Availability, Maintainability, and Safety) requirements [Oehler et al., 2004]. Thus, the standard 
deviation of the nominal error model is: 
                 (4.18) 
4.3.2.3. SBAS 
SBAS provides satellite clock and ephemeris corrections denoted as fast and long term corrections. 
The fast corrections apply to rapidly changing satellite clock errors, and the long term corrections refer 
to slower changing errors in the ephemeris and to the long term satellite clock errors. 
SBAS broadcasts, together with the corrections, parameters to calculate a zero-mean normally 
distributed residual error model. The error variance is defined by the UDRE (user differential range 
error), transmitted at least once every 6 seconds, and degradation parameters that modify the model 
according to the time elapsed since the applicability instant of the used data. Assuming the user 
employs the most recent corrections, the standard deviation of the error model is equal to the UDRE. 
The nominal value of the UDRE has been calculated with an EGNOS simulator at ENAC. Other 
SBAS are understood to have similar performance. The UDRE has been calculated along the trajectory 
of each satellite with a 1-minute temporal step during 24 hours, approximately the rotation period of 
GPS satellites (Figure 4.1). In general, the UDRE of most of the satellites visible from the EGNOS 
operational area is 0.3 m. Hence, the standard deviation of the nominal error model is: 
                 (4.19) 
 
SBAS provides corrections for GPS. The same result will be extended to Galileo in order to analyze 
the potential of hypothetical modernized SBAS.  
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Figure 4.1. Map of the UDRE obtained with EGNOS. 
4.3.3. Ionospheric Residual Error 
The ionosphere is a dispersive medium, i.e. signals traversing it are delayed according to their 
frequency. The ionosphere has an opposite effect in the signal’s code and phase delay, resulting in a 
group delay   (code delay)  and a phase advance    of the same magnitude and opposite sign. The 
first order model of the ionospheric delay is: 
       
    
  
                       (4.20) 
where: 
  : signal frequency [MHz] 
 TEC (Total Electron Content): electron density integrated along the ionospheric path followed by 
the signal                         . 
TEC measurements are denoted vertical TEC (VTEC) when the signal arrives at the user's zenith, and 
slant TEC (STEC) if the signal arrival angle is different to 90°. 
GNSS receivers systematically apply correction algorithms to reduce the pseudorange errors 
introduced by the ionospheric delay. Different correction strategies are established in dual- and single-
frequency receivers. Single-frequency receivers apply algorithms that predict the ionospheric delay 
with the ionospheric parameters supplied by the GNSS in the navigation message. Each system (GPS, 
Galileo, SBAS) has a different ionospheric correction algorithm with its own residual error. Dual-
frequency receivers combine two pseudoranges measured from the same satellite to obtain a range 
measurement in which the first order ionospheric delay has been eliminated. 
Thus, the error model has to be adapted to the following four cases: 
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1) GPS ionospheric corrections (Klobuchar model) 
2) Galileo ionospheric corrections (NeQuick model) 
3) SBAS ionospheric corrections 
4) Dual-frequency receivers 
 
Pseudorange errors due to ionospheric delay are identical in aviation and in urban environments, so the 
residual error models defined in civil aviation standards can be directly applied to urban applications. 
4.3.3.1. Single-frequency GPS corrections 
All GPS civil signals apply the Klobuchar ionospheric model to correct the ionospheric delay in 
single-frequency receivers, which is estimated to reduce at least 50 % of the single-frequency 
ionospheric delay RMS error [Klobuchar, 1987], [ARINC, 2006], [ARINC, 2005], [SAIC, 2008]. 
Let us depart from the residual error n model standardized for civil aviation GPS L1 C/A airborne 
equipment when SBAS corrections are ot available [RTCA, 2006]. The standard deviation of the error 
model is defined as 20% of the ionospheric delay predicted by the Klobuchar model, or a minimum 
error that depends on the user's latitude, whichever is larger: 
                                (4.21) 
where: 
  : the speed of the light in a vacuum                      
    : ionospheric delay correction calculated with the Klobuchar model from the GPS navigation 
message (s) 
      : mapping function defined for SBAS corrections, see eq.(4.23). 
   : minimum standard deviation of vertical errors (m) 
     
                     
                   
                           
  (4.22) 
where    is the user's geomagnetic latitude. 
 
The mapping function scales the ionospheric delay estimated for signals arriving at the user's zenith to 
other elevation angles. The following mapping function is defined in SBAS corrections: 
           
      
     
 
 
 
    
 (4.23) 
where: 
  : satellite's elevation angle 
     approximate radius of the Earth's ellipsoid,                 
     height of the maximum electron density,           
Pseudorange Measurement Model 45 
 
 
 
 
The mapping function   used in the Klobuchar corrections, as well as in the Galileo ionospheric 
residual error model, is different from that used in SBAS: 
              
 
   
 
 
 (4.24) 
 
The difference between   and       is less than 3% for elevation angles higher than 3° (Figure 4.2). 
 
Figure 4.2. Comparison of the mapping functions F and FSBAS. 
 
Substituting       by   in the original model (4.21): 
                                     (4.25) 
 
where       is the vertical ionospheric delay estimated with the Klobuchar model in meters: 
               
     
 
 (4.26) 
 
Developing eq.(4.25): 
       
 
 
 
                                     
                                  
                                          
  (4.27) 
 
The error model depends on the value of the ionospheric correction currently applied by the user, 
which is a function of the correction parameters transmitted in the GPS navigation message, the user's 
position and time. 
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Expression (4.25) allows         to be obtained directly by comparing         with   . A historical 
series of vertical ionospheric corrections will be analyzed with the aim of setting a simplified, worst-
case error model independent from the data currently used by the receiver. 
Suitable values of         have been obtained using the ionospheric corrections database prepared by 
the CTUP (Czech Technical University in Prague). It contains the ionospheric correction coefficients 
  and   broadcasted in GPS navigation messages since 1994, with a variable update rate of every 
several days, sufficient for following their temporal changes. The IGS (International GNSS Service) 
database also provides daily updated corrections parameters since 1997, but some inconsistencies were 
detected in the data from the years 1999-2001 and the wider time span covered by the CTUP database, 
the use of the latter has been preferred. Outside the 1999-2001 period, CTUP and IGS correction 
databases are similar. 
GPS ionospheric corrections depend on the instant of the day, with a maximum at 14:00 local time. 
The daily maximum vertical ionospheric correction            has been obtained with the CTUP 
database and a 1-degree-step geomagnetic magnitude vector. For each geomagnetic latitude interval in 
which    is defined, the highest correction magnitude is compared to the corresponding    (Figure 
4.3). During the studied time period,    always exceeded the 20% of the maximum daily correction.  
Thus, the residual ionospheric error model for single-frequency GPS L1 is in effect (Figure 4.4): 
             
                      
                   
                           
  (4.28) 
 
Figure 4.3. Graphical view of σiono,v = max(0.2∙ΔKl,v, τv). 
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Figure 4.4. Ionospheric residual error model for single-frequency GPS L1. 
 
Ionospheric corrections for L5 signals are obtained scaling the L1 corrections by          
 , so the 
single-frequency residual ionospheric error model for GPS L5 is: 
           
   
   
 
 
                       (4.29) 
4.3.3.2. Single-frequency Galileo corrections 
All Galileo OS signals will broadcast the same single-frequency ionospheric corrections based on the 
NeQuick model, assumed to correct at least 70 % of the ionospheric delay [Arbesser, 2006], [EU, 
2010]. 
Civil aviation standards do not provide yet a ionospheric residual error model for single-frequency 
Galileo receivers. The Galileo TUSREQ (Test User Receiver Requirements) specifies that the residual 
error standard deviation of single-frequency receivers must not exceed 30% of the correction 
magnitude, or the equivalent first order delay of a 20-TECu STEC, whichever is larger [Arbesser, 
2006]: 
                   
    
  
         (4.30) 
where: 
    carrier frequency       
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      NeQuick ionospheric delay estimation applied by the user, defined as the first order 
ionospheric delay calculated with the STEC estimated by the NeQuick algorithm    : 
     
    
  
            (4.31) 
 
The error model depends on the value of the ionospheric correction currently applied by the user. 
Historical series of     could be analyzed with the aim of setting a simplified, worst-case error model 
independent from the data currently used by the receiver. Nevertheless, as of year 2011, Galileo 
correction coefficients are not being transmitted yet and the use of historical databases is not possible. 
Thus, in order to estimate a data series of previous values of    , the        will be approximated as 
the VTEC scaled by the mapping function of (4.24). The advantage of this expression resides in the 
fact that VTEC is a well studied parameter with available databases of historical data: 
               (4.32) 
 
The alternative ionospheric residual error model results:  
       
    
  
                        (4.33) 
Equivalently: 
        
    
  
                                   
    
  
                                                         
  (4.34) 
 
The model of eq.(4.33) has been satisfactorily assessed in [Rogers et al., 2005]. 
The IGS VTEC database has been used to compute the historical       series that would have been 
obtained in the previous years. The IGS provides worldwide VTEC data since 1998, approximately 
covering the 11-year solar period, updated every 2 hours with a 0.1 TECu accuracy [Hernández-
Pajares et al., 2008]. 
First, the VTEC database position grid is converted from geographic into geomagnetic latitude, which 
describes better the ionospheric delay. The following conversion formula is applied [Klobuchar, 
1987]: 
                                                         (4.35) 
where    is the geomagnetic latitude,   the geographic latitude, and   the longitude. Most of Europe 
is located between            (Figure 4.5). 
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Figure 4.5. Geomagnetic latitude. 
 
The VTEC presents daily variations with the maximum peak during day time and the minimum at 
night, as well as long term variations that depend on several factors, like the current phase of the solar 
cycle (Figure 4.6).  
 
Figure 4.6. Example of VTEC daily and long term variations.        
 
According to the historical data series, a tight model of       would be tailored to the time of the day 
or to the solar cycle. Nevertheless, a more general error model independent from the time is preferred, 
so it could be used in integrity analysis that would be valid regardless the instant of application. Thus, 
a function of       dependent only on     , the elevation angle and the carrier frequency is proposed. 
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Several percentile curves of the       for E1 signals received at the use's zenith have been obtained 
with the IGS VTEC database (Figure 4.7). The percentile 100% cannot be directly used because it 
includes sporadic VTEC magnitude spikes originated by multiple causes, like electromagnetic storms 
or possible data errors, that cannot be considered within the nominal case. The appropriate percentile 
depends on the application needs. 
The proposed Galileo E1 residual ionospheric error model that bounds that of eq.(4.33) consists of the 
vertical error component        , obtained from the percentile 99.999% of Figure 4.7 at the user's 
geomagnetic latitude, scaled by the mapping function:  
                 (4.36) 
 
The chosen percentile 99.999% means that at a given instant, the probability that the selected         is 
lower than the true one is 0.001%. Let us remember that this percentage has been calculated with all 
the VTEC measurements included in the IGS database since 1998, so it is not restricted to nominal 
errors. 
The ionospheric residual error of E5a signals is obtained scaling the model for E1: 
          
   
    
 
 
                      (4.37) 
 
 
 
Figure 4.7. Percentiles of E1 σiono,v obtained with all VTEC data. 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
|
m
| (deg.)
m
maximum 
iono
 (E1, elevation 90°)
 
 
Galileo 100 % of data
Galileo 99.999 % of data
Galileo 99.99 % of data
Galileo 99.9 % of data
Galileo 99 % of data
Galileo 95 % of data
Galileo 90 % of data
Pseudorange Measurement Model 51 
 
 
 
4.3.3.3. SBAS ionospheric corrections 
SBAS provides GPS L1 ionospheric delay corrections at fixed ionospheric grid points (IGP). It also 
supplies users with the GIVE (Grid Ionosphere Vertical Error), the standard deviation of the 
overbounding zero-mean normally distributed residual error model that remains after applying the 
corrections to signals received at the zenith of each IGP. Additional degradation parameters that adapt 
the error model when the user fails to use the most recent GIVE will be neglected in this study because 
the user is assumed to use the most recent corrections. In general, users are not exactly located on an 
IGP, and interpolate the GIVEs of neighbouring IGPs to calculate the vertical error model at their own 
position, called UIVE (User Ionosphere Vertical Error). Finally, the UIVE is scaled by the mapping 
function         to include the effect of the satellite’s elevation angle in order to obtain the UIRE 
(User Ionosphere Range Error), which is the standard deviation of the residual ionospheric residual 
error: 
                 (4.38) 
where       is the mapping function defined in eq.(4.23): 
           
      
     
 
 
 
    
  
 
The worst GIVE provided by EGNOS during a 24-hour period (approximately the ground track period 
of GPS satellites) has been calculated with an EGNOS simulator available at ENAC (Figure 4.8). 
Other SBAS have similar performance. The GIVE has been calculated with a 1-minute temporal step. 
The circles on Figure 4.8 represent EGNOS ground stations and red areas indicate the places where 
GIVE cannot be continuously provided. In general, the service is continuously available in most of 
Europe with: 
             (4.39) 
 
Since worst case GIVE is the same all over Europe, the worst case UIVE is equal to the worst case 
GIVE. Thus, the standard deviation of the SBAS ionospheric residual error model is: 
                  (4.40) 
             (4.41) 
 
SBAS provides corrections for GPS L1 signals. The same result will be extended to other frequency 
bands and GNSS (Galileo) to analyze the potential of hypothetical modernized SBAS.  
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Figure 4.8. Worst GIVE obtained for EGNOS during 24 hours. 
4.3.3.4. Dual-frequency iono-free measurements 
Dual-frequency receivers measure the pseudorange to each satellite at two different frequencies and 
combine them to build a iono-free pseudorange measurement that removes the first order ionospheric 
delay. For a receiver working at the frequency bands   and  , the iono-free pseudorange is: 
                        (4.42) 
where: 
             iono-free pseudorange combination 
        pseudoranges measured at the frequency band   and  , respectively 
        combination coefficients 
    
  
 
  
    
  (4.43) 
    
  
 
  
    
  (4.44) 
     carrier frequency of the frequency band   
     carrier frequency of the frequency band   
 
Dual-frequency pseudorange combinations remove the first order ionospheric delay, but higher order 
errors remain. Nonetheless, their magnitude is insignificant compared to other error sources: for 
example, typical second order ionospheric delays are around 0 and 2 cm at the zenith, and the third 
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order ones, between 0 and 2 mm [Mainul-Hoque et al., 2007]. Thus, ionospheric effects of order 
higher than one are neglected: 
         (4.45) 
 
The main drawback of iono-free pseudoranges is the amplification of the errors caused by thermal 
noise and multipath. Assuming these two error sources are independent at each frequency: 
                 
    
         
    
         
  (4.46) 
              
    
      
    
      
  (4.47) 
 
Noise amplification makes (L1, L2) and (L1/E1, L5/E5a,) and (E1,E5b) the only practical frequency 
pairs to build dual-frequency iono-free measurements (Table 4.1). 
 
Table 4.1. Iono-free coefficients for different frequency pairs. 
        
    
  
    (1575.42 MHz)     (1227.6 MHz) 6.48 2.39 
       (1575.42 MHz)         (1176.45 MHz) 5.11 1.59 
    (1575.42 MHz)      (1207.14 MHz) 5.87 2.02 
    (1227.6 MHz)    (1176.45 MHz) 150.19 126.68 
     (1207.14 MHz)      (1176.45 MHz) 396.80 357.96 
 
4.3.4. Tropospheric Residual Error 
Tropospheric delay is a local phenomenon caused by tropospheric refraction. Therefore, neither 
standalone GNSS (GPS, Galileo), nor SBAS provide tropospheric delay corrections in the navigation 
messages. Instead, the user segment is responsible of estimating and correcting its own tropospheric 
delay. The tropospheric residual error only depends on the correction model applied by the user, which 
is independent from the GNSS or SBAS used. A suitable model should provide low residual error 
standard deviation with a low computational burden. 
The UNB3 (University of New Brunswick) tropospheric delay model has been proven to provide the 
lowest residual error standard deviation among the most representative models proposed for GNSS 
applications [Collins, 1999]. Originally conceived for civil aviation WAAS receivers, the UNB3 is 
based on the zenith delay algorithms of Saastamoinen, the mapping functions of Niell and a table of 
atmospheric parameters extracted from the U.S. 1966 Standard Atmosphere Supplements (years 1987 
– 1996). 
The tropospheric delay model currently specified in [RTCA, 2006] for civil aviation GPS/WAAS 
airborne equipment is based on the UNB3, replacing the Niell mapping function by the 
computationally less exigent Black and Eisner (B&E) one. This change reduces the computational 
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burden at the expense of a delay over-prediction that could reach 30 cm. at elevation angles of 5° 
[Collins and Langley, 1999]. 
The tropospheric delay correction algorithm chosen for integrity urban applications is the standardized 
for civil aviation because of its compromise between residual error magnitude and computational cost. 
The residual error model is a vertical error standard deviation of 12 cm. scaled by a mapping function 
[RTCA, 2006]. Therefore it is exclusively dependent upon the satellite’s elevation angle   (Figure 
4.9): 
                        (4.48) 
where: 
        
 
 
 
     
               
                                                                         
     
               
                                        
  (4.49) 
                     (4.50) 
 
The overboundning capacity of the model (4.48) has been satisfactorily assessed in [Collins and 
Langley, 1999]. 
 
Figure 4.9. Residual tropospheric error model standard deviation. 
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4.3.5. Thermal noise and interferences 
GNSS receivers must first acquire and track the signal broadcast by the GNSS satellite in order to 
measure its pseudorange. The signal acquisition mechanism computes a rough frequency and delay 
estimation of the received signal, while the tracking loops perform a fine estimation and follow the 
temporal signal variations. During the first stage of the tracking process, the PLL (Phase Lock Loop) 
or FLL (Frequency Lock Loop) wipe off the carrier of the incoming signal. Afterwards, the DLL 
(Delay Lock Loop) synchronizes the local code replica with the received one and computes the 
pseudorange. 
The DLL’s discriminator compares the Early, Late and Prompt correlator outputs to synchronise the 
code. Coherent discriminators only use the in-phase correlators, assuming a perfect phase alignment 
between the received and locally generated carrier. Non coherent discriminators use in-phase and 
quadrature components. Two non-coherent discriminators are widely used, Early minus Late Power 
       and Dot Product      . 
Noise present at the receiver front-end perturbs the tracking process and causes pseudorange errors. 
The code tracking error variance of a limited bandwidth receiver with an E-L discriminator due to 
white Gaussian noise at its input is given by [Betz and Kolodziejski, 2000]: 
    
     
                        
         
   
    
  
  
                      
   
    
 
     
         
         
   
    
  
  
                    
   
    
 
   
  (4.51) 
For a DLL with a DP discriminator, the code tracking error variance is given in [Julien, 2005]: 
   
     
                        
         
   
    
  
  
                      
   
    
 
     
 
  
  
            
   
    
 
   
  (4.52) 
In both equations: 
   : is the one-sided equivalent rectangular bandwidth of the DLL [Hz] 
   : integration time [s] 
      : signal power spectral density (PSD) 
      : signal to noise ratio 
  : two-sided early-late spacing [chips] 
  : two-sided front-end bandwidth [Hz] 
  : speed of the light in the vacuum        
 
The previous models are adequate when the digital tracking loops are derived from the analog loop 
model using an approximate analog-to-discrete transform. If they are designed directly in the digital 
domain, the term              is omitted. 
Thus, the pseudorange error model due to noise and interferences depends on the discriminator: 
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  (4.53) 
 
The standard deviation of the error model of different receiver types is plotted in Figure 4.10 as a 
function of     ,    and   . 
 
 a)       ;               b)       ;         
 
 c)       ;                  d)       ;          
 
Figure 4.10. Pseudorange error model due to thermal noise for various receiver configurations. 
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 BPSK(1);         ;            
 BPSK(1);          ;            
 BPSK(10);          ;             
 BOC(1,1);         ;              
 CBOC(6,1,1/11,+);         ;              
 CBOC(6,1,1/11,-);         ;               
 TMBOC(6,1,4/33);         ;               
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Pseudorange errors present a similar magnitude regardless the discriminator type, E-L or DP. In 
general, a narrower DLL bandwidth, or a longer integration time decreases the error. Concerning the 
signal performance, the most robust signals against noise effects are those that allocate the highest 
amount of power in higher frequencies, i.e. BPSK(10) followed by TMBOC and CBOC. After them, 
wideband BPSK(1) and BOC(1,1) receivers provide a similar standard deviation, approximately twice 
as the TMBOC or CBOC ones. As expected, 2MHz-band BPSK(1) receivers provide the poorest 
performance in terms of thermal noise effects. 
The effect of interferences can be simulated with the thermal noise obtained by setting the      at the 
loss-of-lock threshold of the tracking loops. As example, the lowest      allowed in civil aviation 
vary between 29 dB and 36.5 dB. 
4.3.6. Multipath 
Urban environments typically present a high number of obstacles and reflecting surfaces, being 
scenarios rich in multipath, signal blocking and fading. This chapter describes a novel model of 
pseudorange error due to multipath for integrity-oriented vehicular applications in urban 
environments. 
The error model has been calculated analysing, via Monte Carlo simulations, the pseudorange errors 
obtained by a GNSS receiver simulator processing signals that have been modified by the effects 
generated with a GNSS urban channel model. The subsequent scheme has been followed (Figure 
4.11): 
1) A database of the characteristics of received signal rays in urban environments has been 
calculated with an urban channel model specifically designed for GNSS users in an urban road 
scenario. The generated database consists of time series of the power, phase and delay of each 
LOS and NLOS rays of the signal received from a satellite situated at different elevation and 
azimuth angles. 
2) The database of received rays is processed with a module that implements the receiver tracking 
loops and correlator to provide the pseudorange error and additional data like the PLL and DLL 
outputs. All the data are obtained before the coherent integration, at the same sampling rate as the 
channel database. 
3) A lock detector based in PLL error and C/No estimations decides which pseudorange error 
samples after the coherent integration correspond to instants in which the receiver is tracking the 
signal or not. 
4) Finally, the pseudorange error samples selected by the lock detector are used to compute the 
standard deviation of the overbounding function. 
 
58 Chapter 4 
 
 
 
Figure 4.11. Scheme followed to calculate the multipath error model. 
4.3.6.1. Urban Channel Model 
A channel model specifically developed for GNSS applications in urban environments has been used 
to generate delay     , amplitude      and phase      time series of each LOS and reflected ray 
received by the user [Lehner and Steingass, 2005], [Steingass and Lehner, 2004]. 
The simulated scenario consists of a vehicle moving at a constant speed along a street with three sort 
of obstacles: buildings, trees and lampposts. Only one satellite at a constant azimuth and elevation 
angle is simulated at a time. The street width is constant and the distance between the vehicle and the 
road centre is fixed by the user. The size of the buildings and other obstacles, as well as of the gaps 
between them, changes along the simulation time according to a Gaussian distribution. 
The direct ray follows a deterministic model determined by the house fronts, trees and lampposts 
found in its trajectory. House front diffraction is modelled by a knife edge model, the trees as an 
attenuating cylinder plus a statistical fading process, and the lampposts by a double knife edge model. 
The reflected rays are generated one by one. Each multipath ray is associated with a reflector that is 
generated following a statistical model based on measured data: the number of simultaneous reflectors, 
their position in the scenario, their mean power according to their location and their lifespan follow 
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statistical distributions obtained from data obtained in a measurement campaign. The excess delay and 
phase (Doppler) of each reflected ray is computed geometrically from the relative position between the 
satellite, the reflector and the user while the receiver moves. That is, the model does not use statistical 
distributions neither for the excess delay nor for the Doppler spectrum.  
 
Scenario parameters 
The scenario has been set to reproduce a typical city centre street: 
 The user is assumed to be a vehicle progressing along the road axis at a speed     of         
with the GNSS antenna situated at a height of 1.5 metres. 
 The street is assumed to be 20 meters wide. The width of the buildings follows a normal 
distribution                subject to       . The height of the buildings follows a 
normal distribution                subject to           . A gap between buildings 
appears with a probability        . The width of the gaps follows a normal distribution 
                subject to      . 
 Trees have a constant height of 8 m. and a diameter of 5 m. Tree trunks have a constant length of 
2 m. a diameter of 0.2 m. Leafs are assumed to cause an attenuation of         . The distance 
between the trees and the buildings is 2 m. The distance between trees follows a normal 
distribution                subject to      . 
 Lampposts have a constant height of 10 m. and a diameter of 0.2 m. The distance between 
lampposts follows a normal distribution                subject to      . 
 All reflected rays up to a maximum attenuation of -60 dB are taken into account. 
 
Sampling period 
The sampling period that typically gives enough resolution of urban channel models is [Pérez-Fontàn 
et al., 2001]: 
    
 
   
 (4.54) 
 λ: carrier wavelength (m) 
  : user speed (m/s) 
The adequate sampling period for different GNSS frequency bands and user velocities are of the order 
of the millisecond, between 0.95 ms and 2.3 ms (Table 4.2). The multipath database has been 
generated with a frequency period of       . 
Table 4.2. Recommended channel model sampling period Ts (ms). 
 
Frequency bad 
L1/E1 L2 L5/E5a E5b 
v (km/h) 
50 1.7 2.2 2.3 2.2 
90 0.95 1.2 1.3 1.2 
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Satellite position 
The database contains the time series of received rays from a satellite at different positions. The 
elevation angle goes from 10° to 90° in 10° steps, and the azimuth from 0° to 90° in 10° steps, 
considering the street axis as azimuth 0°. 
 
Number and length of simulations 
Sixty simulations with a duration of ten seconds have been performed for each satellite's azimuth and 
elevation angle pair. The number and length of the simulations has been chosen according to criteria of 
computation time, output data size and accuracy of the model. 
4.3.6.2. Receiver tracking loops 
Once the received signals have been obtained with the urban channel model, they are processed by 
GNSS receiver tracking loops. A typical loop configuration suitable for urban scenarios has been used. 
The PLL is of     order with a 10-Hz bandwidth and a Q discriminator, aided by a 15-Hz bandwidth 
FLL to improve the tracking of phase changes. The DLL is of     order, with a 1-Hz bandwidth and a 
dot product discriminator. 
The delay of the signal without multipath is known at each instant of the database, so the computation 
of the pseudorange error due to multipath from the delay estimated by the DLL is straightforward. 
The correlator and the tracking loops are implemented in a simple and computationally efficient way, 
where the only inputs are the channel model time series                    and the power spectral 
density of the modulated signal. 
First, the GNSS receiver wipes off the carrier multiplying the incoming signal by a local carrier with 
the phase estimated by the PLL followed by a low pass filter. This process may be done in one or 
several steps using intermediate frequencies. The analytical result is the incoming code signal scaled 
by the cosine of the difference between the phase of the incoming signal and the phase estimated by 
the PLL in the in-phase branch (I), and by the sine in the quadrature (Q) one. Let us take the in-phase 
branch as an example:  
                             
   
   
 (4.55) 
where: 
      : received signal after the carrier wipe-off process in the in-phase branch 
    : number of multipath rays 
  : modulated signal code filtered by the front-end filter 
        and   : are the amplitude, delay and phase of the     received ray 
   : carrier phase estimated by the PLL 
 
Afterwards, the correlator multiplies the  incoming code signal by a local code replica with the delay 
estimated by the DLL plus the delay       corresponding to the correlator gate, that is,          for 
the prompt,            for the early and            for the late gate, where    is the discriminator 
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chip-spacing. This product is integrated to compute the correlator outputs that are fed into the DLL 
and PLL. As example, the analytical expression of the in-phase prompt is: 
                            
   
   
         
    
 
   (4.56) 
where: 
   : correlator integration time 
  : code delay estimated by the DLL. 
  : modulated PRN code (not filtered by the front-end because it is the code replica generated by 
the receiver) 
 
In order to reduce the computational burden of eq.(4.56), the filtered PRN code autocorrelation 
function is introduced: 
                          
    
 
   (4.57) 
 
The filtered PRN code autocorrelation function is the result of the convolution between the front-end 
filter impulse response               and the PRN code autocorrelation function     : 
                   (4.58) 
 
Assuming modulated PRN codes are wide-sense stationary (WSS), their autocorrelation function can 
be obtained with the Wiener-Kinchin theorem:  
      
             (4.59) 
where      means inverse Fourier transform and PSD is the power spectral density. 
An alternative computation approach of    is obtained introducing eq.(4.57) into (4.56): 
                           
   
   
 (4.60) 
 
The use of    reduces considerably the computational complexity needed to calculate the correlator 
outputs, but makes the following assumptions: 
1) the channel parameters                       and the PLL and DLL estimations          
remain constant during the integration time   . 
2) the integration time    is equal or longer than the whole PRN code, in order to consider the signal 
approximately white noise. In particular, the signal must satisfy the two following properties: 
2.1) the autocorrelation function is approximately a delta centred at the 0-chip lag: 
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2.2) the signal is WSS, so the Wiener-Kinchin theorem is applicable: 
     
             
 
The integration time    is longer than the channel sampling period        (see Table 4.2), so the 
signal parameters are not constant. To solve this, the integral (4.56) is split between         
intervals of    length, in order to accommodate the signal update rate caused by channel changes. 
Continuing with    as example: 
                                     
     
   
          
     
         
   
 
   
 (4.61) 
where: 
      : number of signal rays received during the     interval 
            and     : amplitude, delay and phase of the     received ray during the     interval 
     and   : carrier phase and code delay estimates during the     interval 
 
Introducing   : 
    
 
 
                                 
     
   
 
 
   
 (4.62) 
 
This new formula fulfils the first assumption: the signal parameters remain constant during each    
interval. It also meets the second assumption if the PRN is shorter than       . Nevertheless, 
Galileo E1B and E1C and GPS L1C signals have PRN lengths of 4 ms and 10 ms respectively, all of 
them at a chip rate of 1023 chips per ms.  
Any 1-ms portion of these PRN codes has white noise properties, so eq.(4.62) is applicable to each 
signal considered. To prove that                             , the circular autocorrelation of 
every 1023-chip segments of each E1B and E1C codes have been calculated, showing that they can 
still be approximated by a delta centred at the 0-chip lag. As an example, Figure 4.12 compares the 
normalized circular autocorrelation of the PRN #1 of the whole E1B PRN (of duration 4 ms), a 1023-
chip segment of it (of duration 1 ms), and the complete L1 C/A. The entire E1B PRN has the lowest 
correlation values at lags larger than 0 chips, so its approximation to a delta is the most accurate. 
Nevertheless, partial E1B code has similar correlation values at lags different to 0 chips than L1 C/A, 
so the    approach is valid.  
Several statistical measures, apart from the autocorrelation function, have been obtained for any partial 
code segment of 1023-chip length, presenting approximately white noise characteristics. Therefore 1 
ms portions of any code can be assumed to be WSS, even for PRN codes with duration longer than 1 
ms. 
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Figure 4.12. Normalized autocorrelation function of total and partial PRN codes. Example of L1 C/A and E1B. 
Finally, operating as for   , the correlator outputs result: 
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The instantaneous pseudorange error is calculated every         as the difference between the 
delay estimated by the DLL and the real LOS delay. Finally, the number of samples is reduced 
averaging the errors obtained during the integration time. Integration times of 20 ms and 100 ms are 
studied. 
4.3.6.3. Lock Detector 
The GNSS receiver may not be able to track the signal during the whole simulation period because of 
signal masking or multipath. A lock detector has been implemented to exclude data obtained with 
unlocked tracking loops from the set of pseudorange errors used to calculate the nominal error model. 
A single outlier can have a strong influence on the overbounding algorithm and increment the final 
   . Thus, the lock detector plays a key role discarding the large pseudorange errors caused by 
unlocked tracking loops that would amplify artificially    . 
The lock detector consists of a PLL lock detector in parallel with a      estimator. This double check 
is necessary because the PLL lock detector cannot detect 25 Hz offset false locks. Although this fault 
is usually overcome with the navigation message parity check, a      estimator is used to solve the 
problem faster and without the navigation message. 
The following PLL lock detector has been implemented [Parkinson et al., 1996]: 
     
   
   
 (4.69) 
where: 
    : estimated          
    : Narrow Band Difference 
        
 
   
 
 
     
 
   
 
 
 
    : Narrow Band Power 
        
 
   
 
 
     
 
   
 
 
 
where M is the number of averaged correlator outputs. The total average time of the lock detector is 
                  . 
A carrier phase error threshold of 30° has been taken; signals with        are considered not locked. 
This gives a lock detector threshold of        . 
The implemented      estimator is: 
      
        
       
 (4.70) 
The mean and the variance of    are computed during a period equal to the averaging time of the PLL 
lock detector. The detector decides the tracking loops are locked when the estimated      is at least 
     . This threshold has been chosen because it is the      that produces an equivalent effect on the 
PLL lock detector of eq.(4.69) equivalent to a 30° carrier phase error [Parkinson et al., 1996]. 
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The averaging time               drives the lock detector performance. Various averaging times have 
been tested; in general, the longer the averaging time, the lower the number of outliers included in the 
computation of the error distribution. An averaging time of 500 ms has been chosen because it 
provides good performances for all studied receiver configurations. 
4.3.6.4. Error overbounding 
The set of pseudorange errors selected by the lock detector do not exactly follow a normal distribution. 
For this reason, the CDF overbounding technique of eq.(4.5) is applied in order to obtain a 
conservative Gaussian distribution suitable for the nominal error model: 
 
                         
                         
  
where      is the overbounding CDF (zero-mean normal distribution),      is the original CDF of the 
error database and x is the error magnitude. 
The CDF overbounding method requires the measured distribution to be zero-mean, symmetric and 
unimodal. As the measured distribution has been obtained with Monte Carlo simulations, it does not 
exactly fulfil these conditions, but approximately does (the measured mean is of the order of 
milimeters). Then, the mean has been displaced in order to center the measured CDF around the case 
of no error,            . Doing this the overbounding definition (4.5) can be applied directly.  
Figure 4.13 provides an example of CDF overbounding, where the accumulated probability axis is in 
gaussian scale and the error is normalized by the overbounding standard deviation, so normal 
distributions follow straight lines. A comparison between the measured and overbounding error 
distributions shows how the latest redistributes the probability towards larger error magnitudes (Figure 
4.14, Figure 4.15). 
 
Figure 4.13. Example of CDF of simulated pseudorange error and its overbounding function. 
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Figure 4.14. Example of CDF of simulated pseudorange error and its overbounding function. 
 
Figure 4.15. Example of error percentiles of simulated pseudorange error and its overbounding function. 
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4.3.6.5. Final Pseudorange Error due to Multipath 
A multipath error model dependent only on the elevation angle is proposed for the receiver 
configurations of Table 3.3 with          and            (Figure 4.16, Figure 4.17). The 
modulation CBOC(6,1,1/11,-) has been taken as representative of TMBOC(6,1,4/33) and 
CBOC(6,1,1/11,+), which provide similar results. As expected, the most robust signal against 
multipath is BPSK(10), followed by CBOC(6,1,1/11,-). The next performing signals are wideband 
BPSK(1) and BOC(1,1), while narrowband BPSK(1) receivers provide the poorest performance 
against multipath effects. 
Except for narrowband L1 C/A receivers,     is relatively independent from the elevation angle. The 
variations between the values at different elevation angles, of the order of centimetres, are explained 
because they are the result of different Monte Carlo simulation runs. For those signals, an simplified 
model independent from the elevation angle can be used taking the maximum     obtained at any 
elevation angle (Table 4.3). 
 
Table 4.3. Maximum multipath error model standard deviation (σmp) obtained at any elevation angle. 
   
Receiver type 
Wideband L1 C/A BPSK(10) BOC(1,1) CBOC(6,1,1/11,-) 
        0.41 0.22 0.53 0.29 
         0.39 0.15 0.51 0.23 
 
 
 
Figure 4.16. Multipath nominal error model with an integration time of 20 ms. 
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Figure 4.17. Multipath nominal error model with an integration time of 100 ms. 
4.3.6.6. Conclusions and scope of the multipath model 
The nominal error model shown in Figure 4.16 and Figure 4.17 describes the pseudorange errors due 
to multipath rays that are always present and disturb constantly the reception of the useful signal. The 
nominal model does not include NLOS multipath with large delays that occur only at specific times. 
For this reason, the magnitude of     is of the order of tens of centimetres. Indeed, the significant 
phase shift of high power NLOS multipath made the tracking loops to lose track, eliminating these 
samples from the model calculation.  
Representative scenarios and receiver configurations of electronic toll collection systems in urban 
environments have been simulated to derive the multipath nominal error model. Nevertheless, the 
model may vary in other scenarios or receiver configurations different from the studied case. 
4.3.7. Total pseudorange nominal measurement error model 
Recalling equation (4.14), the variance of the total pseudorange nominal error is: 
     
           
       
        
        
     
   
 
The standard deviation      has been computed for standalone, SBAS and dual frequency receivers 
(Figure 4.18 - Figure 4.21). The receiver configuration depends on the tracked signal as set in Table 
3.3. In all cases the receiver tracking loops employ a DP discriminator, a DLL with an equivalent 1-
sided bandwidth of        and a correlator with an integration time of        . The signal to 
noise ratio is fixed to           . The user is located in the south of France at the coordinates 
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
elevation (degrees)

m
p 
(m
)
 
 
L1 C/A (narrowband)
L1 C/A (wideband)
BPSK(10)
BOC(1,1)
CBOC(6,1,1/11,-)
Pseudorange Measurement Model 69 
 
 
 
                    . A modernized GNSS infrastructure is considered so that           
     . 
Standalone single-frequency receivers have the largest values of     , with a strong effect of the 
satellite elevation angle (Figure 4.18, Figure 4.19). High performance BPSK(1) and TMBOC/CBOC 
receivers provide the best results with      values between 5 and 15 meters, while BOC(1,1) signals 
offer a slightly poorer performance. Despite its robustness against noise and multipath, BPSK(10) 
receivers have the largest nominal error because of the higher ionospheric residual error at the L5/E5a 
frequency band. In general,      is higher in Galileo than in GPS because the residual error model 
obtained for NeQuick corrections predicts bigger errors at the user's location that the one for 
Klobuchar corrections. At the studied location, the difference is of 30 cm. for an elevation angle of 
90°, and up to one meter for an elevation of 5°. 
SBAS corrections significantly reduce the ionospheric errors and provide lower values of     , which 
are less sensitive to the satellite elevation angle (Figure 4.20). The SBAS corrections are assumed to 
be available and with the same performance for GPS and Galileo, and for the L1/E1 and L5/E5a 
frequency bands. The best performance, with      between 0.5 and 2 meters, is provided by 
BPSK(10) signals, followed by TMBOC and CBOC. The Wideband BPSK(1) and CBOC have an 
intermediate performance with      between 2 and 3 meters, while narrowband BPSK(1) receivers 
have values of      between 5 and 5.5 meters. 
Dual frequency L1/E1 & L5/E5a receivers eliminate the ionospheric residual error and provide a      
considerably lower than the one of standalone receivers, but higher than that obtained with SBAS 
corrections (Figure 4.21). The reason is the amplification effect that the iono-free pseudorange 
combination has on the errors due to noise and multipath, which are already large due to the low      
and the urban environment. All receivers use the same BOC(10) modulation in the L5/E5a frequency 
and only differ in the L1/E1 signals. The magnitude of the     , approximately independent from the 
satellite elevation angle, is around 2 meters with TMBOC and CBOC signals, 4.5 meters for BOC and 
wideband BPSK(1), and 12 meters for narrowband BPSK(1). 
An analysis of the contribution of each error source to the total pseudorange nominal error helps to 
understand the different performances of standalone, SBAS and dual-frequency receivers (Figure 4.22 
- Figure 4.24). The total pseudorange error in single-frequency standalone receivers is largely 
dominated by the ionosphere (Figure 4.22). Therefore, when it is reduced with SBAS corrections or 
eliminated with dual frequency measurements, the total error is significantly reduced (Figure 4.23). 
The second most important contribution is the error due to thermal noise, which is even larger than the 
ionospheric residual error when SBAS corrections are applied, in part because of the low     . For 
that reason, the noise amplification makes the dual-frequency pseudorange error larger than that of 
SBAS single-frequency receivers(Figure 4.24). SBAS corrections in dual-frequency receivers would 
only mitigate the effect of satellite clock and ephemeris errors, decreasing           from 0.85 to 0.3 
meters, so the improvement is practically insignificant. 
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Figure 4.18. Nominal pseudorange measurement error model σPSR of single frequency, standalone GPS 
receivers. 
 
Figure 4.19. Nominal pseudorange measurement error model σPSR of single frequency, standalone  Galileo 
receivers. 
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Figure 4.20. Nominal pseudorange measurement error model σPSR of single frequency GPS and Galileo 
receivers with SBAS corrections. 
 
Figure 4.21. Nominal pseudorange measurement error model σPSR of dual frequency GPS and Galileo receivers. 
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Figure 4.22. Contribution of the error sources to the total nominal pseudorange measurement error model σ2PSR. 
Example of a single frequency L1 BOC(1,1)  receiver. 
 
Figure 4.23. Contribution of the error sources to the total nominal pseudorange measurement error model σ2PSR. 
Example of a single frequency L1 BOC(1,1)  receiver with SBAS corrections. 
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Figure 4.24. Contribution of the error sources to the total nominal pseudorange measurement error model σ2PSR. 
Example of a dual frequency receiver with L1/E1 BOC(1,1) and L5/E5a BPSK(10) signals. 
 
4.3.8. Nominal model of the external altitude information 
3D positioning can be aided by altitude information provided by external sensors such as barometers 
or digital maps supports. Nominal errors of this external altitude information are modeled by a zero-
mean normal distribution characterized by its variance     
 . This assures their integration with GNSS 
signals in RAIM algorithms that require Gaussian range measurement errors. 
Once the user is assured to be within a given area, its altitude information can be obtained from a 
digital map. If the user's altitude is uniformly distributed between the minimum and maximum altitude 
values in the zone, the error is uniformly distributed between                and the standard 
deviation of the overbounding Gaussian function is (Appendix B): 
                 (4.71) 
 
Four different values of      are considered in order to cover the use of different sensors with different 
performances: 
                      (4.72) 
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4.4. Fault Model 
The fault model characterizes the errors not included in the nominal case. Pseudorange faults are 
modelled as a bias added to the nominal error: 
                  
 
 (4.73) 
 
Faults may have different origins: a satellite clock malfunction, high power and large NLOS 
multipath, large and punctual ionospheric delays (due to magnetic storms, for instance), etc. One of 
the key properties of the fault model used in RAIM design is the probability of occurrence of the 
failures. Unfortunately, the only failure sufficiently characterized for integrity applications is the GPS 
major service failure (MSF). This characterization is assumed to be also applicable to Galileo. For this 
reason, the fault model will consider only pseudorange failures due to major service failures. This 
choice requires GNSS receivers to have robust protection mechanisms against other failures like 
NLOS multipath. 
A major service failure is defined to occur whenever a healthy SPS SIS's instantaneous URE exceeds 
the SIS URE not-to-exceed (NTE) tolerance without a timely alert (alarm or warning) being provided 
[DoD, 2008]. The NTE tolerance is defined to be       times the upper bound of the currently 
transmitted URA. A previous version of standard limits the MSF to be higher than 30 metres [DoD, 
2001]: 
                            (4.74) 
 
The SPS SIS integrity standard specifies the maximum probability of MSF per hour: 
         
                 (4.75) 
 
This probability assumes that an MSF was not present at the start of the hour. When an MSF occurs, 
the GNSS will detect and alert it with a worst case delay of 6 hours. Nevertheless, realistic maximum 
alert delays are around 1 hour, and are expected to improve in the future [Martineau, 2008]. Therefore, 
the probability that a satellite has an MSF at a given instant is the probability that the MSF had begun 
during the previous hour: 
                               
              (4.76) 
 
The probability      is small enough to neglect the probability of multiple simultaneous MSF. Thus, 
the faulty model considers only one biased pseudorange at a time: 
                    
  (4.77) 
 
The probability that a position calculated with      satellites contains a MSF is: 
                                           
                          (4.78) 
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4.5. Error Correlation Time 
As explained in sections 3.6.3 and 3.6.4, the toll charging algorithm may depend on the number of 
independent positions estimated along the user's trajectory through a road segment, where two 
positions are considered independent if they provide independent RAIM outputs. The time elapsed 
between independent positions is related to the temporal correlation of positioning errors, which in 
turn depends on the user/satellite geometry and on the magnitude and temporal correlation of 
pseudorange errors. 
Nominal pseudorange errors are modelled with an autoregressive model derived from a     order 
Markov process. With a 1-second positioning sampling period,       : 
                          (4.79) 
where: 
  : nominal pseudorange error 
          : white Gaussian noise 
    autoregressive coefficient: 
         
 
  
  (4.80) 
The term       is the normalization coefficient that makes   to have variance   . 
The nominal pseudorange error correlation time is derived analyzing each independent error source 
identified in the nominal measurement model. Their correlation time has already been defined in civil 
aviation standards [RTCA, 2006]. The following values of    are considered for urban scenarios: 
 Ionospheric residual errors: The civil aviation model is adopted (International Ionosphere 
Reference 2001), with typical values around            minutes. 
 Tropospheric residual errors: The civil aviation model is adopted, with             minutes, 
which is representative of a typical storm passing by. 
 Satellite clock and ephemeris errors: The civil aviation model is adopted, with      hours. 
Nevertheless, it can be reduced to               hour, based on the average satellite visibility. 
 Thermal noise and multipath errors: Values around              second have been obtained 
analyzing the multipath model. Additionally, a DLL bandwidth of 1 Hz indicates a thermal noise 
correlation close to 1 second. Thus, a correlation time of a few seconds can be taken. 
 
The correlation time of the total pseudorange error depends on the magnitude and the correlation time 
of each error source. In general, ionospheric errors, thermal noise and multipath are the largest error 
sources and dominate the final correlation time. Pseudorange errors in single frequency receivers 
without SBAS corrections are driven by the ionospheric one, resulting in a correlation time close to 30 
minutes. On the other hand, dual-frequency receivers present an error correlation of a few seconds, 
mainly driven by the thermal noise and multipath. The dominant error source in SBAS single 
frequency receivers depends on the signal-to-noise ratio and on the GNSS signal robustness against 
noise and multipath. Nevertheless, in civil aviation applications using SBAS, two estimated positions 
are considered to be independent when they time elapsed between them is at least 120 seconds, which 
is the period of the smoothing filter. 
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The error correlation also depends on the variations of the user/satellite geometry. The longest 
correlation time corresponds to the scenario in which the same satellites are used during the whole 
pseudorange correlation time. In that case, the correlation period of the position error can be as long as 
the pseudorange one. On the other hand, when a satellite is excluded from or included within the 
position estimation, it is likely to be less correlated with the previous estimate. 
Considering the time elapsed between consecutive independent positions is equal to the pseudorange 
error correlation time, single frequency users with long    dominated by the ionospheric residual delay 
are likely to have only one independent position per geo-object, while dual frequency users with 
shorter    are likely to have several positions. 
4.6. Conclusions 
The linear approximated relationship between pseudorange measurements and the navigation solution 
of equation (4.1) is used. 
The pseudorange measurement errors are divided in two components, fault-free (nominal) and faulty 
case. Nominal errors are present when all GNSS segments are working according to their 
specifications, and faults are the rest of errors not included in the nominal case. The nominal error 
model and the fault model are important because they are a key input in the design of GNSS integrity 
monitoring mechanisms and their posterior prediction of performance. 
Nominal errors are modeled by zero-mean independent normal distributions, which variance is the 
result of five independent error sources that can be analyzed separately: residual satellite clock errors 
and inaccurate ephemeris, ionospheric delay, tropospheric delay, thermal noise and multipath. A 
pseudorange error model has been obtained for each error source for different types of GNSS 
receivers. 
The faulty case only considers major service failures because they are sufficiently characterized for 
integrity applications. This assumption requires the GNSS receiver to use reliable protection 
mechanisms against other possible failures like NLOS multipath. The probability of occurrence and 
the minimum size of major service failures are defined in the GPS SPS integrity standard [DoD, 
2008]. The probability of a failure is low enough to assume that, at a given instant, only one of the 
pseudoranges used to estimate a position may be affected by major service failure. 
The temporal correlation of nominal errors has been studied. Pseudorange errors in single frequency 
receivers are dominated driven by the ionospheric error and have long correlation times, close to 30 
minutes. On the other hand, dual-frequency receivers present an error correlation of a few seconds, 
mainly driven by the thermal noise and multipath. Civil aviation applications using SBAS take a 
temporal correlation of 120 seconds, which is the period of the smoothing filter. 
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Chapter 5  Integrity requirements of GNSS-based Electronic Toll Collection Systems 
5.1. Introduction 
GNSS-based ETC systems periodically charge users an amount equal to the sum of the price 
associated to the route segments in which the user has been detected during the invoice period. 
Different failures in the toll system may cause charging errors, which are classified as overcharging 
when a user is levied a higher charge than the real one, and as undercharging when a user is levied a 
lower charge than the real one. 
ETC requirements are set to bound the impact of over- and undercharging errors. These specifications 
are usually defined either at service level, for example as the required invoice accuracy, or at geo-
object level. In this thesis, the maximum allowable probabilities of missed geo-object recognition 
        and of false geo-object recognition         are proposed. 
In order to meet the ETC specifications, GNSS positioning integrity is monitored with RAIM 
algorithms which design parameters, i.e. the maximum allowed probabilities of missed detection 
      and false alert      , are derived from the geo-object recognition requirements. 
First, some examples of ETC requirements and measured performances are presented. Second, the 
relationship between the requirements at service and geo-object levels is obtained and, finally, the 
RAIM parameters are derived. 
5.2. Examples of ETC requirements and performance 
The Ducth ABvM project specified the ETC requirements at service level, indicating that "the 
requirement set for the registration unit is that the amount, corresponding to the distances recorded 
over a one-month period, may not deviate by more than 1% from a ‘perfect’ measurement in 99% of 
cases" [ARS, 2006]. 
A similar requirement type is proposed by Expert Group 9 supporting the European Commission on 
the work of the Directive 2004/52/EC when specifies that the measurement device "should be certified 
to provide distance measurement accurate to within 2%" [EG9, 2006]. 
The Expert Group 9 report also expresses requirements for ETC tests directly at the geo-object level, 
indicating that "it is necessary to define a specific set of test conditions in which test geo-objects are 
guaranteed to be successfully recognized with a success rate of at least 99.99 %. False recognition of 
a geo-object should be less than 1 in 610 " [EG9, 2006]. 
78 Chapter 5 
 
 
The operators of current GPS-based ETC systems offer performance statistics. For instance, Toll 
Collect, operator of the ETC deployed in German highways, affirms that the overall toll detection rate 
remains at 99.75 % [Toll Collect, 2011 (a)]. Sky Toll, operator of the ETC deployed in Slovak 
highways and certain national roads, confirms a toll collection efficiency of 98.99% [SkyToll, 2011 
(b)]. These detection rates include undercharging cases because of different causes, not only due to 
GNSS positioning failures or unavailability (for example, vehicles that circulate through the network 
without the OBU, etc.). 
The number of claims is an important parameter which is also monitored by ETC operators. For 
instance, Sky Toll affirms that the claim rate (not necessarily due to an incorrect toll computation) of 
users with at least one toll transaction during June of 2011 was 0.25%, and 0.05% considering only 
claims judged as justified by the company [SkyToll, 2011 (a)]. 
5.3. Geo-object recognition requirements 
A missed road segment (or geo-object) recognition occurs whenever the toll system does not charge a 
user the price of a road segment he has actually used. 
A false road segment (or geo-object) recognition occurs whenever the toll system charges a user a the 
price of a road segment he has not used. 
The geo-object requirements are the maximum allowable rates of missed geo-object recognition 
        and false geo-object recognition        . Before selecting an appropriate value of these 
parameters, the relationship between them and the accuracy of the invoice periodically calculated by 
the toll system operator is presented. 
5.3.1. Relationship between invoice accuracy and geo-object 
requirements 
The requirements expressed as invoice accuracy or as false and missed geo-object recognition 
probabilities are interrelated. Indeed, the invoice error depends on the price of the incorrectly 
recognized segments (missed or false recognitions) during the invoice period. 
Let us consider a service level specification that requires a minimum percentage    of the total 
invoices processed by the toll system to have an error equal to or lower than     of the real charge. 
Assuming that each segment has the same price and considering the worst case in which no missed 
recognitions compensate the false ones or vice versa, the invoice error can be expressed as the number 
of incorrect geo-object recognitions present in the invoice. Although the invoice error of real systems 
will depend on the price of each road segment, this approach allows to obtain a good analytical 
approximation. 
5.3.1.1. Undercharging 
The undercharging requirement at geo-object level is given by the maximum allowable probability of 
missed geo-object recognition        . If missed segment recognitions are independent events that 
occur with a constant probability equal to      , the probability that there are   missed geo-object 
recognitions         during the invoice period is: 
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      (5.1) 
where     is the real number of road segments the user has driven trough during the invoice period. 
 
Assuming all road segments have the same fee, an invoice has an undercharging error equal to or 
lower than     of the correct bill if the number of missed geo-object recognitions in the invoice 
computation does not exceed         : 
                       (5.2) 
where the operator     is the highest integer lower than  . 
 
At least    of the invoices must meet the accuracy requirement. That is, the undercharging error of 
any invoice must not exceed    with a probability equal to or higher than   : 
                                
        
   
 
 
   
 (5.3) 
where             is given in eq.(5.1). 
 
Introducing the expressions (5.1) and (5.2) in equation (5.3), the maximum allowable probability of 
missed geo-object recognition       can be related to the ETC high-level requirements        and 
the real number of geo-objects the user has driven through during the invoice period      . 
        
 
         
           
       
            
   
 
 
   
 (5.4) 
 
The required       is a function of     and the invoice accuracy specifications (Figure 5.1). The 
required       decreases as the number of used geo-objects     augments, until     is sufficiently 
high to increase the number of allowed missed geo-object recognitions          in one. At that 
point the required       is significantly relaxed (increased) with respect to lower    . 
Given the invoice accuracy specifications       , the worst case, i.e. the lowest      , occurs when 
the user has driven through                geo-objects during the period for which the invoice 
is computed. This is the maximum number of geo-objects for which a single missed recognition would 
cause an undercharging error higher than    , so in this case           . The       that still 
meets the invoice accuracy specifications in the worst case is obtained setting               , 
and therefore                        , in eq.(5.4): 
          
 
   
 
 
          
 (5.5) 
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Table 5.1 contains the worst case values of       for various invoice high-level requirements. These 
values correspond to the most demanding cases; a different     would result in less restrictive 
(higher)       for the same invoice accuracy specifications. 
 
Table 5.1. Maximum probability of missed geo-object recognition (PMGoR) for different invoice requirements in 
the worst case. 
 
Maximum invoice error       
1 % 
         
0.1 % 
          
0.01 % 
           
Percentage of invoices 
meeting the maximum 
error requirement 
     
99 %                
99.9 %                
99.9 %                
 
 
Figure 5.1. Probability of missed geo-object recognition needed for different invoice requirements. 
5.3.1.2. Overcharging 
The overcharging requirement at geo-object level is given by the maximum allowable probability of 
false geo-object recognition        . If false segment recognitions are independent events that occur 
with a constant probability equal to      , the probability of making   false geo-object recognitions 
        during the invoice period is: 
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where        is the number of potentially false geo-object recognitions during the invoice period, that 
is, the number of road segments that, although the user has not driven trough them, are susceptible to 
be incorrectly recognized with a probability      . 
 
Assuming all road segments have the same charge, an invoice has an overcharging error equal to or 
lower than     of the correct bill if the number of false geo-object recognitions in the invoice 
computation does not exceed         : 
                       (5.7) 
where     is the total number of geo-objects driven by the user during the invoice period. 
 
Since the overcharging error of any invoice must be below     with a probability equal to or higher 
than   : 
                                
        
   
 
 
   
 (5.8) 
where             is given in eq.(5.6). 
Introducing the expressions (5.6) and (5.7) in eq.(5.8), the maximum allowable probability of false 
geo-object recognition         that meets the invoice requirements        can be related to the 
number potential false geo-object recognitions          and the number of geo-objects really used 
      during the invoice period: 
           
 
         
           
          
            
   
 
 
   
 (5.9) 
 
Figure 5.2 shows the required       as a function of            and          (note that          
is a function of     and the invoice percentage error    , given in eq. (5.7)). Being    and 
         fixed, the required       becomes more stringent (decreases) as the number of geo-objects 
susceptible to be false recognized          increases.  
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Figure 5.2. Probability of false geo-object recognition needed for different invoice requirements.  
 
Given the invoice accuracy specifications   and   , the worst case, i.e. the lowest      , for any 
       occurs when           . This happens when the number of geo-objects really used       
is so low that a single false geo-object recognition would cause an overcharging error greater than    
% of the real invoice for that user. Introducing  
                        into eq.(5.9), the worst case       results: 
          
 
   
 
 
      
 (5.10) 
 
As opposed to the undercharging case, there is no lower bound in the required      , which is a 
monotonically decreasing function of       . 
The reason is that in the undercharging case, the maximum allowed number of missed segments 
           and the probability of having a certain number of missed segments in the invoice 
            depend on the total number of route segments used      . The higher    , the higher 
the probability of having more missed segments. Nevertheless, the fee that should be really charged to 
a vehicle for using the road infrastructure during a given period increases with the number of geo-
objects he has used,    . Consequently, the number of allowed missed geo-objects          that 
reaches a specific undercharging percentage of the real invoice charge also increases with    . Both 
effects compensate each other, providing the       lower bound of eq.(5.5). 
In the overcharging case, the probability of having a certain number of false segment recognitions in 
the invoice             increases with the number of segments susceptible to be overcharged 
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         , while the maximum allowed number of false segment recognitions            depends 
on the total number of used segments      . Therefore,           and          are independent 
from each other. For example, in the case of a user that has not driven through the tolled road network 
at all, a single false geo-object recognition would exceed the allowable invoice error, regardless the 
number of segments susceptible to be overcharged. And clearly, the higher is this number, the lower is 
the       needed to avoid false recognitions. 
Consequently, if an invoice percentage error must be assured, the number of segments likely to be 
overcharged must be limited. Another option is to express the overcharging requirement as the 
probability of false geo-object recognition, knowing that its performance depends on the number of 
potentially false geo-object recognitions          . 
5.3.2. Conclusions and proposition of geo-object level 
requirements 
The maximum allowable probabilities of missed and false geo-object recognition have been derived 
assuming that all geo-objects in the road network have the same fee and the same probability of being 
missed or false recognized. Furthermore, the fact of missing or false detecting a geo-object is assumed 
to be an independent event. ETC systems need to be adapted to the road network characteristics and 
therefore these assumptions may not be exactly held. For example, a GPS satellite may be affected by 
a major service failure during several hours before it is repaired or warned, introducing some 
correlation in the probability of erroneous geo-object recognition to users employing the signals from 
that satellite during the failure period. Nevertheless, the methodology presented in section 5.3.1 to 
relate the invoice accuracy specifications with the geo-object requirements can be adapted to any 
particular road topology, and equations (5.5) and (5.10) still provide a good analytical approximation 
of the geo-object requirements of real systems. 
In this work a missed geo-object recognition probability of      is proposed: 
         
   (5.11) 
It corresponds to the value given in [EG9, 2006]. The requirement is more severe than the toll 
collection efficiency rates reported by operating GPS-based ETC systems, which are between 98.99% 
and 99.75% [Toll Collect, 2011 (a)], [SkyToll, 2011 (b)], although these rates also include road 
segments missed due to non-technical reasons. Moreover, under the conditions of equation (5.5), a 
missed geo-object probability of      assures that the undercharging error of at least       of all 
invoices processed by the toll system do not exceed       of the real charge, regardless the 
number of road segments crossed by the user. The same invoice accuracy specification       and 
      is given in [ARS, 2006]. 
As in [EG9, 2006], the proposed false geo-object recognition rate is     : 
         
   (5.12) 
For example, under the assumptions of equation (5.10), a false geo-object probability of      assures 
that       of all the invoices processed by the toll system will not have a single false geo-object 
detection, if the number of geo-objects likely to be false recognized of a user during the invoice period 
does not exceed             . 
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5.4. GNSS integrity requirements 
A snapshot RAIM algorithm performing only Fault Detection (FD) functions is assumed (no fault 
identification and exclusion capabilities are taken into account). The alert is raised when there is a 
fault detection because the RAIM is a snapshot algorithm. The general diagram of FDE events of 
Figure 2.3 is simplified for this type of RAIM as depicted in Figure 5.3. The probability of missed 
alert is equal to the probability of missed detection and will be denoted    , and the probability of 
false alarm is equal to the probability of false detection and will be denoted    . 
 
Figure 5.3. Diagram of events for snapshot fault detection RAIM algorithms. 
 
This section derives the GNSS integrity requirements needed to meet the geo-object requirements, that 
is, the values of the     and     that meet the missed and false geo-object recognition specifications. 
The RAIM is assumed to monitor integrity with constant values of     and    , as it does in civil 
aviation. 
The relationship between geo-object               and RAIM           requirements depends on 
the geo-object recognition algorithm. The recognition rule of eq.(3.6) is followed: a road segment is 
charged to a user if the number of independent valid positions inside the geo-object is equal to or 
higher than a threshold:  
                                          
 
The GNSS integrity specifications depend therefore on the minimum number of positions required to 
decide the user has been inside the geo-object      , the number of independent positions estimated 
during the user trajectory through the road segment (or nearby in the overcharging case), and on how 
many of them are affected by a positioning error exceeding the alert limit.  
Positioning 
failure 
Valid 
position 
 Missed detection 
 Missed alarm 
 False detection 
 False alarm 
 No detection 
 Normal operation 
 Detection 
 (True) alarm 
Fault detection No fault detection 
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The number of independent estimated positions per segment depends on several factors such as the 
segment length, the time spent by the user inside it (or nearby in the overcharging case) and the 
correlation time of position errors. 
5.4.1. Definitions 
This subsection presents the main concepts and events involved in the relationship between the RAIM 
parameters (    and    ) and the geo-object missed and false recognition specifications (      and 
     ). 
Geo-object Recognition Process: it is the process followed to decide whether a user has been or not 
inside a road segment. It comprises the selection of the valid estimated positions for ETC and the geo-
object recognition algorithm. 
Detectable Failure     : detectable failures are the failures the RAIM has been designed to detect. 
For example, Weighted Least Squares Residuals (WLSR) RAIM algorithms are designed to detect 
pseudorange failures, and not other failures like receiver hardware or software errors that may cause as 
well the a positioning error. 
Undetectable Failure     : failures the RAIM has not been designed to detect but contribute to an 
erroneous geo-object recognition. Nevertheless, a RAIM may detect a failure it has not been designed 
to detect, without guaranteeing the     is respected. 
Pseudorange Failure       : pseudorange failures are pseudorange measurement errors not 
considered in the nominal case, and consequently not included in the nominal measurement model. In 
this work, pseudorange failures are assumed to be caused only by major service failures. 
Positioning Failure (PF): a PF occurs whenever the difference between the estimated and the true 
positions exceeds the alert limit. Since this work focuses in road applications, only the horizontal 
positioning failure will be studied: 
                     (5.13) 
Valid Position           : an estimated horizontal position    is declared valid for ETC purposes 
whenever the RAIM is available and has not detected a failure: 
                                 (5.14) 
An estimated position may not be declared valid because of different reasons: it is not possible to 
monitor its integrity (due to insufficient number of visible satellites, for instance), RAIM 
unavailability               , or a failure detected by the RAIM. 
Undetected Positioning Failure (UPF): undetected positioning failures are those estimated positions 
that contain a positioning failure but are declared valid by the RAIM: 
                            (5.15) 
Geo-object Misleading Position (GoMP): geo-object misleading positions are those estimated 
positions, declared valid by the RAIM, that are in a different side of the geo-object boundaries than the 
true position (that is, a valid estimated position outside the geo-object when the user is inside it, and 
vice versa): 
              
                                                                 
                                                                 
  (5.16) 
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As opposed to the civil aviation case, not all Undetected Positioning Failures (UPF) occurred in 
GNSS-based toll systems have negative consequences. Only those UPF constituting a Geo-object 
Misleading Position (GoMP) may cause a geo-object recognition error (Figure 5.4). 
 
 
Figure 5.4. Examples of Undetected Positioning Failures (UPF) and Geo-object Misleading Positions (GoMP). 
5.4.2. Failure tree of geo-object misleading positions (GoMP) 
Geo-object Misleading Positions (GoMP) are those estimated positions, declared valid for its use in 
ETC by the RAIM, that contain positioning failures which contribute to geo-object recognition errors. 
Various failures at different stages and components of the geo-object recognition process can lead to a 
GoMP (Figure 5.6). They can be divided in three groups: 
1) Pseudorange failures       . In this thesis they are caused by major service failures. 
2) Positioning failures not caused by a pseudorange failure            . For example, positioning 
failures caused by receiver hardware or processing errors. 
3) Failures that generate a GoMP, but not a positioning failure             . For example, an error 
in the geo-object boundaries database can make the segment detection algorithm to consider an 
estimated position to be outside the geo-object when the user is inside, or vice versa, even if the 
positioning error does not exceed the alert limit. 
The probability of occurrence of each of these failures is known or can be set as a specification the 
GNSS receiver and the associated algorithm implementations must meet. A failure tree is used to 
derive, from these known probabilities, the probability of occurrence of Geo-object Misleading 
Positions (GoMP). 
Tolled 
Road 
Free 
Road 
HAL 
   
   
   
HAL       
   
HAL 
   
   
   
HAL    
   
   
geo-object 
HMI 
Undetected Positioning Failures (UPF) that 
are not Geo-object Misleading Positions 
(GoMP) 
Geo-object Misleading Positions 
(GoMP) 
Integrity Requirements of GNSS-based Electronic Toll Collection Systems 87 
 
 
 
a) Undetected Positioning Failures caused by a Pseudorange Failure  
Integrity monitoring techniques like WLSR RAIM algorithms are designed to protect only against 
pseudorange failures. Assuming pseudorange failures        are caused by major service failures, 
they are sufficiently large to cause a positioning error exceeding the alert limit (HAL). Therefore, in 
this work pseudorange failures always generate a positioning failure: 
                     (5.17) 
where       stands for Positioning Failure caused by a Pseudorange Failure. 
Whenever a Positioning Failure caused by a Pseudorange Failure         occurs, the RAIM algorithm 
does not detect it with a probability lower than the probability of missed detection      : 
                         (5.18) 
where        stands for Undetected Positioning Failure caused by a Pseudorange Failure. 
Introducing eq.(5.17) into (5.18): 
                        (5.19) 
 
b) Undetected Positioning Failures not caused by a Pseudorange Failure             
GNSS receivers and RAIM implementations may suffer from other failures different than pseudorange 
ones, like hardware or software errors, that lead to positioning failures            . RAIM algorithms 
are not designed to detect these failures because their origin is not a pseudorange failure. 
Consequently, neglecting the effect of RAIM false alerts, whenever these failures occur, they become 
undetected positioning errors: 
                               (5.20) 
where        stands for Undetected Positioning Failure caused by any Failure different than a 
Pseudorange Failure. 
 
c) Geo-object Misleading Positions (GoMP) caused by Positioning Failures 
As explained in section 5.4.1 and Figure 5.4, only those Undetected Positioning Failures (UPF), 
originated by a pseudorange failure or not, in which the estimated position is outside the geo-object 
when the user is inside it, or vice versa, are Geo-object Misleading Positions (GoMP) and contribute to 
road segment recognition errors. 
The probability that an     becomes a      depends on the magnitude and direction of the 
positioning error, and on the user position with respect to the geo-object boundaries. The worst case is 
taken, in which every undetected positioning failure, caused by a pseudorange failure or not, generates 
a     : 
                   (5.21) 
The probability of a geo-object misleading position given a pseudorange failure is obtained combining 
equations (5.19) and (5.21): 
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                      (5.22) 
 
The probability of a geo-object misleading position given a positioning failure not originated by a 
pseudorange failure is obtained combining equations (5.20) and (5.21): 
                         (5.23) 
 
d) Geo-object Misleading Position not caused by a Positioning Failure              
Some failures, like erroneous geo-object boundaries, may generate a GoMP without causing a 
positioning failure          . The occurrence of these failures cannot be detected with RAIM 
algorithms:  
                       (5.24) 
 
e) Summary 
RAIM algorithms are designed to detect positioning failures caused by pseudorange failures. Taking 
the worst case in which any undetected positioning failure is a geo-object misleading position 
(GoMP), the probability that a pseudorange failure        generates a GoMP is lower than the 
RAIM's probability of missed detection      , as given in eq.(5.22). In this thesis, the probability of a 
pseudorange failure is the probability of a major service failure, which is given in [DoD, 2008]. 
The two remaining failure categories, i.e. positioning failures not caused by pseudorange failures 
            and failures that generate a GoMP without causing a positioning failure          , are 
not detectable by RAIM algorithms. Therefore, these failures always generate a GoMP, as shown in 
equations (5.23) and (5.24). These failures can be described jointly as failures undetectable by the 
RAIM     : 
                  (5.25) 
 
The probability of the failures causing GoMP are known or set as requirements. Particularly, 
pseudorange failures are assumed to occur with the known probability of major service failures, and 
the maximum allowable probability of failures undetectable by the RAIM are set as an specification of 
the ETC system equipment. 
Integrity Requirements of GNSS-based Electronic Toll Collection Systems 89 
 
 
 
Figure 5.5. Failures that lead to a Geo-object Misleading Position (GoMP). 
 
5.4.3. Scenario description 
The probability of missing or incorrectly charging a geo-object depends on the number of geo-object 
misleading positions (GoMP) present in the geo-object recognition process. This section characterizes 
the presence of GoMP caused by pseudorange failures, the only ones the RAIM is designed to detect. 
As described in the fault model used in this thesis (section 4.4), pseudorange failures are assumed to 
be caused by Major Service Failures (MSF). Major service failures only appear at specific instants but, 
once they occur, they remain during a period of time until the GNSS broadcasts the corresponding 
warning flag. Although this period can last up to six hours [DoD, 2008], a period of one hour is taken, 
which is a reasonable assumption for modernized GPS and Galileo. The probability of simultaneous 
major service failures is neglected. 
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For this reason, two scenarios are considered: 
 Nominal scenario: nominal pseudorange measurements. 
In this case, any of the satellites used to estimate the user trajectory along the road 
segment is affected by a major service failure. However, there may be Geo-object 
Misleading Positions (GoMP) caused by other failures the RAIM is not designed to 
detect. 
 Faulty scenario: faulty pseudorange measurement. 
In this case, all positions involved in the geo-object recognition process have been 
estimated with one faulty pseudorange due to a major service failure present during the 
whole user trajectory along the road segment. Consequently, any RAIM missed detection 
results in a Geo-object Misleading Position (GoMP). 
A possible third scenario would occur whenever a major service failure appears or disappears while 
the user is crossing the road segment. In this case, only a portion of the estimated positions involved in 
the geo-object recognition process are affected by a pseudorange failure. This scenario will be 
simplified to the worst case as the faulty pseudorange measurement scenario. 
The probability of the faulty scenario                   , that is, the probability that all positions used 
in the geo-object recognition process are affected by a major service failure, is bounded by the 
probability that a major service failure is set in the period of time beginning one hour before the 
moment the user enters the geo-object, and finishing at the instant the user leaves it. Neglecting 
simultaneous failures and following a similar method as in eq.(4.78): 
                                                    
   (5.26) 
where: 
     is the duration of the user trajectory along the geo-object (in hours) 
                         is the probability of major service failure per satellite per hour [DoD, 
2008] 
Equation (5.26) is an upper bound of the faulty scenario probability that also includes the case in 
which a major service failure appears or disappears while the user moves along the road segment.  
In order to set a value of                 , a 6-minute trajectory is proposed. This is the trajectory 
duration corresponding to a user moving at a constant speed of 50 km/h trough a 5 km-long geo-
object. Note that this is a pessimistic approximation because road segments in urban environments are 
expected to be shorter. The average number of visible satellites in urban environment using jointly 
GPS and Galileo constellations, obtained via simulations, is        . The satellite visibility 
simulation is completely described and analyzed in section 7.3. Introducing                and 
        in eq.(5.26), the faulty scenario probability used hereafter is: 
                               
             (5.27) 
 
The probability of the nominal scenario is: 
                                               
   (5.28) 
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The calculated                  is the rate of segment recognition processes affected by a major service 
from the total number of processes managed by the toll system. Nevertheless, it is important to remark 
that for a specific user that travels trough or near several consecutive segments, the probability that the 
recognition process of a given segment is disturbed by a major service failure is correlated with the 
fact that the failure was already present in previous segments or not, since they may remain up to one 
hour.  
5.4.4. Probability of missed detection (PMD) and probability of 
false alarm (PFA) 
This section presents the method followed to derive the RAIM specifications (    and    ) that meet 
the high level toll requirements, i.e. the maximum rate of missed geo-object recognition       
     and the maximum rate of false geo-object recognition         
  . 
With this purpose, the road segment overcharging (false geo-object recognition) and undercharging 
(missed geo-object) cases are analyzed in the nominal and faulty scenarios. 
5.4.4.1. False geo-object recognition (Road segment overcharging) 
This section analyzes the case of a user moving outside a road segment, but close enough to it so 
faulty estimated positions may be inside the geo-object. These positioning failures lying inside the 
geo-object become geo-object misleading positions (GoMP) if the RAIM does not detect them, 
contributing in that case to the false geo-object recognition, i.e. incorrectly charging the road segment. 
Two events result in a false geo-object recognition. The first one is a number of GoMP         equal 
to or higher than    , the minimum number of positions inside the geo-object required to decide the 
user has been inside the road segment, defined in the geo-object recognition algorithm of eq.(3.6). If 
the number of valid positions is lower than    , the geo-object recognition algorithm is not available 
and the probability of false segment recognition due to misleading positions is zero. The second event 
are those failures that directly overcharge a segment              , regardless the positioning 
information. Examples of these failures are implementation errors in the geo-object recognition 
algorithm. 
The maximum allowed probability of false geo-object recognition         must be divided between 
the two events that originate it (Figure 5.6): 
         
                                (5.29) 
where: 
                 is the maximum allowed probability that the geo-object recognition process suffers 
a failure that directly causes the segment overcharging               
              is the maximum allowed probability that a segment is overcharged due to an 
excessive number of GoMP: 
                            (5.30) 
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Figure 5.6. Events that lead to a false geo-object recognition. 
The following allocation of       between                 and              is proposed: 
                     
   (5.31) 
                  
   (5.32) 
 
The probability                     
   is set as a toll system equipment specification. 
The probability              depends on the RAIM performance and on the occurrence of the 
different failures leading to a GoMP. The following subsections apply the required  
                 
   to the segment recognition case in the nominal and faulty case.  
5.4.4.1.1. Nominal scenario (no pseudorange failures) 
In this scenario, a user moves outside a road segment in the absence of a major service failure. All 
estimated positions that may be used in the geo-object recognition algorithm are free of pseuorange 
failures, although they can be affected by other failures undetectable by the RAIM (Figure 5.7). 
Whenever a user moves outside a road segment, this scenario occurs with a probability 
                           
  . 
 
Figure 5.7. Example of scenario susceptible to false geo-object recognition without pseudorange failures. 
real trajectory Free Road 
geo-object 
HMI 
Tolled Road 
Estimated positions may be 
inside the geo-object due to 
undetectable failures 
      - estimated position with  available RAIM. 
                    
   
Failure that directly overcharges 
a segment  
False Geo-object Recognition 
         
   
                 
   
Excessive number of Geo-object 
Misleading Positions (GoMP)  
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All Geo-object Misleading Positions (GoMP) are caused by failures not detectable by the RAIM. 
Neglecting the probability of RAIM false detections, any undetectable failure automatically becomes a 
GoMP. This results in the following requirement on the number of GoMP caused by undetectable 
failures                        in the nominal scenario, i.e. with no major service failure: 
                                                
            
                 
              (5.33) 
 
The worst case of eq.(5.25) is taken, in which undetectable failures always generate a GoMP. 
Moreover, the presence of undetectable failures is independent from the scenario type, nominal or 
faulty: 
                                                                              (5.34) 
 
Hence, the toll system equipment must meet the following specification in order to fulfill the false 
geo-object recognition requirement in the nominal scenario: 
                                                
   (5.35) 
where                       is the number of independent estimated positions affected by a failure not 
detectable by the RAIM while the user moves close to a road segment. 
Let us remark that e overcharging requirement in the nominal scenario does not set any constraint to 
the RAIM parameters     and    . 
5.4.4.1.2. Faulty scenario (major service failure) 
In this scenario, a user moves outside a road segment in the presence of a major service failure. All 
estimated positions that may be used by the segment recognition algorithm are inside the geo-object 
due to pseuorange failures, so any RAIM missed detection results in a geo-object misleading position 
(Figure 5.8). Undetectable failures are not considered because all estimated positions are already 
faulty. Whenever a user moves outside a road segment, this scenario occurs with a probability 
                        
  . 
The RAIM is able to detect a pseudorange failure with a probability         . As shown in 
eq.(5.22), any undetected failure becomes a Geo-object Misleading Position (GoMP). Therefore, with 
a constant probability of missed detection      , the number of GoMP              , caused in this 
case by pseudorange failures, in the faulty scenario must meet: 
                                      
     
 
     
         
        (5.36) 
where       is the number of independent positions with available RAIM that are inside the geo-
object due to a pseudorange failure. In the faulty scenario,       is equal to the total number of 
independent positions estimated with available RAIM while the user moves close the road segment. 
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Figure 5.8. Example of scenario susceptible to false geo-object recognition affected by a major service failure. 
 
The probability that the number of geo-object misleading positions               is equal to or higher 
than the threshold    , consequently overcharging the road segment, is: 
                                         
                                         
     
   
 (5.37) 
Figure 5.9 shows the probability of false geo-object recognition due to GoMP in the faulty scenario of 
eq.(5.37) with       
   as a function of the number of pseudorange failures         for various 
values of    . The error probability increases with       and decreases with higher     or lower 
   . 
Expression (5.37) must meet the required probablity of false geo-object recognition             : 
                                      
            
                
 
      
         
          
  (5.38) 
 
The     is derived from eq.(5.38) as a function of     and the number of pseudorange failures 
       , which in this case is the total number of independent positions (Figure 5.10). The     
becomes more stringent (lower) as      , the number of positions estimated along the road segment, 
grows. Increasing     relaxes (increments)    . 
 
real trajectory Free Road 
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HMI 
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 All estimated positions are inside the geo-object due to a 
pseudorange failure (major service failure) 
 Any estimated position becomes a GoMP if the RAIM does 
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      - estimated position with  available RAIM. 
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Figure 5.9. Probability of false recognized geo-object due to positioning failures caused by pseudorange failures 
with PMD=10
-3 in the presence of a major service failure. 
 
Figure 5.10. Maximum allowable probability of missed detection PMD that meets the false geo-object 
recognition requirement p{ NGoMP (PSR) ≥ NTh | Faulty Scenario} ≤ 3.8∙10
-3. 
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The threshold     is a design parameter of the recognition algorithm, but      depends on the 
duration of the user trajectory near the road segment and on the RAIM availability, which in turn is a 
function of the geometry between the satellites and the user. In this work the worst case is taken, in 
which RAIM is always available so       counts for each independent position.  
Let us take 5 km as the maximum road segment length expected in rural or urban environments; the 
trajectory duration of a user moving at a constant speed of      km/h parallel to the geo-object is 
                           seconds. Assuming two positions are independent when the time 
elapsed between them is at least      seconds, and that the RAIM always available, the maximum 
number of independent positions per segment is               . 
Table 5.2 shows the maximum allowable probability of missed detection     required to meet the 
probability of false geo-object recognition          
    with various thresholds of the geo-object 
recognition algorithm       and          independent position samples involved in the geo-object 
recognition process. 
 
Table 5.2. Probability of missed detection PMD that meets the overcharging requirement in the worst-case 
scenario. 
    1 2 3 4 5 
                   
                              
 
Let us remark that the decision of the RAIM fault detection algorithm with two different position 
estimates contaminated by the same a major service failure is likely to be highly correlated. 
Nevertheless, it can be uncorrelated by variations of the nominal errors and the satellite/user geometry. 
Since the number of independent positions estimated with the same faulty satellite         is likely to 
be low, the     of Table 5.2 calculated with          can be taken as a worst case. 
It is observed that the overcharging requirement in the faulty scenario is a constraint for the    , but 
not for the    . 
5.4.4.2. Missed geo-object recognition (road segment undercharging) 
This section analyzes the case of a user moving inside a road segment. Those independent positions 
lying outside the geo-object become Geo-object Misleading Positions (GoMP) if the RAIM does not 
detect the positioning failure, contributing to the missed geo-object recognition, i.e. not charging the 
road segment. 
Two events result in a missed geo-object recognition. The first one is a number of positions, 
independent and declared valid by the RAIM, inside the geo-object                 lower than the 
threshold     defined in the geo-object recognition algorithm of eq.(3.6). The second event are those 
failures that directly miss a segment               , regardless the positioning information. Examples 
of these failures are implementation errors in the geo-object recognition algorithm. 
 
The maximum allowed probability of missed geo-object recognition         must be divided between 
the two events that lead to a segment undercharging (Figure 5.11): 
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                                            (5.39) 
where: 
                 is the maximum allowed probability that the geo-object recognition 
process suffers a failure that directly causes the segment undercharging                
                      is the maximum allowed probability that a geo-object is missed due to 
an insufficient number of independent and valid positions inside it: 
                                            (5.40) 
 
The following allocation of       between                 and                      is proposed (Figure 
5.11): 
                     
   (5.41) 
                          
   (5.42) 
 
 
Figure 5.11. Failure tree that leads to a missed geo-object recognition. 
 
The probability                     
   is set as a toll system equipment specification. 
Several reasons may lead to a missed road segment due to an insufficient number of independent and 
valid positions inside the geo-object                    . These causes include RAIM fault 
detections, periods of RAIM unavailability, and the difficulty of estimating multiple independent 
positions in the case of insufficient satellite visibility, short road segments or long error correlation 
times. The following subsections apply the required                          
   in the nominal and 
faulty scenarios. 
5.4.4.2.1. Nominal scenario (no pseudorange failure) 
In this scenario, a user moves inside a road segment in the absence of a major service failure. All 
estimated positions that may be used in the geo-object recognition algorithm are free of pseuorange 
failures, although they can be affected by other failures undetectable by the RAIM (Figure 5.12). 
                    
   
Failure that directly undercharges a road 
segment  
Missed Geo-object 
Recognition 
         
   
                         
   
Insufficient number of independent and 
valid positions inside the geo-object  
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Whenever a user moves inside a road segment, this scenario occurs with a probability 
                           
  . 
 
 
Figure 5.12. Example of scenario susceptible to missed geo-object recognition without pseudorange failures. 
 
The total number of independent positions with available RAIM can be divided in faulty and fault free 
positions: 
             (5.43) 
where: 
     is the total number of positions, independent and with available RAIM, estimated during the 
user trajectory along the road segment. 
     is the number of positions affected by a failure. In the nominal scenario, failures are not 
detectable by the RAIM because they are not pseudorange failures. All of these estimated 
positions are outside the geo-object. 
     is the number of fault-free positions, disturbed only by nominal errors. All of these estimated 
positions are inside the geo-object. 
Faulty positions do not contribute to a correct segment recognition because they are outside the geo-
object boundaries. The number of independent and valid positions inside the geo-object                 
is the number of fault-free positions for which the RAIM has not detected a failure (i.e. false 
detection). Assuming a constant probability of false alarm    : 
                                        
   
 
     
             
  (5.44) 
 
The probability that               is lower than the minimum threshold     to charge the road segment 
is: 
                                                                                
     
   
 
real trajectory 
Free Road 
geo-object 
HMI 
Toll Road 
Estimated positions may be outside the 
geo-object due to failures the RAIM is 
not designed to detect 
      - estimated position with  available RAIM. 
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  (5.45) 
Figure 5.13 shows the probability of missing a road segment in the nominal scenario as a function of 
the number of fault-free positions       for       
   and various thresholds    . This probability 
decreases quickly as     increases. For the same     and    , a higher threshold provides a higher 
probability of missing the segment. 
The expression (5.45) must meet the required probablity of missed geo-object recognition 
                    : 
The     requirement is obtained from which derive the     is: 
                                         
                    
                 
        (5.46) 
 
The     that meets the requirement (5.46) is a function of the number of fault-free positions       and 
the threshold       (Figure 5.14). The requirement on the     is considerably relaxed as     
augments, and becomes more stringent when     is increased. 
From the two parameters affecting the    , only the geo-object recognition algorithm threshold     is 
parameter under the control of the toll system designer. The threshold     also have effects in the 
required     (see  Figure 5.10). 
The second parameter, the number of independent and fault-free positions estimated during the user 
trajectory       is not fully under control. It depends on the total number of independent positions 
with available RAIM       and on the probability of positioning failures. In fact,     depends of the 
duration of the user trajectory through the road segment, the error correlation time and the RAIM 
availability, which in turn is a function of the geometry between the visible satellites and the user. 
Therefore,     depends on the environment. This is one of the reasons why chapter 7 analyzes the 
performance of toll systems and RAIM algorithms via simulations in different scenarios. 
If the total number     of independent positions with available RAIM is known, the following 
requirement can be set to the number     of undetectable failures: 
                                                            
     
   
   
  
                    
                 
        (5.47) 
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Figure 5.13. Probability of missed geo-object recognition due to false detections with PFA = 10
-3. 
 
Figure 5.14. Maximum allowable probability of false alarm PFA that meets the missed geo-object recognition 
requirement p{ Nvalid pos IN < NTh | Nominal Scenario } ≤ 5∙10
-5. 
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5.4.4.2.2. Faulty scenario (major service failure) 
In this scenario, a user moves inside a road segment in the presence of a major service failure that 
makes all estimated positions to be outside the geo-object (Figure 5.15). Undetectable failures are not 
considered because all estimated positions are already faulty. Whenever a user moves inside a road 
segment, this scenario occurs with a probability                         
  . 
 
Figure 5.15. Example of missed geo-object recognition in the faulty scenario (major service failure). 
 
This work derives the     and     of a RAIM with Fault Detection (FD) capabilities (see the 
introduction of section 5.4). In this case, an alert is raised whenever the RAIM detects a failure, but the 
position estimate is not corrected. As a consequence, the road segment is missed whenever a major 
service failure is present. Nevertheless, the faulty scenario occurs with a higher probability than the 
required missed geo-object recognition rate: 
                         
                            
   (5.48) 
It is important to remark that this is a worst case result in which all estimated positions are affected by 
the major service failure and lie outside the geo-object. 
Using a Fault Detection and Exclusion (FDE) technique capable of correcting positioning failures 
would increase the number of valid positions inside the geo-object. In this case, the required 
probability that the number of valid positions is lower than the geo-object recognition threshold is: 
                                                   
                    
                
      (5.49) 
 
The GNSS integrity requirements derived for FD capabilities are applicable to FDE if the probability 
of false exclusion is negligible. 
 
real trajectory 
Free Road 
geo-object 
HMI 
Toll Road 
All estimated positions are 
outside the geo-object due to a 
major service failure 
      - estimated position with  available RAIM. 
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5.4.4.3. Performance for a particular user trajectory throughout 
successive road segments 
The     and     constraints derived in sections 5.4.4.1 and 5.4.4.2 have been calculated to achieve a 
global rate of false and missed geo-object recognitions of         
   and         
   over the 
total number of segment recognition processes managed by the toll system during a given period of 
time. 
However, the analysis of the number of overcharged or undercharged road segments during the 
trajectory of a particular user instead of the average global rate over a given period must take into 
account the fact that a major service failure may remain up to one hour and disturb the recognition of 
several consecutive road segments. 
The     and     constraints plotted in Figure 5.10 and Figure 5.14, valid to meet the average false 
and missed geo-object rates over all road segments processed by the toll system, will be used in this 
thesis. Nevertheless, the performance analysis for a particular trajectory throughout multiple 
successive road segments will be outlined in this section. 
The problem could be simplified in two possible scenarios, faulty and nominal. In the faulty case a 
major service failure disturbs all the positions estimated along the user trajectory, while in the nominal 
case user positioning is affected only by nominal errors and failures not detectable by the RAIM. The 
probability of each scenario can be calculated as in section 5.4.3. 
Let us consider first the case of a user trajectory inside various road segments. In the nominal scenario, 
position estimates may lie outside the geo-object only due to failures not detectable by the RAIM. 
Provided a short temporal correlation of these failures, the decision of charging each road segment is 
independent as described in section 5.4.4.2.1. In the faulty scenario, all position estimated are outside 
the geo-object and each road segment is missed unless fault detection and exclusion algorithms are 
used. 
The second case consists in a user moving outside and parallel to various road segments. In the 
nominal scenario, position estimates may lie inside the geo-object only due to failures not detectable 
by the RAIM. Provided a short temporal correlation of these failures, the decision of overcharging 
each road segment is independent as described in section 5.4.4.1.1. In the faulty scenario, all position 
estimated are inside the geo-object. The probability of overcharging a road segment depends on the 
    and the number of independent position estimates with a pseudorange failure         inside the 
geo-object. Note that positions estimated at different road segments may not be independent. 
5.5. Conclusions 
Electronic Toll Collection (ETC) systems specify the maximum allowable impact of over- and 
undercharging errors. These requirements are usually defined either at service level (e.g. invoice 
accuracy), or at geo-object level as the maximum allowable rate of missed geo-object recognitions 
        and false geo-object recognitions        . The relationship between the invoice accuracy and 
      and       has been obtained.  
A missed geo-object recognition probability of         
   has been proposed for road toll 
applications because existing ETC systems report similar efficiency rates in non-urban environments 
and it is the value proposed in [EG9, 2006]. A false geo-object recognition rate of         
   is 
proposed, which agrees with the value stated in [EG9, 2006]. 
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The geo-object specifications have been translated into the requirements of a snapshot RAIM 
algorithm with Fault Detection capabilities, i.e. the probabilities of missed detection       and of 
false alarm      . The relationship between the requirements at geo-object recognition level 
              and at positioning failure detection level           has been obtained. The geo-object 
recognition algorithm of (3.6) has been used, in which a road segment is charged if the number of 
valid positions estimated inside it exceeds a threshold. Additionally, faulty positions are assumed to be 
caused only by major service failures, which requires the GNSS receiver to employ robust 
mechanisms against other failure sources. 
The     is derived from the maximum probability of false geo-object recognition (overcharging), and 
it is a function of the segment recognition threshold     and of the number     of detectable faulty 
positions inside the geo-object (Figure 5.10). The     is derived from the maximum probability of 
missed geo-object recognition (undercharging), and it is a function is a function of the segment 
recognition threshold     and of the number     of fault-free positions with available RAIM inside 
the geo-object (Figure 5.14). Since     depends on the RAIM availability, which in turn depends on 
the user/satellite geometry (the environment), RAIM performance has to be tested with simulations. 
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Chapter 6  RAIM Algorithms 
6.1. Introduction 
Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring (RAIM) are GNSS integrity monitoring algorithms based 
on the redundancy of GNSS measurements and optionally other sensors, that are run autonomously by 
the receiver. They can provide Fault Detection (FD) and Fault Detection and Exclusion (FDE) 
capabilities. 
To achieve the required level of redundancy, at least an additional range measurement than the 
minimum needed to compute the navigation solution is needed for the failure detection function, and 
at least two additional measurements are necessary for fault exclusion. 
RAIM algorithms can be designed to protect against horizontal and vertical positioning errors. Only 
the integrity monitoring in the horizontal plane will be considered for road toll applications. 
This section presents the design and characteristics of the two RAIM techniques under study. First, the 
Weighted Least Squares Residuals (WLSR) RAIM used in civil aviation is analyzed and afterwards a 
novel version of the algorithm, suitable for road toll systems and specially adapted to environments 
with reduced satellite visibility is proposed. 
6.2. WLSR RAIM 
Least Squares Residuals (LSR) RAIM and the solution separation RAIM are ones of the most used 
RAIM algorithms in civil aviation. LSR RAIM usually outperforms solution separation methods and is 
usually taken as reference to check the performance of other RAIM algorithms [van Graas, 1993]. 
The LSR RAIM algorithm was published in 1988 [Parkinson et. al, 1988] and has been proven to be 
equivalent to the parity matrix method [Sturza, 1988] and the range comparison method [Lee, 1986] in 
[Brown, 1992]. 
LSR RAIM was originally developed under the assumption that pseudorange nominal errors are 
described by independent Gaussian distributions with equal variance, which was a good supposition 
when the selective availability (SA) dominated the pseudorange error. Nowadays, with SA switched 
off, each pseudorange error is best characterized with its own variance, which usually depends on the 
satellite elevation angle. This case requires the Weighted Least Squares Residuals (WLSR) RAIM 
[Walter and Enge, 1995]. 
The main elements of the WLSR RAIM are the availability check, the fault detection and, optionally, 
the fault isolation and exclusion modules. First, the Horizontal Protection Level (HPL) is calculated 
and compared against the Horizontal Alert Level (HAL) to check the RAIM availability. The RAIM 
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assures to detect a positioning failure that exceeds the HAL with the probabilities of missed detection 
      and false alarm       only when the HPL does not exceed the HAL. Afterwards, a test statistic 
    characterized by chi-squared statistics is computed. A positioning failure is detected whenever   
exceeds a detection threshold     . Both HPL and    are functions of the desired     and    . The 
fault exclusion algorithm can be optionally run after a fault detection in order to eliminate the faulty 
pseudorange measurement from the position estimation. 
6.2.1. Algorithm design 
The following subsections provide the rationale of the computation of the test statistic, the detection 
threshold and the HPL of the WLSR RAIM. The equivalent RAIM obtained with the parity matrix 
method is presented in Appendix D. 
6.2.1.1. Navigation solution and pseudorange measurement models 
The WLSR RAIM provides integrity for navigation solutions obtained applying the Weighted Least 
Squares Estimator (WLSE) to the linear pseurorange measurement model: 
           (6.1) 
         (6.2) 
where: 
 the observation matrix   depends on the navigation state vector to be estimated and on the 
receiver type (appendix A). For example, when the position is to be estimated in the North-East-
Up coordinates in the user local frame with a single constellation receiver: 
    
                                    
    
                                    
  (6.3) 
˗    : elevation of     satellite relative to the user position 
˗    : azimuth of  
   satellite relative to the user position 
 
 the matrix   is a function of the observation matrix   and the nominal pseudorange error 
correlation matrix  : 
           
  
      (6.4) 
 
A detailed analysis of the WLSE applied to the navigation solution estimation is done in Appendix C. 
Pseudorange measurement errors are divided in nominal errors and faults: 
       (6.5) 
where: 
 nominal errors are assumed to have independent, zero-mean and normal distributions: 
          (6.6) 
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 (6.7) 
 faults are biased pseudorange measurement. In this work, only one simultaneous bias is assumed 
(the probability of multiple simultaneous failures is neglected): 
                   
  (6.8) 
Some fault models also include the effect of nominal biases [Martineau, 2008]. 
6.2.1.2. Test Statistic 
Since positioning errors are not directly measurable, the WLSR RAIM calculates a measurable scalar 
parameter that provides information about pseudorange measurement errors. This measurable 
parameter, called test statistic    , is a random variable with a known distribution. 
WLSR RAIM computes the test statistic processing the pseudorange residual vector    , defined as the 
difference between the measured pseudorange vector and the peudorange vector derived from the 
estimated navigation solution: 
           (6.9) 
 
The pseudorange residual vector has two important properties: 
1) each element of the vector   can be expressed as a known linear combination of the elements of 
   or   (demonstration in appendix C): 
                    (6.10) 
where the matrix   is a function of the observation matrix and the nominal error covariance: 
            
  
      (6.11) 
 
2) if pseudorange nominal measurement errors follow independent and normal distributions with 
variance unity, i.e.         , the squared magnitude of the residual vector     , also known as 
the sum of squared residual errors (SSE), is a chi-squared random variable in the fault free case, 
and a non-central chi-squared one in the faulty case:  
                 
  
                        
    
                     
  (6.12) 
where   is the number of degrees of freedom and   is the non-centrality parameter of the chi-
squared distribution. 
The SSE does not follow any known statistical law when pseudorange nominal errors do not have 
equal variance, i.e.         . This case can be transformed dividing each line of the equation system 
(6.1) by the corresponding nominal error standard deviation, resulting in an equivalent system with 
normalized nominal error covariance matrix equal to the identity,          . The SSE of the 
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normalized equation system is equivalent to a weighted SSE (WSSE) and is a suitable test statistic that 
follows a known chi-squared distribution: 
        
     
           (6.13) 
     
       (6.14) 
where the subscript   stands for normalized. 
Hence, the test statistic is calculated as follows: 
                             (6.15) 
     
  
                             
    
                          
  (6.16) 
 
The number of degrees of freedom of the chi-squared distribution is the number of redundant 
pseudorange measurements: 
        (6.17) 
where    is the number of unknowns to be estimated as in Table 3.10, and   is the total number of 
used range measurements. 
The non-centrality parameter of the non-central chi-squared distribution due to a faulty pseudorange is 
a function of the matrix  , the nominal error covariance and the bias vector (appendix D): 
               (6.18) 
Since only the    satellite contains a bias, eq.(6.18) results: 
   
       
  
    
  (6.19) 
 
The test statistic contains information about pseudorange errors via the following relationship 
(appendix D): 
                (6.20) 
6.2.1.3. Detection Threshold 
Failure detection is achieved comparing the test statistic against the detection threshold: 
                            
                          (6.21) 
 
The value of the detection threshold is set in order to obtain a Neyman-Pearson test with a constant 
false detection rate under fault free conditions. Although other alternative algorithms are possible, a 
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constant false alarm rate is chosen in civil aviation because false alarm is not a safety matter. This 
way, the RAIM is set to provide a fixed false alert rate that is always equal to the required    , and a 
variable probability that undetected positioning failures exceed the HAL equal to or lower than     
[Brown, 1992]. 
Neglecting the probability that a positioning failure is caused by nominal errors, any fault detection 
with fault-free measurements is a false detection. The detection threshold is set to achieve a detection 
rate equal to     under fault free conditions (Figure 6.1): 
                                                
           
      (6.22) 
Thus,    is a function of the     and the number of degrees of freedom,  . 
 
Figure 6.1. Derivation of the detection threshold (Th). 
 
It is important to point out the assumption that the fault-free horizontal positioning error due to 
pseudorange nominal errors does not exceed the HPL:  
                               (6.23) 
6.2.1.4. Minimum detectable failures 
Let us define      as the non-centrality parameter of the test distribution in the faulty case that results 
in a missed detection rate of     (Figure 6.2): 
                                                         
             
      (6.24) 
Thus,      is a function of the    , the number of degrees of freedom   and   , which in turn depends 
on the    . 
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Figure 6.2. Derivation of the minimum detectable non-centrality parameter (λdet). 
 
Given fixed values of    and  , the missed detection rate decreases as   increases. Thus,      is the 
minimum non-centrality parameter the RAIM is able to detect with a probability equal to or lower than 
   : 
                                                     
     
                    
                    
                     
   (6.25) 
 
According to eq.(6.19),   is proportional to the squared magnitude of the bias. Therefore, the 
minimum pseudorage bias in the     satellite the WLSR RAIM is capable to detect with a probability 
of missed detection equal to or lower than     is: 
         
  
 
       
       (6.26) 
Thus: 
                                  
                       
                       
                        
   (6.27) 
Each satellite has their own minimum detectable bias magnitude        . 
6.2.1.5. Relationship between test statistic and position errors 
The aim of the WLSR RAIM algorithm is to protect against horizontal positioning errors, raising an 
alert whenever      exceeds the HPL within the required     and    . Nevertheless, fault detection is 
performed via the test statistic. The relationship between the measurable test statistic    and what the 
RAIM protects, i.e. the horizontal position errors     , is the key information used to derive the HPL 
from parameters used in the fault detection process with the test statistic. 
Pseudorange errors have a statistic component - the nominal errors,          - and a deterministic 
component - the bias of faulty measurements. Since the test statistic     and the horizontal position error 
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     are derived from the pseudorange errors, they also have a statistic component due to the nominal 
errors, and a deterministic component due to the pseudorange bias. 
6.2.1.5.1. Deterministic component (Slope) 
The deterministic component of      is the projection of the pseudorange bias present in the  
   
satellite into the horizontal position error domain. Considering the horizontal position is estimated in 
the north and east directions of the user's local plane: 
         
    
       
      
     (6.28) 
where    and    are the projection of the bias in the north and east directions, and    and    are the 
lines of the matrix   that correspond to the north and east position components: 
  
  
  
 
       
  
  
 
    
    
    
 
    (6.29) 
Note that      is the bias projection in the horizontal error and not the mean of the horizontal 
positioning error. 
The deterministic component introduced by a pseudorange bias in the test statistic is the non-centrality 
parameter. Combining equations (6.19) and (6.28), the following relationship between   and      is 
found: 
                (6.30) 
where: 
            
    
      
 
       
 (6.31) 
 
The slope is a measure of the coupling between the effect of a pseudorange bias in the observable 
parameter, i.e. the test statistic's   , and what the RAIM wishes to protect, the horizontal position 
error (Figure 6.3). Each satellite has its own slope. The satellite with the highest slope is the most 
difficult to detect, in the sense that a given      has the lowest    among all satellites, that is, the 
lowest detection probability.  
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Figure 6.3. Examples of the slope as the relationship between the test statistic non-centrality (λ) and the bias 
projection |bH|. 
6.2.1.5.2. Statistic component 
The statistic components of the test statistic and the navigation solution errors are uncorrelated [Ober, 
1997] (see appendix D): 
            (6.32) 
 
Thus, the pdf of the joint distribution of   and      is the product of their individual pdf: 
                                (6.33) 
 
The test statistic follows a chi-squared distribution as in eq.(6.16). 
The horizontal positioning error follows a bivariate Gaussian distribution. Describing it as two 
independent monodimensional Gaussian distributions in the direction of the major and minor semiaxes 
of the equidensity ellipses:  
                  (6.34) 
Its magnitude results: 
             
        
  (6.35) 
In general, the error components        and        have different variances and      does not follow a 
known distribution. Alternatively,      can be expressed as the sum of the monodimensional Gaussian 
distributions of the error in the north and east directions, which in general are correlated (appendix C). 
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Hence, the joint distribution of   and      follows a chi-squared law in the   axis, non-central or central 
depending on the presence of a faulty measurement, and the root of the sum of two squared Gaussians 
in the      axis (Figure 6.4). The joint distribution is usually represented in the plane            in 
order to represent linearly the relationship provided by the slope in eq.(6.30). 
  
 
 
Figure 6.4. Examples of bidimensional pdf in the plane square root(t) vs. |eH| in the a) fault free case, b) faulty 
case. 
 
6.2.1.6. Horizontal protection level 
The WLSR RAIM calculates the HPL as: 
                    (6.36) 
where: 
             
 
           (6.37) 
Equation (6.36) does not depend on current measurements, so the HPL can be predicted according to 
the expected satellite/user geometry and nominal error covariance. 
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Figure 6.5 illustrates the joint distribution of    and      in different stages of the WLSR RAIM 
design. It is a visual analysis of the relationship between the measurable domain in which the fault 
detection is performed (i.e. the test statistic   ), and the positioning error       against which the 
RAIM tries to protect. Figure 6.5 is useful to understand the interpretation of the HPL equation (6.36) 
explained in the next paragraphs.  
The HPL is calculated as the projection in the position domain of the pseudorange bias in the most-
difficult-to-detect satellite, i.e. the satellite with the highest slope, that generates a test statistic with a 
non-centrality parameter equal to     . Let as denote the magnitude of this bias        . By 
definition, the RAIM detects the presence of this bias with a missed detection probability equal to 
   , regardless the positioning error. 
Hereafter, pseudorange biases are assumed to be in the maximum slope satellite. This is a worst case 
scenario because pseudorange biases that generate a non-centrality parameter equal to      in other 
satellites with lower slopes provide lower     , meaning that the RAIM is able to detect them within 
the required     when they cause smaller positioning errors (Figure 6.3). 
When the pseudorange bias projection in the position domain      is sufficiently larger than the 
statistical error component, the distribution of      is approximately centered around     . 
Consequently, the probability that a pseudorange bias      causes an undetected positioning error 
larger than     is approximately      ; in any case it is always is lower than     (Figure 6.5-c). 
Pseudorange biases larger than      generate a non-centrality parameter larger than     , which is 
explained graphically as a displacement of the joint              upwards along the slope in Figure 
6.5-c. Despite their projection in the position domain larger than the    , and consequently a higher 
probability that      exceeds it, the integrity requirements are met because the RAIM detects them 
with a missed detection probability lower than    , regardless the positioning error. 
Pseudorange biases smaller than      generate a non-centrality parameter smaller than     , which is 
explained graphically as a displacement of the joint              downwards along the slope in 
Figure 6.5-c. Therefore, the rate of missed detection increases and exceeds    , while the probability 
of positioning failure decreases because of the lower     . Thus, the HPL equation (6.36) is valid if 
the lower positioning failure probability compensates the higher missed detection rate, so that the 
probability of undetected positioning failures is below    . Unfortunately it has been proven that for 
certain satellite/user geometries, principally when the maximum slope has a low value, the HPL 
should be higher [Brown and Chin, 1997]. However, the HPL computed as in eq.(6.36) is judged to be 
practical in most of the cases and it is in use. 
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Figure 6.5. Relationship between the test statistic and the position error in different stages of the WLSR RAIM 
design. a) Derivation of the detection threshold. b) Computation of the minimum detectable non-centrality 
parameter. c) Estimation of the HAL. 
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6.2.2. Implementation 
The GNSS receiver will carry out at least the availability check and the fault detection tasks. Fault 
exclusion can be optionally implemented. 
6.2.2.1. Availability check and fault detection 
The availability check and fault detection modules run within the receiver are depicted in Figure 6.6. 
The inputs are the observation matrix   and the nominal error covariance   for the RAIM availability 
check, plus the current pseudorange measurements    for the fault detection module.  
The values of      and    are functions of    ,     and the number of redundant range measurements 
 . Since they do not depend on current measurements, they can be computed offline and stored in the 
receiver as look-up tables. For given     and    , the stored data are the vectors         and      . 
The RAIM availability check do not employ current measurements, so the HPL can be predicted with 
the expected satellite/user geometry and nominal error covariance. 
 
Figure 6.6. WLSR RAIM algorithm. 
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6.2.2.2. Fault exclusion 
The RAIM can optionally perform fault exclusion, which in case of a fault detection eliminates the 
faulty pseudorange measurement from the position estimation, providing integrity information without 
service interruption. 
A possible fault exclusion technique consists in creating   subgroups of     range measurements 
each, excluding one range measurement at each subgroup. Since there is only one faulty satellite, 
applying the fault detection module to each subgroup will detect a fault in all of them except in the one 
excluding the faulty measurement.   
Fault exclusion needs at least two redundant range measurements and it is available when fault 
detection is available for each subgroup. 
6.2.3. Limitations 
6.2.3.1. Assumptions made during the algorithm design 
WLSR RAIM algorithms are limited by the following assumptions made during their design: 
 the navigation state vector must be calculated with the Weighted Least Squared Estimator 
(WLSE) 
 pseudorange nominal errors must be characterized as zero-mean Gaussian variables 
 the faulty case consists in a single pseudorange failure at a given instant (there are no 
simultaneous failures) 
 the probability that nominal errors cause a positioning failure must be negligible 
 
Additionally, the probability that undetected horizontal positioning errors exceed the HPL should be 
equal to or lower than    , although this cannot be assured in specific cases, particularly with low 
values of the maximum slopes (see section 6.2.1.6). 
6.2.3.2. Pseudorange detection and probability of false detection 
Although the aim of integrity monitoring is to detect horizontal positioning failures, i.e.         , 
the WLSR RAIM fault detection module is actually designed to decide whether at a given instant there 
is a biased pseudorange measurement or not. It is afterwards when the RAIM translates the effect of 
the bias plus noise to the positioning error domain via the HPL. 
A probability of false detection equal to     is assured only in the fault free case. Any pseudorange 
bias, regardless its size and the positioning error, generates a certain chi-squared non-centrality 
parameter   that increases the detection probability over    . 
Only pseudorange biases that generate a chi-squared non-centrality parameter equal to or greater than 
     are assured to be detected with a probability of missed detection equal to or lower than the 
required    . These are the minimum detectable biases, which magnitude      varies from one 
satellite to another. 
The HPL is calculated to assure that the probability of undetected positioning errors exceeding it 
meets the required     under the effect of a pseudorange bias equal to or larger than      in the 
maximum slope satellite. 
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Consequently, the probability of false detections under the presence of pseudorange biases that 
generate            exceeds the    . 
6.2.3.3. Minimum allowable HAL 
The WLSR RAIM assumes that positions estimated with fault free range measurements do not contain 
positioning failures. Nevertheless, positioning errors due to pseudorange nominal errors may exceed 
the HAL with a non-negligible probability depending on the user/satellite geometry, the nominal error 
model and the required alert limit. Thus, the assumption of a negligible probability of positioning 
failures in the fault free case only holds for sufficiently large HAL. 
The HAL exceeded with a given probability P by nominal positioning errors could be computed 
numerically for each error distribution        
        
  . For the sake of simplicity analytical upper 
and lower bounds will be computed as a function of       
 . 
The worst case occurs when σ      σ     . In this case, the squared fault-free horizontal error 
scaled by the variance follows a chi-squared distribution of 2 degrees of freedom: 
       
      
     
  (6.38) 
Hence, the upper bound of the HAL that      exceeds with a probability   is: 
     σ             
        (6.39) 
where       
   is the inverse cdf of a   
  distribution. 
The lower bound is found with σ       . In this case, the horizontal error follows a unidimensional 
normal distribution of variance σ     
 . Thus, the lower bound of the HAL that      exceeds with a 
probability   is: 
                     
        (6.40) 
where          
   is the inverse cdf of a zero-mean normal distribution of variance unity. 
The minimum allowable HAL is a function of the horizontal positioning error distribution and the 
maximum allowable probability of positioning failures in the fault-free case, which are actually 
undetectable by the RAIM (Figure 6.7). 
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Figure 6.7. HAL exceeded by nominal horizontal positioning errors with a probability P. 
6.3. WLSR RAIM with a variable PFA 
Scenarios with limited satellite visibility like urban environments are likely to provide bad 
user/satellite geometries that result in a high unavailability rate of the WLSR RAIM introduced in 
section 6.2. Every time the RAIM is unavailable, the estimated position must be rejected because it is 
not supported by integrity information. 
The aim of this section is to present a novel WLSR RAIM algorithm adapted to the characteristics of 
road toll systems with the objective of increasing the number of valid positions in urban environments. 
6.3.1. Motivation and rationale 
WLSR RAIM algorithms for civil aviation are designed with the values of     and     that assure 
agreement with the integrity risk and continuity levels standardized by the ICAO [ICAO, 2006]. 
Positions estimated with a missed detection probability higher than     or a false alert rate higher than 
    are unacceptable in civil aviation because they do not guarantee the integrity and the continuity 
risks; consequently, the RAIM is declared unavailable whenever the user/satellite geometry and the 
nominal errors make impossible to monitor integrity with the required     and    . RAIM availability 
rates in typical aviation environments generally fulfill the ICAO requirements. 
Urban environments can be more challenging than civil aviation ones in terms of RAIM availability. 
In GNSS-based Electronic Toll Collection (ETC) systems in urban environments, RAIM 
unavailability decreases the number of positions valid to be used by the segment recognition algorithm 
and raises the undercharging rate. Fortunately, road toll requirements differ from those of civil 
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aviation, which allows to redesign the WLSR RAIM in order to increase the number of valid positions 
in environments with reduced visibility. 
The toll algorithm proposed in equation (3.6) charges a road segment to a user if the number of valid 
positions inside the geo-object is at least equal to a threshold    , being valid positions those with 
available RAIM for which no fault has been detected: 
                                          
 
Then, the desired goal of the RAIM is to reject enough faulty positions to meet the overcharging 
requirement while attaining the number of valid positions that reaches the undercharging requirement 
in the fault free case. 
The     calculated in chapter 5 (Figure 5.10) is the maximum allowable probability of missed 
detection that meets the overcharging requirements. For fixed values of     and  , the HPL decreases 
when the     increases, so RAIM availability could be improved at the expense of the missed 
detection probability. This option is not chosen because the overcharging requirement would not be 
met; thus, the proposed RAIM will be designed to provide a maximum allowable probability of missed 
detection equal to    . 
The     calculated in chapter 5 (Figure 5.14) has been derived to meet the undercharging requirement. 
It is the maximum allowable probability of false alarm that assures the maximum allowed probability 
that the number of fault-free valid positions in the road segment is lower than    , given a minimum 
number of independent positions with available RAIM      .  However, the     does not fulfil the 
undercharging requirement if     is lower than its required minimum value, which may happen due 
positioning or RAIM unavailability. 
For fixed values of     and  , the HPL increases as the     decreases (Figure 6.8). Hence, the 
probability that a fault-free position is declared valid (available RAIM and no fault detected) results 
from a trade-off between the false alarm and the RAIM unavailability rates: the more stringent is    , 
the lower is the number of fault-free positions rejected due to false alarms but the higher due to RAIM 
unavailability, and vice versa. 
When the number of estimated positions, independent and with available RAIM, is not sufficiently 
high, the WLSR RAIM of section 6.2 could be designed with a maximum allowable probability of 
false detection higher than the required    , which would increase the RAIM availability, and 
consequently the average     per road segment, at the expense of a false alarm rate augmentation. 
Although this solution does not meet the undercharging requirements, it may improve the obtained 
undercharging rate in scenarios with severe RAIM unavailability rates. However, another strategy will 
be adopted in order provide a better undercharging rate. 
The new WLSR RAIM design relies on the fact that road toll systems do not have a GNSS continuity 
requirement as defined in civil aviation, that is, they do not need all positions of a user trajectory along 
a road segment to be valid uninterruptedly; instead, the geo-object recognition algorithm requires a 
minimum number of valid positions per road segment, regardless they are consecutive or not. 
Therefore, RAIM for GNSS-ETC systems do not require imperatively a fixed    , but rather the best 
trade-off between false alarm and RAIM availability that results in the highest probability that a fault-
free position is declared valid. 
Estimated positions are automatically rejected whenever the RAIM is unavailable because they are not 
supported by integrity information; that is, the probability of providing a valid position is zero. 
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Increasing the     to reduce the HPL until the RAIM becomes available allows to calculate integrity 
information for those positions at the cost of increasing the probability of false detection. 
Based on that, the proposed WLSR RAIM design uses a fixed     to protect against overcharging and 
a time variant     that provides the trade-off between false alarm and RAIM availability that 
maximizes the probability of valid position and consequently provides the best possible undercharging 
rate. 
 
 
Figure 6.8. Effect of the PFA in the WLSR RAIM. 
6.3.2. Algorithm design 
The aim is to design a WLSR RAIM that maximizes the probability that a fault-free position 
(disturbed only by nominal errors) is declared valid, i.e. the RAIM is available and does not detect a 
fault, assuring a rate of undetected positioning errors equal to or lower than    . 
Therefore, the objective is to find the detection threshold      that maximizes the probability of not 
detecting a failure in a fault-free position (i.e. minimizing the actual false detection probability), 
subject to the condition that the RAIM must be available          : 
           
  
                 
                 (6.41) 
The non-detection probability is a monotonically increasing function of   . Thus, the objective is to 
find the maximum    that results in an available RAIM. 
According to equations (6.24) and (6.36),      and the HPL are monotonically increasing functions of 
   (for fixed values of     and  ). Hence, the highest allowable detection threshold is the one that 
gives        . 
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The proposed algorithm has a constant HPL equal to the HAL, so the RAIM is always available and 
fault-free positions are rejected only due to false detections. The constant maximum missed detection 
probability equal to     makes the resulting false detection probability to vary in time as a function of 
the user/satellite geometry and the pseudorange nominal error covariance. 
The algorithm design is the following (Figure 6.9): 
1) The minimum detectable chi-squared non-centrality parameter that corresponds to an HPL equal 
to HAL is obtained from eq. (6.36): 
       
   
        
 
 
 (6.42) 
 
2) The detection threshold is derived from     and λ    using eq.(6.24): 
               
 
        (6.43) 
 
3) The fault detection process only needs the detection threshold, so the RAIM implemented in the 
receiver could finish in step 2). For performance analysis, the probability of false alarm can be 
obtained as in eq.(6.22): 
                  (6.44) 
 
The resulting algorithm is a Constant-Probability-of-Detection (CPOD) RAIM [Sturza and 
Brown, 1990] with the particularity of having no maximum allowed PFA. The probability that a 
fault-free position is declared valid is: 
                         (6.45) 
 
 
Figure 6.9. Design of the WLSR RAIM that maximizes the number of valid positions. 
     
Fault free 
distribution 
    
         
    
     
          
Faulty 
distribution 
2) 1) 
3) 
         
RAIM Algorithms 123 
 
 
6.3.3. Implementation 
The fault detection module run at the receiver is depicted in Figure 6.10. There is no availability check 
module because the RAIM is always available (positions are rejected only by fault detections and bad 
user/satellite geometries are translated into high probabilities of false alarm, not into RAIM 
unavailability). The inputs are the observation matrix  , the nominal error covariance   and the 
current pseudorange measurements   . Note that the probability of false detection does not depend on 
    and can be predicted with eq.(6.44). 
To reduced the computational burden of the calculation at each instant of the detection threshold with 
the inverse CDF of a chi-squared distribution, look-up tables can be calculated offline for discrete 
values of     . 
Fault exclusion can be optionally implemented applying the fault detection module to the   subgroups 
resulting from excluding one range measurement at each subgroup; the only subgroup for which no 
fault has been detected is the one excluding the faulty measurement. Fault exclusion needs at least two 
redundant range measurements. 
 
 
Figure 6.10. WLSR RAIM fault detection that maximizes the number of valid positions. 
6.3.4. Comparison against the WLSR RAIM used in civil aviation 
Both RAIM algorithms presented in sections 6.2 and 6.3 rely on the same WLSR test statistic and their 
main difference resides in the rule used to set the detection threshold. 
The classic WLSR RAIM used in civil aviation provides a constant false detection rate under fault free 
conditions equal to    , and assures that undetected positioning errors exceed the HPL with a 
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probability equal to or lower than    . That is, the RAIM detects positioning errors greater than the 
HPL as if they were positioning failures (Figure 6.11). The HPL varies in time as a function of the 
user/satellite geometry and the nominal pseudrange covariance matrix. Therefore, when the RAIM is 
available, the actual maximum probability that an undetected error exceeds the HAL evolves together 
with the HPL, and it is lower than the probability that it exceeds the HPL. 
The novel WLSR RAIM provides a constant HPL equal to the HAL. Consequently it detects 
positioning errors larger than the HAL with a constant probability of missed detection equal to     
(Figure 6.11). The probability of false detection in the fault-free case varies in time as a function of the 
user/satellite geometry and the pseudorange nominal error covariance matrix. 
 
Figure 6.11. Comparison of fault detection events in the classic and novel WLSR RAIM algorithms. 
 
Both algorithms assure that the maximum probability of missed detection of positioning failures 
         is equal to     at any instant. The difference is that, while the classic RAIM is pushed to 
obtain the lowest possible HPL, and hence the lowest probability of an undetected positioning failure, 
at the cost of providing continuously the maximum allowable    , the novel algorithm is set to obtain 
the lowest possible probability of false alarm for a given HAL, at the expense of providing 
continuously the maximum allowable    . 
The motivation of the novel algorithm is to improve the rate of valid positions in environments with 
degraded visibility. The probability of not declaring valid a fault-free position with the novel 
algorithm is given by the probability of false alarm of eq.(6.44), whereas with the classic WLSR 
RAIM it is the required     when the RAIM is available, and one if it is not (Figure 6.12). The classic 
WLSR RAIM is available when the       calculated as in eq.(6.24) is greater than the ratio 
            . The novel algorithm always provides a probability of rejecting a fault-free position 
lower than the classic WLSR RAIM, especially when the latter is unavailable due to high slopes 
frequent in scenarios with degraded satellite visibility. 
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Figure 6.12. Probability of not declaring valid a fault free position as a function of the ratio HAL/slopeMAX and 
the number of chi-squared degrees of freedom k. Example with PMD=10
-3 and PFA=10
-5. 
 
Applications like civil aviation specify a maximum allowable    . In these applications, the RAIM 
with variable probability of false alarm should be declared unavailable whenever the probability of 
false detection exceeds the required    , as the algorithm proposed for civil aviation in [Feng et al, 
2006]. In this case, both WLSR RAIM have equivalent availability, although the new algorithm still 
provides a higher probability of valid positions due to the probability of false alarm lower than the 
maximum allowable    . 
6.3.5. Limitations 
Since the WLSR RAIM with variable     is based on the WLSR test statistic, it has the same 
limitations as the civil aviation WLSR RAIM presented in section 6.2.3. 
6.4. Conclusions 
Two RAIM algorithms have been selected as candidates to be employed in urban road toll 
applications. The first one is the WLSR RAIM because it is an algorithm widely used in civil aviation 
and it is usually set as a reference, against which other RAIM techniques are compared. The second 
one is a novel algorithm based on the WLSR RAIM, adapted to the needs of road toll systems with the 
aim of increasing the rate of valid positions in scenarios with degraded satellite visibility. 
The rationale of the WLSR RAIM design has been presented, including the derivation of the test 
statistic, the detection threshold and the HPL. Afterwards, the availability check, the fault detection 
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and the fault exclusion modules run at the receiver have been depicted. Finally, the limitations of the 
RAIM have been identified. These include the assumptions of Gaussian nominal pseudorange errors 
and no simultaneous failures, the fact that the probability of false alarm only applies to the fault-free 
case, and the minimum HAL derived from the nominal positioning errors. 
The novel RAIM is obtained modifying the rule to set the detection threshold of the WLSR RAIM 
used in civil aviation. The objective is to develop a RAIM for GNSS-ETC systems that provide a 
trade-off between false alarm and RAIM availability in order to get the highest rate of valid positions 
with fault-free measurements. Whereas the classic WLSR RAIM is designed to obtain the lowest 
possible HPL providing continuously the maximum allowable    , the novel algorithm is set to obtain 
the lowest possible probability of false alarm for a given HAL, providing continuously the maximum 
allowable    . The novel RAIM has been proved to increase the probability of valid positions under 
fault-free conditions with respect to the classic WLSR RAIM. 
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Chapter 7  Simulation results of GNSS-based ETC Systems 
7.1. Introduction 
The performance of GNSS-based road toll systems strongly depends on the environment where they 
operate. Whereas the RAIM     has been set to always meet the false road segment recognition 
requirement in the worst case, the actual missed segment recognition rate varies with the number of 
independent positions with available RAIM per geo-object, which directly depends on the GNSS 
receiver, the RAIM algorithm, the user's trajectory duration and the environment (section 5.4.4). For 
this reason, various simulations have been run in order to obtain the performance of road toll systems 
for different configurations and scenarios. First, the different configurations of the simulations are 
described. Later, the satellite visibility and positioning error statistics are shown in rural and urban 
environments. Afterwards, the performance of the WLSR RAIM algorithms introduced in Chapter 6 is 
studied. Finally, the GNSS-based ETC performance is analyzed. 
7.2. Description and configuration of the simulations 
7.2.1. Scenario 
The simulated scenario consists of a user circulating at 50 km/h along the axis of a straight street of 20 
metres of width. Buildings are generated statistically at both sides of the street, being separated by a 
gap with a probability       . Two different environments, which represent typical urban and a 
rural scenarios, are simulated following the building generation pattern of Table 7.1. 
Data is output at a 1-Hz sampling frequency in order to follow the variations on the user/satellite 
geometry due to satellite masking. 
 
Table 7.1. Building generation pattern of urban and rural environments. 
Scenario Building height      Building width      
Width of the gaps between 
buildings      
Urban 
               
           
                
       
                
       
Rural 
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7.2.2. GNSS receiver configuration 
The receiver configurations described in Table 3.4 - Table 3.9 are studied. These include single and 
dual constellation GPS and Galileo single-frequency receivers operating standalone or augmented by 
SBAS corrections, as well as dual frequency L1/E1-L5/E5a receivers. For each receiver configuration, 
the four different navigation solutions summarized in Table 3.10 are considered: 2D and 3D 
positioning with and without the knowledge of inter-system time shift in dual constellation receivers. 
Additionally, receivers providing 3D positioning hybridized with external altitude information are also 
analyzed. 
Dual constellation receivers that track BOC(1,1) signals and estimate a navigation solution consisting 
of 3D positioning plus the receiver/GNSS time shift have been identified as the baseline study case. 
The baseline case includes SBAS corrections and iono-free measurements with L5/E5a BPSK(10). 
The joint use of GPS and Galileo satellites has been chosen to face the limited visibility of urban 
environments (Figure 7.1), while the BOC(1,1) modulation is GPS/Galileo interoperable and requires 
a minimum bandwidth of 4 MHz, narrower than those of TMBOC or CBOC. The selected navigation 
solution is the most common one in current receivers and allows a direct performance comparison 
between dual- and single constellation users. For the sake of clarity, only the performance of baseline 
receivers will be presented in detail, relegating the analysis in depth of other receiver types to 
Appendix E and F. 
7.2.3. Nominal pseudorange error model and user location 
The nominal pseudorange error model depends on the GNSS receiver. The model described in section 
4.3.7 is used, that is, tracking loops with a 1-Hz bandwidth DLL, a correlator with a 20-ms integration 
time and a DP discriminator. The signal to nose ratio is fixed to           . 
Single frequency ionospheric residual delay is the only error source which model depends on the user 
location; limiting the real position within continental France, the GPS nominal error is simplified to an 
elevation angle function independent from the user's position (Figure 4.4), while the Galileo error 
increases as the geomagnetic latitude decreases (Figure 4.7). In order to deal with a scenario close to 
the worst case, the user is set to be located in the city of Perpignan [42°41', 2°53'], in southern France. 
The same tropospheric residual error model as in civil aviation is used (Figure 4.9). 
The GNSS modernization level is presumed to assure a nominal error due to ephemeris and satellite 
clock inaccuracies with a standard deviation of 85 cm (eq. (4.18)). 
7.2.4. Satellite constellations 
The nominal 24-satellite GPS and 27-satellite Galileo constellations are used. A 72-hour simulation is 
run to obtain approximately all possible ground track combinations of GPS and Galileo satellites. The 
user is assumed to track only satellites directly visible from its position, with a minimum elevation 
angle of 5°. 
7.2.5. RAIM algorithms 
The chosen RAIM algorithms are the constant-    and the variable-    WLSR RAIMs presented in 
Chapter 6. 
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7.2.6. Positioning error correlation time 
The positioning error correlation time    depends on the pseudorange correlation and on the variations 
of the user/satellite geometry. Two cases are studied: 
1) Only one independent sample per segment. This case corresponds to receivers with pseudorange 
errors mainly driven by the ionospheric delay, with typically long correlation times. 
2) Correlation time of      seconds. This case corresponds to receivers with pseudorange errors 
dominated by thermal noise, with short correlation times. 
Two positions can be taken as independent, i.e. they produce independent fault detection outputs, 
when the difference between their estimation instants is at least   . 
7.2.7. Geo-object detection algorithm 
The geo-object recognition algorithm of eq.(3.6) is followed, in which a road segment is charged to a 
user if the number of independent valid positions inside the geo-object is equal to or higher than a 
threshold:  
                                          
 
In order to contain only independent positions, the set of valid positions used to recognize a geo-object 
is obtained as depicted in Figure 3.11: every estimated position (sampled at 1 Hz) is checked until an 
valid position is found, and once it happens, a period of time equal to the positioning error correlation 
time    is waited before searching for the next valid position. 
7.2.8. HAL 
The HAL for road toll applications depends on the road network topology as described in section 3.4. 
Given the RAIM availability results obtained in the urban scenario (section 7.5) and the advice of 
experts, two different values of HAL are studied, 25 and 50 meters. 
7.2.9. Trajectory duration 
The objective of the simulations is to analyze the rate of missed road segments, so shorter segments 
represent worse cases. According to the statistics of existing GNSS-ETC systems in non-urban 
environments (Figure 3.6, Figure 3.7), the percentage of road segments with a length smaller than 500 
meters in the Slovak system (which mainly covers national roads, which usually have sorter segments 
than highways) is lower than 30%, decreasing below to 20% and 5% for lengths of 250 and 70 meters 
respectively. Thus, a user's trajectory duration up to 40 seconds is taken, which corresponds to a geo-
object length up to 555 meters for a user's speed of 50 km/h. 
7.3. Satellite visibility 
The positioning error and the RAIM performance depend on the user/satellite geometry, i.e. the 
number and position of the satellites used to estimate the navigation solution. 
The statistics of the number of visible satellites obtained from the simulation results in urban and rural 
environments are illustrated in Figure 7.1, and the percentage of epochs in which a user is capable to 
perform fault detection and fault exclusion according to its required minimum number of satellites 
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(Table 3.10) are compiled in Table 7.2 - Table 7.4. These results are compared with those of an open 
air scenario in which any satellite with an elevation angle over 5° is visible. The higher visibility rates 
with Galileo than with GPS are due to the fact that the number of satellites is 27 for the Galileo 
nominal constellation, per 24 for the GPS one. 
Dual constellation receivers provide a significant improvement in terms of satellite visibility with 
respect to single GPS or Galileo ones. Let us consider the example of a user that needs 5 satellites to 
perform fault detection, which is always attained in the open air scenario but in only 22.99 % and 
42.41 % of the epochs in urban environments if it process only GPS or Galileo satellites respectively. 
Using both GPS and Galileo satellites increases the instants with        up to 96.22% of the total 
time. 
 
Table 7.2. Percentage of epochs with a number of visible GPS satellites enough for running a RAIM algorithm. 
GPS 
Environment                             
Open air 100 % 100 % 100 % 94.57 % 
Rural 98.95 % 85.96 % 49.50 % 14.85 % 
Urban 53.62 % 22.99 % 7.01 % 1.5 % 
 
Table 7.3. Percentage of epochs with a number of visible Galileo satellites enough for running a RAIM 
algorithm. 
Galileo 
Environment                             
Open air 100 % 100 % 100 % 97.66 % 
Rural 99.99 % 99.02 % 81.20 % 45.62 % 
Urban 73.59 % 42.41 % 17.51 % 5.96 % 
 
Table 7.4. Percentage of epochs with a number of visible GPS & Galileo satellites enough for running a RAIM 
algorithm. 
GPS & Galileo 
Environment                             
Open air 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 
Rural 100 % 100 % 100 % 99.996 % 
Urban 99.26 % 96.22 % 89.01 % 75.84 % 
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Figure 7.1. Measured probability that at a given epoch there is a minimum number of visible satellites (x). 
 
In an open air scenario, the distribution of the GNSS satellites seen over the horizon from the user's 
location is an approximately decreasing function of the elevation angle (Figure 7.2). Obstacles in rural 
and urban environments mask more frequently satellites with low elevation angles, redistributing the 
probability from low towards higher elevation angles. There are no relevant differences between the 
distribution in elevation of GPS and Galileo satellites. 
In the absence of obstacles, the azimuth of visible satellites is approximately uniformly distributed 
between       and     . The shape of the distribution becomes elliptical in the simulated rural and 
urban scenarios, with an increased probability of azimuth angles aligned with the street axis (Figure 
7.3, where the street axis has been set in the line defined by the angles 0° - 180°). There are no 
relevant differences between the distribution in azimuth of GPS and Galileo satellites. 
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Figure 7.2. Measured distribution of visible GPS and Galileo satellites according to their elevation angle. 
 
Figure 7.3. Measured distribution of visible GPS and Galileo satellites according to their azimuth with respect to 
the street axis (set in the line 0° - 180°). 
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As example, Figure 7.4 shows the observed distribution of visible satellites in the urban environment 
as a function of both their elevation and azimuth angle with respect to the street axis. 
 
Figure 7.4. Distribution of the visible satellites in the urban environment.  
7.4. Horizontal positioning error 
The horizontal positioning error is a bivariate Gaussian distribution, so it that can be described as the 
joint distribution of two independent Gaussian random variables in the axis of the equidensity ellipses, 
which directions and variances depend on the user/satellite geometry and the pseudorange nominal 
error (Appendix C). 
The difference of the standard deviation of the positioning error components in the major and minor 
semiaxes, σ      and σ     , can reach several meters (Figure 7.5). The horizontal positioning error 
magnitude, as well as the importance of the major axis component over the minor axis one, increases 
as the number of visible satellites decreases (Figure 7.6). 
In general, the error ellipse is likely to be oriented with its major axis perpendicular to the street axis, 
so that the positioning errors tend to situate the estimated position outside the street boundaries (Figure 
7.7). 
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Figure 7.5. Measured PDF of σmajor and σminor in the urban scenario. Receiver: dual constellation, dual frequency 
receiver L1/E1 BOC(1,1) - L5/E5a BPSK(10). Navigation solution: 3D position and receiver/GNSS time shift. 
 
Figure 7.6. Mean, 5% and 95% percentiles of the measured σmajor and σminor as a function of the number of 
visible satellites. Receiver: dual constellation, dual frequency receiver L1/E1 BOC(1,1) - L5/E5a BPSK(10). 
Navigation solution: 3D position and receiver/GNSS time shift. 
 
Figure 7.7. Measured distribution of the relative angle between the positioning error major axis and the street 
axis. Receiver: dual constellation, dual frequency receiver L1/E1 BOC(1,1) - L5/E5a BPSK(10). Navigation 
solution: 3D position and receiver/GNSS time shift. 
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7.5. RAIM performance 
RAIM performance can be measured by the probability of not detecting a positioning failure and by 
the probability of missing an valid position (because of a false alarm or RAIM unavailability). For a 
given user/satellite geometry and pseudorange nominal errors, the RAIM performance depends on the 
combination of    ,     and its availability, that is, the comparison between HPL and HAL. Since 
both analyzed RAIM have been designed with a fixed    , they always attain the missed alarm rate 
they have been conceived to meet, and it is the probability of providing an valid position in the fault-
free case which varies in time. The civil aviation WLSR RAIM has constant     and     with a time-
variant HPL, whereas the novel WLSR RAIM is designed to provide fixed     and HPL with a time-
variant    . Therefore the RAIM performance at a given instant is characterized by the HPL in the 
first algorithm and by the     in the second one. Both variable parameters are directly related with the 
         and depend on the user/satellite geometry, the nominal pseudorange error and the other 
integrity monitoring requirements (    and     for the variable HPL,     and HAL for the variable 
   ). 
In the studied case, single-frequency SBAS users have the lowest nominal errors, followed by dual-
frequency and finally, with the highest errors, non-augmented single-frequency ones (section 4.3.7). 
Dual-frequency SBAS users are not studied because their nominal errors are approximately equal to 
those of the non-augmented case. Therefore, for the same RAIM configuration and geometry, SBAS  
users provide the best performance, followed by dual-frequency ones. 
The user/satellite geometry depends on the number of visible satellites and on how these are 
introduced in the observation matrix. In general, at a given instant and for the same RAIM and 
pseudorange errors, dual constellation receivers outperform single-constellation ones. The different 
navigation solutions modify the observation matrix and also play an important role in the 
user/geometry; in decreasing order of performance: 
1) 2D position and receiver/GNSS delay, 
2) 2D position, receiver/GPS delay and inter-GNSS delay, 
3) 3D position and receiver/GNSS delay 
4) 3D position, receiver/GPS delay and inter-GNSS delay. 
This section presents a statistical analysis of the         , the HPL of the standard WLSR RAIM and 
the     of the novel RAIM for the baseline receiver (dual frequency receivers with BOC(1,1) 
modulation in L1/E1 and navigation solution consisting of 3D position plus user/GNSS delay), in 
urban and rural scenarios, in the fault-free case (no major service failure). Afterwards, the behavior of 
other receivers is overviewed and finally, the performance of the fault exclusion module is analyzed. 
7.5.1. Maximum slope 
The maximum slope is a function of the nominal error covariance matrix and the user/satellite 
geometry, independent from the WLSR RAIM algorithm and its configuration. It is an indicator of the 
performance the WLSR RAIM is able to attain at a given instant: the smaller it is, the lower is the 
HPL in the classic WLSR RAIM, as well as the     in the variable-    WLSR RAIM. 
Figure 7.8 compares the maximum slope CDF obtained with the baseline receiver in the urban and 
rural scenarios. In order to obtain comparable functions for different users and environments, the CDF 
has been computed over the whole simulation length, setting          to infinity when the number of 
satellites does not reach the minimum necessary to perform integrity monitoring. That is, the obtained 
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curves represent the probability that at a given instant the user is able to run the integrity monitoring 
function with a          equal to or lower than a given value. 
The environment has a significant impact on the maximum slope: the values of          are much 
lower in the rural scenario than in the urban one, which is additionally limited by the fact that only 
96% of the epochs have 5 or more visible satellites. As expected, SBAS receivers have the best 
performance, followed by dual frequency ones. 
 
Figure 7.8. Measured CDF of the slopeMAX in the fault detection RAIM (fault-free case). Receiver: dual 
constellation L1/E1 BOC(1,1); dual frequency with L5/E5a BPSK(10). Navigation solution: 3D position and 
receiver/GNSS time shift. 
7.5.2. Variable HPL (WLSR RAIM with constant PFA) 
The HPL of the classic WLSR RAIM of eq.(6.36) is a function of         , which varies with the 
user/satellite geometry and the nominal pseudorange error, and     , which depends on the     and 
   . Figure 7.9 depicts the probability that the RAIM is available at a given instant as a function of the 
HAL. In general, the availability rate in urban environments for HAL below 100 meters is low; with 
HAL=50 m., it spans between 9% and 19% for single frequency receivers, 22% and 34% for dual 
frequency ones, and between 58% and 68% for L1/E1 SBAS users. Despite the improvement in rural 
environments, the RAIM availability remains low, specially for single frequency receivers. For the 
same    , higher     give smaller HPL (better availability). 
Hybridized GNSS receivers with external altitude information increase the RAIM availability 
according to the altitude nominal noise     , being able to reach a performance level up to that of 2D 
receivers that do not estimate the altitude (Figure 7.10). For instance, an external altitude with        
meters increases the availability rate of baseline dual-frequency receivers with         
  , 
      
   and        meters in urban environments from 28% to 44%. 
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  a) Urban environment 
 
  b) Rural environment 
—                       Dotted line:   L1/E1 
—                       Dashed line:  L1/E1 + SBAS corrections 
—                             Solid line:     iono-free L1/E1 - L5/E5a 
—                              
 
Figure 7.9. CDF of the HPL obtained in the fault detection civil aviation WLSR RAIM (fault-free case). 
Receiver: dual constellation L1/E1 BOC(1,1); dual frequency with L5/E5a BPSK(10). Navigation solution: 3D 
position and receiver/GNSS time shift. 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
X
p
( 
H
P
L
 
 X
 )
 
 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
X
p
( 
H
P
L
 
 X
 )
 
 
138 Chapter 7 
 
 
 
 a) Urban environment 
 
 b) Rural environment 
Figure 7.10. CDF of the HPL obtained in the fault detection module of the civil aviation WLSR RAIM for 
hybrid receivers with external altitude with an error model σalt. Receiver: dual constellation, dual frequency 
L1/E1 BOC(1,1) - L5/E5a BPSK(10). Navigation solution: 3D position and receiver/GNSS time shift. RAIM 
configuration: PMD = 5∙10
-5, PFA = 5∙10
-3. 
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7.5.3. Variable PFA (WLSR RAIM with constant HPL) 
The variable     - eq.(6.44) - depends on the    , the HAL, the user/satellite geometry and the 
nominal pseudorange error. 
Figure 7.11 illustrates the CDF of the probability of false alert with the HAL set to 25 and 50 meters. 
The HAL has a significant effect on the    ; for example, a iono-free baseline user with       
     has       
   the 63% of the epochs if        m, and 32% if        m. 
The CDF of the     is equivalent to the RAIM availability in the civil aviation WLSR RAIM. For 
instance, the probability that baseline users have       
   in an urban environment with       
     and        is the same that        with         
   and       
  . This 
probability is 14% for L1/E1 receivers, 28% for dual frequency and 63% for SBAS users (Figure 7.9, 
Figure 7.11) 
Hybridized GNSS receivers with external altitude information decrease the     up to the levels of 2D 
receivers that do not estimate the altitude (Figure 7.12). 
7.5.4. Alternative receivers 
Appendix E contains the classic WLSR RAIM unavailability rate, i.e.           , in the fault-free 
case, obtained from the simulations for all the combinations of GNSS signals and navigation solutions 
under study in the urban and rural environment, with HAL equal to 25 and 50 meters. The RAIM has 
been configured with the values selected in section 7.6, that is,         
  ,       
   and 
        
  . The shown RAIM unavailability is equivalent to the probability that the     of the 
variable-    WLSR RAIM exceeds     
  .  
In general, the best performance is obtained for users computing 2D positioning with SBAS 
corrections. 
In the dual constellation case, SBAS 2D users reach, with a 50-m HAL in urban environment, an 
unavailability rate of 6.9% for L1 TMBOC(6,1,4/33) & E1 CBOC(6,1,1/11,-) users, and of 5.5% for 
L5/E5a BPSK(10) users. Three-dimensional positioning receivers that integrate external altitude data 
with        m attain unavailability rates close to those of 2D users: 7.4% for L1 TMBOC(6,1,4/33) 
& E1 CBOC(6,1,1/11,-) users, and 6% for L5/E5a BPSK(10) users. 
Using E1 CBOC(6,1,1/11,+) or E1 CBOC(6,1,1/11,-) do not provide important differences; for 
example, the unavailability for 3D positioning with both signals combined with L1 TMBOC(6,1,4/33) 
varies from 18.8% to 17.8%. 
RAIM unavailability is considerably smaller in the rural scenario, attaining values around      or 
even lower for 2D SBAS users. Nevertheless, some receiver configurations, specially single frequency 
ones with HAL=25 m, provide unacceptably large unavailability rates.  
Users using only one constellation, GPS or Galileo, have a very high unavailability in urban 
environment. For instance, a dual-frequency, 2D-positioning GPS user with TMBOC, has the RAIM 
unavailable 80.5% of the time for         
   and a HAL of 50 meters; in the same conditions, a 
dual constellation user that additionally process E1 CBOC- signals decreases the unavailability rate to 
18%. The high unavailability rate of single constellation users in the urban scenario make them 
suitable for road toll only in rural environments. 
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  a) Urban environment 
 
 b) Rural environment 
—                   m. Dotted line:   L1/E1 
—                     Dashed line:  L1/E1 + SBAS corrections 
—                          Solid line:     iono-free L1/E1 - L5/E5a 
—                           
 
Figure 7.11. CDF of the PFA obtained in the fault detection module of the variable- PFA WLSR RAIM (fault-free 
case). Receiver: dual constellation L1/E1 BOC(1,1); dual frequency with L5/E5a BPSK(10). Navigation 
solution: 3D position and receiver/GNSS time shift. 
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  a) Urban environment 
 
  b) Rural environment 
 
Figure 7.12. CDF of the PFA obtained in the fault detection module of the variable- PFA WLSR RAIM for hybrid 
receivers with external altitude with an error model σalt. HAL=50 meters. Receiver: dual constellation, dual 
frequency L1/E1 BOC(1,1) - L5/E5a BPSK(10). Navigation solution: 3D position and receiver/GNSS time shift.  
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7.5.5. Fault exclusion module 
Although this work focuses in the RAIM fault detection capability, Appendix E contains the 
unavailability rate of the WLSR RAIM fault exclusion module, obtained from the simulations for all 
the combinations of GNSS signals and navigation solutions under study in the urban and rural 
environment, with HAL equal to 25 and 50 meters. These data are equivalently the probability that the 
    of the variable-    WLSR RAIM exceeds     
  . The unavailability of the fault exclusion 
module has been calculated as the worst-case value computed in the N subgroups of N-1 range 
measurements at each instant. The RAIM has been configured as in fault-free case, that is,       
    ,       
   and         
  . 
The satellite removal process, which deteriorates the user/satellite geometry, and the fact of selecting 
the worst-case subgroup, results in a poorer performance than in the fault detection case. As in the 
fault detection case, the best performance is obtained for users computing 2D positioning with SBAS 
corrections, and the integration of external altitude information improve the performance up to a 
maximum equal to that of users that only estimate the bidimensional horizontal position. 
7.6. Road toll performance 
WLSR RAIM algorithms are designed with a fixed    , so they always attain the false segment 
recognition rate (overcharging) they have been conceived to meet in section 5.4.4.1, independently 
from the environment. Therefore, the analysis of the GNSS-ETC performance focuses in the missed 
geo-object recognition rate (undercharging). 
The probability of  missed segment recognition, i.e.                     , has been computed for 
any user trajectory beginning every      second and duration ranging from 1 to 40 seconds. The 
presented results are the average probability obtained along the 72 hours of simulation. 
First, the best parameters of the geo-object recognition algorithm are found. Afterwards the probability 
of missed road segment detection is calculated in the fault-free case is calculated, first with baseline 
receivers and finally for the rest of users. 
7.6.1. Segment recognition algorithm and RAIM configuration 
A road segment is correctly recognized and charged to the user when the number of valid positions 
inside the geo-object is equal to or greater than the threshold     of the segment recognition 
algorithm. A higher threshold requires the RAIM to be designed with a less restrictive     in order to 
meet the overcharging constraint (Table 5.2). 
The probability of missed segment recognition has been analyzed for different     and their 
corresponding    , proving that the best results are obtained with       (Figure 7.13). In all 
different combinations of GNSS signals, RAIM algorithms and trajectory durations under study, the 
increased     allowed by a higher     does not compensate the increment in the required of number 
of valid positions per segment. 
For this reason, the geo-object recognition algorithm threshold is set to      , that is, only one 
valid position inside the geo-object is necessary to charge the road segment. 
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 a) Urban, iono-free L1/E1 + L5/E5a    b) Urban, L1/E1 + SBAS corrections 
      
 c) Rural, iono-free L1/E1 + L5/E5a    d) Rural, L1/E1 + SBAS corrections 
—      ;               —      ;               
—      ;               —      ;               
—      ;                
 
Figure 7.13. Probability that, in the fault-free case, the number of valid positions inside the geo-object is lower 
than the segment recognition threshold for different NTh and PMD. HAL=50 meters. Variable-PFA WLSR RAIM. 
Receiver: dual constellation L1/E1 BOC(1,1); dual frequency with L5/E5a BPSK(10). Navigation solution: 3D 
position and receiver/GNSS time shift. 
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The     is obtained from the curve       of Figure 5.10 (or Table 5.2). Two values of     will be 
studied: 
           , which meets the overcharging requirement in the worst-case with a positioning 
error correlation of      seconds (it meets the maximum allowed probability of false geo-object 
recognition for up to 72 independent geo-object misleading positions, which corresponds to a user 
trajectory of 360 seconds -5 km at 50 km/h- outside the geo-object and all its positions incorrectly 
estimated inside it). 
         , which meets the overcharging requirement when there is only one independent 
position per segment. 
 
The     is obtained from the curve       of Figure 5.14. Two values of     are studied: 
           , which meets the undercharging requirement if there is always one independent 
position with available RAIM in the geo-object. 
           , which meets the undercharging requirement if there is always two independent 
positions with available RAIM in the geo-object. 
7.6.2. Probability of missed geo-object recognition 
The toll system performance with baseline receivers is analyzed in the fault-free scenario described in 
section 5.4.4.2.1, in which a user circulates through a road segment and all estimated positions that 
may be used by the segment recognition algorithm are free of pseuorange failures because there is no 
major service failure (Figure 5.12). The undercharging requirement         
   is met when the 
probability of an insufficient number of valid positions inside the geo-object in the fault-free case is 
                       
   - eq.(5.46) -. 
The average probability of missed segment recognition has been calculated for the baseline receiver 
for trajectory durations up to 40 seconds and the configurations set in the previous subsection, that is, 
     ,         
  ,       
  , and for the civil aviation RAIM,         
   and     
      . 
In general, the WLSR RAIM with variable     outperforms the classic one, which in turn provides 
better results with         
   than with         
   (Figure 7.14); this behavior is found in all 
studied cases, so only the case with         
   will be analyzed hereafter (Figure 7.15 - Figure 
7.16). 
The probability of missed geo-object recognition decreases as the user trajectory along it gets longer. 
Table 7.5 and Table 7.6 contain the minimum user trajectory duration        from which the required 
probability of missed road segment recognition with       is met, i.e.                       
          
  , where   is the total trajectory duration. 
In the urban environment, users with the classic WLSR RAIM are able to meet the undercharging 
requirement only if they apply SBAS corrections and the HAL is 50 meters. The RAIM with variable 
    reduces the trajectory duration needed to attain the requirement with those configurations, and 
adds two more valid cases with       
  : HAL=25 m. for SBAS users and HAL=50 m. for iono-
free receivers. The integration of external altitude information with an error model σ        
decreases      for all valid cases with non-hybridized receivers, and includes the case of HAL=25 m. 
with         
   and the variable-    WLSR RAIM. 
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In the rural environment, the classic WLSR RAIM attains the requirement in all cases except for 
single-frequency receivers without SBAS corrections with an HAL of 25 m. If the variable-    RAIM 
is used, the only case that does not meet the maximum allowed undercharging ratio is for HAL=25 m. 
and         
  . 
 
Table 7.5. Minimum user trajectory that meets the undercharging requirement. Urban environment. Receiver: 
GPS & Galileo L1/E1 BOC(1,1); iono-free with L5/E5a BPSK(10). Navigation solution: 3D position and 
receiver/GNSS time shift. 
External 
altitude 
hibridization 
Pseudorange  
nominal 
error model 
Environment 
Urban 
WLSR RAIM 
Classic          
    Variable               
    
                        
HAL 
25 50 25 50 25 50 25 50 
No 
hibridization 
L1/E1 x x x x x x x x 
L1/E1 + SBAS x 29 x 26 x 22 31 20 
L1/E1 + L5/E5a x x x x x x x 36 
σ        
L1/E1 x x x x x x x x 
L1/E1 + SBAS x 20 x 17 29 15 21 13 
L1/E1 + L5/E5a x x x x x 30 x 21 
 
Table 7.6. Minimum user trajectory that meets the undercharging requirement. Rural environment. Receiver: 
GPS & Galileo L1/E1 BOC(1,1); iono-free with L5/E5a BPSK(10). Navigation solution: 3D position and 
receiver/GNSS time shift. 
External 
altitude 
hibridization 
Pseudorange  
nominal 
error model 
Environment 
Rural 
WLSR RAIM 
Classic          
    Variable               
    
                        
HAL 
25 50 25 50 25 50 25 50 
No 
hibridization 
L1/E1 x 20 x 17 x 10 23 7 
L1/E1 + SBAS 9 3 8 3 5 2 4 2 
L1/E1 + L5/E5a x 10 28 8 15 5 12 4 
σ        
L1/E1 x 17 x 14 26 8 18 6 
L1/E1 + SBAS 8 3 6 2 5 1 4 1 
L1/E1 + L5/E5a 25 8 20 6 12 5 9 4 
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 a)           ,        m          b)           ,        m 
   
  c)         ,        m                 d)         ,        m 
 
— Constant-    WLSR RAIM              Dotted line:  L1/E1 
— Constant-    WLSR RAIM              Dashed line: L1/E1 + SBAS corrections 
— Variable-    WLSR RAIM Solid line: iono-free L1/E1 - L5/E5a 
 
Figure 7.14. Probability of zero valid positions during a user trajectory trough a geo-object in the fault-free case. 
Environment: urban. Receiver: dual constellation L1/E1 BOC(1,1); dual frequency with L5/E5a BPSK(10). 
Navigation solution: 3D position and receiver/GNSS time shift. 
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 a)           ,        m          b)           ,        m 
   
  c)         ,        m                 d)         ,        m 
 
— Constant-    WLSR RAIM              Dotted line:  L1/E1 
     + external altitude           Dashed line: L1/E1 + SBAS corrections 
— Variable-    WLSR RAIM  Solid line: iono-free L1/E1 - L5/E5a 
    + external altitude            
 
Figure 7.15. Probability of zero valid positions during a user's trajectory trough a geo-object in the fault-free 
case. Environment: urban. Receiver: dual constellation L1/E1 BOC(1,1); dual frequency with L5/E5a BPSK(10); 
hybridization with external altitude σalt = 5 m. Navigation solution: 3D position and receiver/GNSS time shift. 
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
10
-6
10
-5
10
-4
10
-3
10
-2
10
-1
10
0
Trajectory Duration (s)
P
( 
N
a
p
t 
=
 0
 )
 
 
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
10
-6
10
-5
10
-4
10
-3
10
-2
10
-1
10
0
Trajectory Duration (s)
P
( 
N
a
p
t 
=
 0
 )
 
 
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
10
-6
10
-5
10
-4
10
-3
10
-2
10
-1
10
0
Trajectory Duration (s)
P
( 
N
a
p
t 
=
 0
 )
 
 
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
10
-6
10
-5
10
-4
10
-3
10
-2
10
-1
10
0
Trajectory Duration (s)
P
( 
N
a
p
t 
=
 0
 )
 
 
P
(N
va
lid
 =
 0
) 
P
(N
va
lid
 =
 0
) 
P
(N
va
lid
 =
 0
) 
P
(N
va
lid
 =
 0
) 
148 Chapter 7 
 
 
  
 a)           ,        m          b)           ,        m 
      
      c) 2D position (unknown inter-GNSS delay) d) 3D position (unknown inter-GNSS delay) 
— constant-    WLSR RAIM              Dotted line:   L1/E1 
— constant-    WLSR RAIM + external altitude        m. Dashed line:  L1/E1 + SBAS corrections 
— variable-    WLSR RAIM Solid line:     iono-free L1/E1 - L5/E5a 
— variable-    WLSR RAIM + external altitude        m.  
 
Figure 7.16. Probability of zero valid positions during a user's trajectory trough a geo-object in the fault-free 
case. Environment: rural. Receiver: dual constellation L1/E1 BOC(1,1); dual frequency with L5/E5a BPSK(10). 
Navigation solution: 3D position and receiver/GNSS time shift. 
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7.6.3. Alternative receivers 
Appendix F contains, for all the studied combinations of GNSS receivers, RAIM algorithms and HAL, 
the average minimum user trajectory duration        from which the required probability of missed 
road segment recognition is met in the fault-free case. 
As expected, the performance with 2D positioning are better than with 3D solutions, and TMBOC or 
CBOC signals provide better results than BOC. In general, the variable-    RAIM outperforms the 
classic one. 
Single constellation users only attain the required undercharging level in the rural environment in 
certain cases. 
7.6.4. A note on the performance in the faulty case 
Let us consider the faulty scenario described in section 5.4.4.2.2, in which a user circulates through a 
road segment and all positions that may be used by the segment recognition algorithm have been 
estimated with a biased pseudorange due to a major service failure. In this case, the undercharging 
requirement         
   is met when the probability of an insufficient number of valid positions 
inside the geo-object after the fault exclusion process is                                   - 
eq.(5.49)-. 
A first approximation of the toll system performance in the faulty case has been obtained as the 
probability of missed geo-object recognition in the fault-free case with the worst-case subgroup 
created in the fault exclusion algorithm; it has been proved that, whenever the undercharging 
requirement is met in the fault-free case, it is also met in the faulty one. 
7.7. Conclusions 
Simulations have been run in order to obtain the probability of missed geo-object recognition in urban 
and rural environments. Different satellite visibility and positioning error statistics have been shown, 
proving the performance decrement in the urban environment with respect to the rural one. 
The evolution of the maximum slope, the HPL of the standard WLSR RAIM and the     of the novel 
RAIM has been analyzed to study the performance of the different integrity monitoring techniques. In 
the studied case, for the same RAIM configuration and geometry, SBAS users provide the best 
performance, followed by dual-frequency ones. In addition, the different navigation solutions also play 
an important role in the RAIM performance, resulting the following order of decreasing performance: 
1) 2D position and receiver/GNSS delay, 2) 2D position, receiver/GPS delay and inter-GNSS delay, 3) 
3D position and receiver/GNSS delay, 4) 3D position, receiver/GPS delay and inter-GNSS delay. 
Hybridized GNSS 3D-positioning receivers with external altitude information increase the RAIM 
availability according to the altitude nominal noise     , being able to reach a performance level up to 
that of users that only need 2D positioning. 
WLSR RAIM algorithms designed with a fixed     always meet the false segment recognition rate 
they have been conceived to attain, so the analysis of the toll system performance focuses in the 
missed geo-object recognition rate. 
The geo-object recognition algorithm gives best results with a threshold      , that is, only one 
valid position inside the geo-object is necessary to charge the road segment. The reason is that the 
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increased     allowed by a higher     does not compensate, in terms of the final probability of 
missed geo-object recognition, the increment in the required of number of valid positions per segment. 
The final RAIM configuration, dependent on    , is         
   when there are multiple 
independent positions per geo-object, and       
   when only one independent position per geo-
object is assumed. For the civil aviation RAIM,         
  . The value         
   has also 
been studied and discarded because it always provided worse results. 
The probability of missed geo-object recognition decreases as the user trajectory duration increases, so 
the toll performance is shown as the minimum user trajectory duration that meets the required 
probability of missed road segment recognition. Two values of HAL are studied, 25 and 50 meters. All 
combinations of GNSS receivers and RAIM algorithms previously identified as potentially suitable for 
road toll applications have been studied. For example, baseline receivers (dual constellation, BOC(1,1) 
signals, 3D positioning) with the civil aviation WLSR RAIM are capable to meet the undercharging 
requirement within a maximum trajectory duration of 40 seconds only augmented with SBAS 
corrections and if HAL is 50 meters; the RAIM with variable     reduces the necessary trajectory 
duration and includes new cases that meet the undercharging requirement, like HAL of 25 meters with 
a hybrid SBAS receiver. Single constellation users do not attain the required undercharging level in 
urban environments, and in rural ones only in certain cases. 
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Chapter 8  Conclusions and Future Work 
8.1. Conclusions 
The aim of the present work is to study GNSS integrity monitoring techniques applied to GNSS-based 
electronic toll collection systems in rural and urban environments. Satellite navigation provides 
flexible, free-flow toll systems with a reduced quantity of roadside infrastructure, and it is one of the 
recommended technologies for the European Electronic Toll Service [EU, 2004]. Electronic toll is a 
liability critical application that needs GNSS integrity monitoring in order to control erroneous 
invoicing, often described in terms of undercharging and overcharging. 
GNSS integrity has been originally developed in the civil aviation framework; currently GPS integrity 
monitoring relies on different augmentation systems (GBAS, SBAS, ABAS) that have been conceived 
to meet the ICAO requirements. For this reason, the GNSS integrity requirements for civil aviation 
applications have been first presented in order to understand the design objectives and constraints of 
the different integrity monitoring systems.  
Current GNSS-based e-toll systems have been presented and geo-fencing has been identified as the 
most suitable technique for developing a GNSS-based ETC over a given area or road network, so the 
tolled region is divided in geo-objects which are the basic pricing sections. Thus, the application's 
objective is the geo-object recognition process, that is, to detect whether a user has been or not in a 
pricing section. The relationship between the road topology and the HAL has been obtained. The use 
of the different augmentation systems inherited from civil aviation to urban toll applications has been 
analyzed; autonomous integrity monitoring algorithms (RAIM) have been selected because they do 
not require additional equipment, are easily extended to the multi-constellation case at any frequency 
band, can be tuned to a given performance level, and are able to deal with all pesudorange errors. 
SBAS is optionally used to correct pseudorange measurement errors. A modernized SBAS capable to 
augment future GPS and Galileo signals is assumed. 
Snapshot positioning and integrity monitoring techniques are used in order to avoid feedback loops 
and have full control of the integrity at each instant. Integration of external altitude information is 
considered. The most suitable GNSS receiver configurations have been identified, with special interest 
in dual constellation GPS & Galileo users. 
A geo-object recognition algorithm based on the number of independent positions inside the geo-
object has been proposed. In this context, two positions are defined to be independent when they 
provide independent outputs of the integrity monitoring algorithm. 
A nominal pseudorange measurement model suitable for integrity-driven applications in urban 
environments has been presented. The pseudorange nominal error model is a zero-mean Gaussian 
function, which assures consistency with the assumptions of integrity monitoring systems used in civil 
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aviation. The nominal model has been obtained dividing the total pseudorange error into five 
independent error sources which can be modelled independently: broadcasted satellite clock 
corrections and ephemeris errors, ionospheric delay, tropospheric delay, receiver thermal noise (plus 
interferences) and multipath. Some of these errors have been characterized with existing and tested 
models, others like the multipath one have been specifically modelled for the targeted application. 
The fault model considers only pseudorange failures due to major service failures. This choice allows 
to know its probability of occurrence but requires GNSS receivers to have robust protection 
mechanisms against other failures. 
The top level requirements of toll applications have been defined in terms of probability of missed and 
false geo-object recognition. The GNSS integrity requirements needed to design the RAIM algorithms 
have been derived afterwards from the top level requirements, assuming a RAIM with fault detection 
capabilities and a major service failure as the faulty case. A failure tree for toll systems has been also 
proposed. The resulting RAIM's     is a function of the probability of false geo-object recognition, 
the road segment recognition threshold      , and the number of geo-object misleading positions, 
which in this work are set to a worst case value of 72 (that corresponds to the case of a 5-km length 
geo-object, a user speed of 50 km/h and    of 5 s.). The resulting RAIM's     is a function of the 
probability of missed geo-object recognition,    , and the number of positions with available RAIM. 
Two RAIM algorithms have been selected as candidates to be employed in urban road toll 
applications. First, the Weighted Least Squares Residual (WLSR) RAIM, widely used in civil aviation 
and usually set as the reference against which compare other RAIM techniques, has been presented. 
One of the main challenges of RAIM in urban environments is the bad user/geometry geometry, which 
usually results in a high RAIM unavailability rate. With the aim to cope with this problem, a novel 
RAIM has been designed with the objective of providing a trade-off between false alarm and RAIM 
availability, in order to get the highest rate of valid positions within the integrity requirements. 
The novel RAIM employs the same WLSR test statistic used in civil aviation. While the classic 
WLSR RAIM is designed to provide fixed     and     and the lowest possible HPL at each instant, 
the novel algorithm is set to obtain constant HPL and    , and the lowest possible     at each instant. 
Thus, setting the HPL equal to the HAL, the new algorithm is always available (provided at least 5 
satellites are visible) and valid positions are discarded only because of false detections, which 
increases the probability that a position is declared valid by the RAIM. Since the     is fixed, the 
maximum allowed probability of missed detection is always met. 
Electronic toll systems using any of both considered WLSR RAIM algorithms meet the probability of 
false geo-object recognition (overcharging constraint) assured by the     in the worst case, 
independently from the environment. On the other hand, the undercharging rate depends on the 
number of valid positions in the geo-object, which not only depends on the GNSS receiver and RAIM 
configuration, but also on the user/satellite geometry. For this reason, simulations in MATLAB have 
been run analyze the viability of toll systems using different on-board units in urban and rural 
environments. 
Satellite visibility and positioning error statistics have been shown, proving the performance 
decrement in the urban environment with respect to the rural one. 
The evolution of the HPL of the standard WLSR RAIM and the     of the novel RAIM have been 
analyzed to study the performance of the different integrity monitoring techniques. In the studied case, 
for the same RAIM configuration and geometry, SBAS users provide the best performance, followed 
by dual-frequency ones. In addition, the different navigation solutions also play an important role in 
the RAIM performance, resulting the following order of decreasing performance: 1) 2D position and 
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receiver/GNSS delay, 2) 2D position, receiver/GPS delay and inter-GNSS delay, 3) 3D position and 
receiver/GNSS delay, 4) 3D position, receiver/GPS delay and inter-GNSS delay. 
Hybridized GNSS 3D-positioning receivers with external altitude information increase the RAIM 
availability according to the altitude nominal noise     , being able to reach a performance level up to 
that of users that only need 2D positioning. 
WLSR RAIM algorithms designed with a fixed     always meet the false segment recognition rate 
they have been conceived to attain, so the analysis of the toll system performance focuses in the 
missed geo-object recognition rate. 
The geo-object recognition algorithm gives best results with a threshold      , that is, only one 
valid position inside the geo-object is necessary to charge the road segment. The reason is that the 
increased     allowed by a higher     does not compensate, in terms of the final probability of 
missed geo-object recognition, the increment in the required of number of valid positions per segment. 
The final selected RAIM configuration, that meets the overcharging requirement for      , is 
        
   in the case of multiple independent positions per geo-object, and       
   in the 
case of only one independent position per geo-object is assumed. For the classic WLSR RAIM, 
        
  . The value         
   has also been studied and discarded because it always 
provided worse results. 
The probability of missed geo-object recognition decreases as the user trajectory duration increases, so 
the toll performance has been shown as the minimum user trajectory duration that meets the required 
probability of missed road segment recognition. Two values of HAL are studied, 25 and 50 meters. All 
combinations of GNSS receivers and RAIM algorithms previously identified as potentially suitable for 
road toll applications have been studied. The novel WLSR RAIM with variable     outperforms the 
original one in terms of missed geo-object recognition in all studied scenarios. 
The feasibility of electronic toll systems by means of GNSS with integrity in urban and rural 
environments has been proven for certain GNSS receivers and RAIM algorithms. In particular, dual 
constellation receivers are needed for a satisfactory performance in urban environments. Single 
constellation users only attain the desired undercharging level in rural environments in certain cases. 
For example, baseline receivers (dual constellation, BOC(1,1) signals, 3D positioning) using the civil 
aviation WLSR RAIM are capable to meet the undercharging requirement within a maximum 
trajectory duration of 40 seconds only augmented with SBAS corrections and if the HAL is 50 meters, 
while the RAIM with variable     reduces the necessary trajectory duration and includes new cases 
that meet the undercharging requirement, like HAL of 25 meters with a hybrid SBAS receiver. 
8.2. Original contributions 
The main contributions presented in this thesis are the following: 
 Detailed analysis of GNSS-based road toll collection applications with geo-fencing: relationship 
between the HAL and the road topology for geo-object recognition with integrity (section 3.4) 
 Pseudorange nominal error model due to ionospheric delay in Galileo single-frequency receivers, 
based on a VTEC database and suitable for applications with GNSS integrity (section 2) 
 Pseudorange nominal error model due to multipath in urban environments, suitable for 
applications with GNSS integrity (section 2) 
 Failure tree that leads to geo-object misleading positions (5.4.2) 
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 Derivation of the     and     of fault detection RAIM algorithms for GNSS-based electronic toll 
systems from the required probabilities of missed and false geo-object recognition, in the case of 
a threat model consisting on major service failures (section 5.4.4) 
 Design of a novel WLSR RAIM with variable probability of false alarm and constant HPL that 
maximizes the number of valid positions within the integrity requirements in the fault-free case 
(section 6.3). It consists in an algorithm with a constant probability of missed detection, without 
restriction in the maximum allowable    . 
8.3. Perspectives for future work 
The joint use of GPS & Galileo has been proved to considerably improve the RAIM performance with 
respect to the single constellation case. It would be interesting to extend the analysis to a multi-
constellation case that includes more systems, such as Glonass or Compass. This task is not 
problematic from a RAIM point of view, since it can easily integrate signals from different systems 
and frequency bands, requiring mainly the pseudorange nominal measurement model of each signal. 
The threat model addressed in this work consists in pseudorange failures caused by major service 
failures, which requires the user to be equipped with mechanisms that protect against other failures 
like NLOS multipath. A more complete threat model could be considered, including other 
pseudorange failure types. This work would need the identification of the possible failure sources and 
a reliable characterization of each of them, including their probability of occurrence and their duration. 
The GNSS integrity requirements should be recalculated to take into account the new pseudorange 
failure types. 
One of the main limitations of the studied WLSR RAIM algorithms is the assumption that the 
occurrence of multiple simultaneous failures is negligible, that is, the probability of positioning failure 
missed detections is assured to be within the required     only if they are caused by a single 
pseudorange bias. This is a common assumption in civil aviation RAIM, which is valid for single 
constellation users and a threat model composed only of major service failures. However, 
simultaneous failures may occur with a non-negligible probability if multi-constellation GNSS 
receivers and additional failure sources such as NLOS multipath in urban environments are 
considered. The use of RAIM able to deal with simultaneous pseudorange failures should be addressed 
in this case. 
Another limitation of the WLSR RAIM is the assumption that the probability of positioning failures in 
the fault-free case is negligible. Nevertheless, nominal positioning errors can exceed the HAL with a 
probability that depends on the HAL, the pseudorange nominal errors and the user/satellite geometry, 
which has been shown to be specially degraded in urban environments. A study could be carried out to 
characterize the missed detections in nominal conditions. 
The present work has focused on GNSS positioning and RAIM monitoring based on the least squares 
estimator, where the integration of external altitude information has resulted to significantly improve 
the RAIM performance. Hybridization of GNSS and external sensors like IMU with a Kalman filter 
are commonly used to improve navigation accuracy and availability in urban environments, and 
moreover, integrity monitoring with Kalman filters has been investigated. Therefore, the use of GNSS 
receivers based on Kalman filter could be studied for electronic toll systems, paying special attention 
to the effect of the feedback loops in the temporal evolution of the integrity monitoring algorithm. 
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Although WLSR RAIM has been selected for this first study, it would be interesting to compare its 
performance in urban environments against other RAIM algorithms. The design of a variable     and 
a fixed HPL can be extended to other existing RAIM.  
The pseudorange nominal error model used to compute the RAIM and the toll system performance 
represents the worst case. An analysis with the actual ionospheric residual errors or the actual      
would improve the obtained results, specially of non-SBAS users. 
The funding entities of the thesis preferred an overall theoretical analysis of the toll collection 
problem, leaving the measurement of real data and its comparison with simulation results as future 
work. Since the RAIM performance has been shown to strongly depend on the environment, more 
different scenarios could be tested. 
Thus, further studies should be conducted to conclude on the use of GNSS integrity monitoring 
techniques in urban environments for different applications. 
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AAIM  Aircraft Autonomous Integrity Monitoring 
ABAS  Aircraft Based Augmentation System 
AGPS  Assisted GPS 
APV  Approach with Vertical Guidance 
ARNS   Aeronautical Radio Navigation System 
BOC  Binary Offset Carrier 
CBOC  Composite Binary Offset Carrier 
CNES  Centre National d'Etudes Spaciales 
CNS/ATM Communications, Navigation, and Surveillance / Air Traffic Management 
DLL  Delay Lock Loop 
DSRC  Dedicated Short Range Communications 
EETS   European Electronic Toll Service 
EFC  Electronic Fee Collection 
EGNOS European Geostationary Navigation Overlay Service 
ENAC  Ecole Nationale de l'Aviation Civile 
ETC  Electronic Toll Collection 
FD  Fault Detection 
FDE  Fault Detection and Exclusion 
FLL   Frequency Lock Loop 
GBAS  Ground Based Augmentation System 
GIVE  Grid Ionosphere Vertical Error 
GNSS  Global Navigation Satellite System 
GPRS  General Packet Radio Service 
GPS   Global Positioning System 
GSM  Global System for Mobile Communications (Groupe Spécial Mobile) 
HAL  Horizontal Alert Level 
HPL  Horizontal Protection Level 
HVF  Performance-Related Heavy Vehicle Fee 
ICAO  International Civil Aviation Organisation 
ILS  Instrument Landing System 
IMU  Inertial Measurement Unit 
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INS  Inertial Navigation System 
LAAS  Local Area Augmentation System 
LNAV  Lateral Navigation 
LOS  Line Of Sight 
LP  Localizer Performance 
LPV  Localizer Performance with Vertical guidance 
LS  Least Squares 
LSR  Least Squares Residuals 
LSVA  Leistungsabhängige Schwerverkehrsabgabe (German acronym of HVF) 
MBOC  Multiplex Binary Offset Carrier 
MSAS  Multi-functional Satellite Augmentation System 
NLOS  Non-Line-Of-Sight 
NPA  Non-Precision Approach 
NTE  Not To Exceed (tolerance) 
OBU  On-board Unit 
OS  Open Service 
PLL   Phase Lock Loop 
PPS  Precise Positioning Service 
PRN  Pseudo-Random Noise 
RAIM  Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring 
RAMS  Reliability, Availability, Maintainability, and Safety 
RTCA  Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics 
RUC  Road User Charging 
SBAS  Satellite Based Augmentation System 
SIS  Signal In Space 
SISA  Signal In Space Accuracy 
SISE  Signal In Space Error 
SISNeTSignal in Space through the Internet  
SoL  Safety of Life 
SPS  Standard Positioning Service 
STEC  Slant Total Electron Content 
SV  Space Vehicle 
TEC  Total Electron Content 
TMBOC Time Multiplexed Binary Offset Carrier 
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TTA  Time To Alert 
UDRE  User Differential Range Error 
UNB3   University of New Brunswick (Tropospheric delay correction algorithm) 
URA   User Range Accuracy 
URE   User Range Error 
VAL  Vertical Alert Level 
VNAV  Vertical Navigation 
VPL  Vertical Protection Level 
VHF  Very High Frequency 
VPL  Vertical Protection Level 
VTEC  Vertical Total Electron Content 
WAAS  Wide Area Augmentation System 
WLS  Weighted Least Squares 
WSS  Wide Sense Stationary 
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Appendix A.  Derivation of the Linear Pseudorange Measurement Equation 
A.1. Linearization 
Let us consider a navigation system in which the solution consists of the user 3D position and the bias 
due to the time shift between the receiver clock and the GNSS reference time. This model corresponds 
to a single-constellation receiver or a multi-constellation receiver that knows the inter-system time 
shift. The navigation solution vector has four unknowns: 
                
  (A.1) 
where: 
            : user's 3D position expressed in WGS-84 coordinates 
   : pseudorange bias due to GNSS/receiver time delay 
 
The exact relationship between pseudorange measurements and the navigation solution is non-linear: 
          (A.2) 
with   range measurements: 
                  : pseudorange measurement vector 
                 : user's true navigation solution vector 
                  : pseudorange measurement error vector 
                             : non-linear relationship between   and   
                   
 
            
 
            
 
    (A.3) 
 where: 
o                       
 
:     satellite's true position in WGS-84 coordinates 
o  : number of pseudorange measurements 
 
The Taylor series of   around an initial estimate    is: 
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 (A.4) 
where: 
                             
  (A.5) 
 
The first-order Taylor series about    gives a linear approximation of  : 
                     (A.6) 
with: 
          
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
    
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
    
 
 
 
 
 
    
 (A.7) 
 
Finally, the following linear equation system is obtained : 
           (A.8) 
where: 
 Δ           : pseudorange measurement vector after linearization [Nx1] 
 Δ      : navigation solution vector after linearization [4x1] 
          : observation matrix [Nx4] 
                  : pseudorange measurement error vector [Nx1] 
A.2. Positioning in the User Geographic Frame 
The observation matrix (A.7) provides the user position in WGS-84 coordinates. If the user position is 
to be estimated in the North-East-Height coordinates in the user local geographic frame, the navigation 
solution vector after linearization results: 
                     
  (A.9) 
 
The observation matrix   has to be adapted to the desired navigation solution: 
    
                                    
    
                                    
  (A.10) 
    : elevation of     satellite relative to the user's position 
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    : azimuth of     satellite relative to the user's position 
A.3. Bidimensional positioning 
If only 2D positioning in the North-East coordinates in the user local geographic frame is needed, the 
navigation solution vector and the observation matrix are:   
                 
  (A.11) 
    
                             
   
                             
  (A.12) 
A.4. Dual-constellation receivers 
Let us consider a dual-constellation GPS/Galileo receiver in which the inter-system time shift is not 
known. The navigation solution vector has five variables: 
                       
  (A.13) 
where: 
            : user's tridimensional position expressed in the WGS 84 coordinates 
     : bias in GPS pseudorange measurements due to the receiver/GPS time delay 
     : bias in Galileo pseudorange measurements due to the receiver/Galileo time delay 
The number of satellites used to estimate the navigation solution vector is            , where 
     and      are the number of GPS and Galileo satellites respectively. A linear equation system 
similar to eq.(A.8) can be built where the first      lines correspond to GPS measurements and the 
last      to Galileo ones, with the following observation matrix: 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
   
   
   
   
   
  
     
      
   
      
   
      
   
  
        
   
        
   
        
   
  
     
   
   
   
   
   
   
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
 (A.14) 
 
Expressing the position in North-East-Height coordinates at the user's local geographic plane: 
                               
 
 (A.15) 
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  (A.16) 
 
If only 2D positioning is needed:   
                           
 
 (A.17) 
   
 
 
 
 
 
                              
    
                                          
                                                  
    
                               
 
 
 
 
 (A.18) 
A.5. External altitude information 
Three-dimensional positioning can be aided by external sensors that provide altitude information, like 
barometers or digital terrain maps. This external information can be included in the pseudorange linear 
measurement equation as an additional range measured at an elevation angle      :  
 Δ   Δ    Δ      Δ    Δ       
 
 (A.19) 
where: 
    : is the     pseudorange measurement after linearization 
         : is the external altitude information 
 
In the case where only one receiver/GNSS time shift must be estimated: 
    
                                    
    
                                    
    
  (A.20) 
 
In the dual constellation case with unknown inter-system time delay: 
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  (A.21) 
 
 
 172 
 
 
 
 
 173 
Appendix B 
Overbounding Gaussian of a Uniform 
Distribution 
 
 
Appendix B.  Overbounding Gaussian of a Uniform Distribution 
B.1. CDF Overbounding of a Uniform Distribution 
Let us consider a random variable uniformly distributed between       : 
                   (B.1) 
 
According to the CDF overbounding technique [DeCleene, 2000],   is overbounded by a zero-mean 
Gaussian,            , if: 
 
                          
                          
 (B.2) 
 
The CDF of the uniform distribution is: 
         
 
 
 
                                      
 
 
   
 
    
               
                                        
  (B.3) 
 
The CDF of the overbounding Gaussian is: 
          
 
 
       
 
    
               (B.4) 
where erf is the error function. 
 
The Gaussian standard deviation that meets the overbounding requirements is obtained introducing 
equations (B.3) and (B.4) in (B.1): 
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  (B.5) 
where       is the inverse error function. 
The       is an odd function, so the restrictions on    for               and              are 
equivalent. Thus: 
    
 
        
 
    
 
                      (B.6) 
 
Requirement (B.6) is a monotonically decreasing function of  . Since    must meet the overbounding 
requirements for any value of  , it is obtained for    : 
          
 
        
 
    
 
 (B.7) 
 
Substituting       by its Taylor series and truncating it in the first term: 
 
      
   
 
   
  
  
 
    
 
 
(B.8) 
 
Hence: 
              (B.9) 
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Appendix C.  Weighted Least Squares Estimator (WLSE) 
C.1. Measurement equation 
The present appendix analyzes the WLSE applied to obtain the navigation solution from a linear 
pseudorange measurement equation system like that of eq.(A.8): 
           (C.1) 
 
with pseudorange errors described by: 
       (C.2) 
          (C.3) 
               
  (C.4) 
C.2. WLS Navigation Solution Estimation 
The WLSE minimizes the squared Mahalanobis distance (squared norm of the estimation residual 
vector weighted by the corresponding standard deviation): 
                                        (C.5) 
 
Solving eq.(C.5) the WLS estimation of    results: 
         (C.6) 
           
  
      (C.7) 
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C.3. WLS Estimation Error vector 
The estimation error vector is defined as: 
         (C.8) 
 
The relation between the estimation error vector     and the pseudorange error vector     is obtained 
introducing (C.6) in (C.8): 
                  
  
                          
  
        
              (C.9) 
Therefore, each estimation error component is a Gaussian random variable (because         ). 
C.4. Estimation Error Covariance Matrix 
By definition, the estimation error covariance matrix is: 
                          (C.10) 
 
Introducing (C.9) in (C.10): 
                                                
 Operating the first term: 
 
                       
                            
 
              
 
              
              
 Operating the second term: 
                         
 
               
 
                 
Hence: 
                     
  
 (C.11) 
 
Weighted Least Squares Estimator (WLSE) 177 
 
 
C.5. Horizontal positioning Estimation Error 
The horizontal positioning error (  ) is a bivariate normal distribution, so its PDF describes 
equidensity ellipses. It can be expressed as the joint distribution of the estimation error components in 
the north and east directions of        , which follow correlated normal distributions as given in 
eq.(C.11). Alternatively,    can be represented in a rotated basis aligned with the major and minor 
equidensity ellipse semiaxes, so it can be expressed as the joint distribution of the estimation error 
components in the ellipse axes                , which follow uncorrelated normal distributions 
(Figure C.1). The directions of the ellipse axes are those of the eigenvectors of the horizontal 
observation submatrix              , and the estimation error variances  σ     
  σ     
   are their 
corresponding eigenvalues. 
 
 
Figure C.1. Horizontal positioning error distribution. 
 
 The horizontal positioning error magnitude is: 
         
    
         
        
  (C.12) 
Therefore,   
  can be expressed as the sum of two squared uncorrelated normal distributions, which 
does not follow any known statistical law.  
(Note:   
  does not follow a chi squared distribution unless σ      σ     ). 
C.6. Pseudorange Residuals 
The pseudorange residual vector     is defined as the difference between the measured pseudorange 
vector and the peudorange vector estimated from the estimated navigation solution: 
           (C.13) 
 
   
   
              
               
               
ellipse of    with probability 
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Introducing (C.6) eq. in (C.13), each element of   can be expressed as a linear combination of the 
elements of   : 
                      (C.14) 
where: 
               
  
      (C.15) 
 
The relationship between the pseudorange residuals and the pseudorange measurement error is 
obtained introducing eq.(A.8) in (C.14): 
                                      (C.16) 
 
Summarizing, the pseudorange residual vector is a parameter calculated from the pseudorange 
measurements that contains information about pseudorange measurement errors, which are not directly 
measurable: 
                    (C.17) 
C.7. Uncorrelation between residual and position error vectors 
The covariance between   and   is zero: 
                               (C.18) 
 
Introducing the expressions (C.9) and (C.16): 
                                                                
  (C.19) 
 
 Operating the first term: 
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 Operating the second term: 
                                         
              
 
                       
 
                      
              
 
Hence: 
            (C.20) 
 
 Demonstration of              
                        
  
            
 
                
  
      
  
  
           
  
          
  
              
  
       
 
  
           
  
          
  
   
C.8. WLSE as the LSE of a Normalized System 
First RAIM algorithms were designed under the assumption of independent pseudorange measurement 
errors with identical variance. Consequently, their algorithms are based in the non-weighted least 
squares estimator (LSE). This appendix describes the transformation of pseudorange measurement 
equations with a general nominal error covariance matrix into an equivalent normalized system with a 
unitary nominal error covariance matrix, in which the original RAIM algorithms could be applied. 
C.8.1. Normalized pseudorange measurement equation system 
The objective is find an equivalent equation system to that one described in (C.1) - (C.4),  with a 
nominal error correlation matrix equal to the identity matrix. An equivalent normalized pseudorange 
measurement equation system can be obtained dividing each equation of eq.(C.1) by the inverse of its 
corresponding nominal noise standard deviation: 
              (C.21) 
where: 
          
        
                      
o        
o        
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The normalizing matrix is the squared root inverse of the noise covariance matrix: 
          
       
      
   
       
  (C.22) 
 
Indeed, the measurement nominal error covariance matrix is the unity: 
                       
       
 
      
 
      
 
   (C.23) 
C.8.2. LSE Properties 
The LS solution estimation  Δ    is the same as in the non-normalized system: 
                    (C.24) 
       
    
  
  
  (C.25) 
 
The estimation error      is the same as in the non-normalized system: 
                 (C.26) 
             
          
  
             (C.27) 
 
The normalized residual vector is the non-normalized one scaled by the matrix : 
                              (C.28) 
                            (C.29) 
         
    
  
  
  (C.30) 
 
The normalized residual vector and the normalized estimation error are uncorrelated: 
              (C.31) 
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Appendix D.  WLSR RAIM related subjects 
D.1.  Derivation of the non-centrality parameter 
Let us recall the WLSR RAIM test statistic formula: 
          (D.1) 
 
Introducing eq.(C.17) gives the following relationship between   and the pseudorange errors: 
    
                   
        
              (D.2) 
where                         is demonstrated in Appendix D.3. 
 
The test statistic with fault-free measurements       is: 
      
           (D.3) 
The test statistic     has a chi-squared distribution         
  , which is known to have a mean value 
equal to the number of degrees of freedom    : 
            
               (D.4) 
 
The test statistic with faulty measurements         is: 
          
               (D.5) 
The test statistic    has a non-central chi-squared distribution           
   , which is known to have a 
mean value equal to the sum of the number of degrees of freedom     plus the non-centrality 
parameter    : 
                 
                     (D.6) 
 
Developing eq.(D.6): 
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Hence: 
               (D.7) 
D.2. Uncorrelation between the test statistic and the 
estimation error vector 
The covariance between the test statistic   and any component of the navigation solution error vector   
is zero: 
                                (D.8) 
 
Expression (D.8) is demonstrated calculating the covariance in the faulty case,      . The fault 
free case is the specific case with    . 
1) First term of the covariance (D.8),        : 
Introducing equations (D.2) and (C.9), operating and rearranging the resulting terms: 
          (D.9) 
                          
  
                            
  
    
                           
  
                            
  
   
                           
  
                           
  
   
                           
  
                          
  
       
 
The different terms of eq.(D.9) have been labelled from a) to f) and developed as follows: 
a) The term without   is deterministic: 
                                       
 
b) The expected values of terms in which   appears only once is zero: 
                                                                   
 
c) Using the eq.(D.4): 
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d) Introducing the noise covariance matrix           : 
     
                                                      
 
    
 where the proof of                can be found in Appendix D.3. 
 
e) When the faulty case consists of a single pseudorange bias, the result of the product of the 4 
first matrices of e) is a scalar, so it is equal to its transpose: 
                                            
 
Substituting             by its transpose in e) gives the same term as in d):  
                                                 
 
f) Pseudorange nominal errrors are modeled as zero mean, uncorrelated Gaussian variables. 
Therefore, they have null skewness and the expected value of the term with a triple product of 
noise is zero: 
                         
 
Then, the expression (D.9) results: 
                                          (D.10) 
 
2) Second term of the covariance (D.8),           : 
 
The expectation of the test statistic in the faulty case is given in eq.(D.6): 
                         
 
The mean of the navigation solution error is: 
                                           (D.11) 
 
Combining (D.6) and (D.11): 
                      (D.12) 
 
Finally, introducing equations (D.10) and (D.13) in the covariance expression (D.8): 
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                                (D.13) 
D.3. Demonstration of matrix expressions 
D.3.1. Demonstration 1 
The objective is to demonstrate: 
                                   (D.14) 
 
Developing the products: 
                                      (D.15) 
 
Introducing the definition of the matrix   in each term: 
 1st term:      
 2nd term:                   
  
             
 
 
 3rd term:                    
  
          
  
    
 4rd term:                      
  
          
  
              
  
             
 
  
             
  
      
 
The last three terms are equal: 
                               
  
      (D.16) 
 
The first equality of (D.14) is demonstrated substituting       and        by      in (D.15): 
                         (D.17) 
 
The second equality of (D.14) is demonstrated substituting      and        by       in (D.15): 
                          (D.18) 
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D.3.2. Demonstration 2 
The objective is to demonstrate: 
               (D.19) 
 
Developing the products: 
  
               
 
            
 
Introducing the definition the matrices   and  : 
  
                          
  
            
 
               
  
      
  
  
 
Regrouping the terms: 
  
                          
  
      
  
               
  
       
 
    
D.4. LSR RAIM design with the Parity Matrix method 
WLSR RAIM can be designed with the parity matrix method, resulting an algorithm equivalent to the 
one obtained with the least squares residuals [Sturza, 1988]. 
Given an observation matrix  , it is always possible to find a parity matrix   that spans the null space 
(parity space) of  : 
       (D.20) 
 
The rows of   are an orthogonal basis of the null space: 
         (D.21) 
For an observation matrix size of      , the resulting parity matrix size is      , with      . 
Parity matrices can be obtained with different methods. For instance, the lower   rows of the   matrix 
transpose derived from a    factorization of   gives a suitable   [Brown, 1997]. 
The parity vector  , of size      , is the result of multiplying any side of the pseudorange 
measurement equation system by the parity matrix, so it provides information about the pseudorange 
measurement errors: 
            (D.22) 
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If pseudorange nominal measurement errors have independent and normal distributions with variance 
unity, i.e.         , the squared magnitude of the parity vector is a valid test statistic that has a chi-
squared distribution in the fault free case, and non-central chi-squared one in the faulty case:  
       
    
      
  
                              
    
                         
  (D.23) 
 
In normalized case         , the test statistic is the same as the computed with the least squares 
residual [Sturza, 1988]: 
       
      
  (D.24) 
 
In the general case         ,  the squared magnitude of the parity vector does not have the 
properties of eq.(D.23), so the test statistic is computed as the squared magnitude of the parity vector 
of the normalized measurement equation system described in eq.(C.21):  
           
        (D.25) 
      
     (D.26) 
               
            
      (D.27) 
       
       
   
        (D.28) 
where subscript   indicates normalized parameters. 
Considering the     pseudorange measurement contains a bias   , the relationship between   and    in 
terms of the parity matrix is: 
     
   
         
            
  
   
      
  
    
  (D.29) 
 
The minimum detectable bias in the     pseudorange measurement, corresponding to a minimum 
detectable non-centrality parameter      is: 
         
  
 
   
      
      (D.30) 
 
The comparison of previous equations with those of residuals yields: 
            
       (D.31) 
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Appendix E.  Simulation Results (I): RAIM Performance 
E.1. WLSR RAIM unavailability 
This appendix compiles the WLSR RAIM unavailability rate obtained from the simulations in urban 
and rural environments for all combination of GNSS receivers under study and HAL equal to 50 and 
25 meters. Two values of probability of missed detection are studied,         
   and     
    , and one of false detection,         
  . 
Equivalently, the unavailability rates correspond to the probability that the false detection of the 
variable-    WLSR RAIM exceeds the limit of     
  . 
The following tables contain the fault detection unavailability probabilities: 
 Table E.1. - Unavailability of the WLSR RAIM fault detection capability in dual constellation 
GPS & Galileo users. 
 Table E.2. - Unavailability of the WLSR RAIM fault detection capability in GPS users. 
 Table E.3. - Unavailability of the WLSR RAIM fault detection capability in Galileo users. 
 
The unavailability probability of the WLSR RAIM fault exclusion capability has been computed as the 
highest fault detection unavailability probability among all subgroups of N-1 range measurements at 
each instant. The following tables contain the fault exclusion unavailability rates: 
 Table E.4. - Unavailability of the WLSR RAIM fault exclusion capability in dual constellation 
GPS & Galileo users. 
 Table E.5. - Unavailability of the WLSR RAIM fault exclusion capability in GPS users. 
 Table E.6. - Unavailability of the WLSR RAIM fault exclusion capability in Galileo users. 
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Table E.1 (a). Unavailability ratio of the WLSR RAIM with a constant         
                  . Equivalently, probability that the WLSR RAIM variable     
exceeds                     
      . Dual constellation GPS & Galileo receivers. RAIM: Fault detection. 
Navigation 
solution 
(observation 
matrix) 
GNSS signals 
Pseudorange  
nominal 
error model 
Environment 
Urban Rural 
    
                        
HAL (m) 
25 50 25 50 25 50 25 50 
  3 variables: 
 2D position 
          
L1 BOC(1,1) 
E1 BOC(1,1) 
L1/E1 0.987 0.745 0.973 0.681 0.795 0.083 0.643 0.048 
L1/E1 + SBAS 0.505 0.196 0.441 0.164 0.007 1.2e-4 0.004 6.2e-5 
L1/E1 + L5/E5a 0.894 0.554 0.855 0.493 0.274 0.009 0.178 0.006 
L1 TMBOC(6,1,4/33) 
E1 CBOC(6,1,1/11,+) 
L1/E1 0.984 0.721 0.968 0.656 0.746 0.072 0.589 0.038 
L1/E1 + SBAS 0.199 0.074 0.166 0.062 1.1e-4 0 6.2e-5 0 
L1/E1 + L5/E5a 0.504 0.200 0.442 0.168 0.005 1.1e-4 0.004 7.7e-5 
L1 TMBOC(6,1,4/33) 
E1 CBOC(6,1,1/11,-) 
L1/E1 0.984 0.720 0.967 0.655 0.744 0.072 0.587 0.038 
L1/E1 + SBAS 0.183 0.069 0.153 0.058 8.1e-5 0 3.1e-5 0 
L1/E1 + L5/E5a 0.473 0.180 0.409 0.150 0.005 8.1e-5 0.004 5.4e-5 
L5 BPSK(10) 
E5a BPSK(10) 
L5/E5a 1 0.966 1 0.941 1 0.575 1 0.426 
L5/E5a + SBAS 0.144 0.055 0.120 0.047 1.9e-5 0 1.5e-5 0 
  4 variables: 
 2D position 
         
             
L1 BOC(1,1) 
E1 BOC(1,1) 
L1/E1 0.994 0.821 0.986 0.760 0.899 0.114 0.788 0.062 
L1/E1 + SBAS 0.589 0.324 0.536 0.285 0.011 0.001 0.007 0.001 
L1/E1 + L5/E5a 0.914 0.631 0.884 0.576 0.338 0.014 0.239 0.010 
L1 TMBOC(6,1,4/33) 
E1 CBOC(6,1,1/11,+) 
L1/E1 0.992 0.801 0.983 0.738 0.872 0.095 0.742 0.051 
L1/E1 + SBAS 0.332 0.158 0.293 0.139 0.001 3.1e-5 0.001 1.9e-5 
L1/E1 + L5/E5a 0.583 0.329 0.534 0.289 0.009 0.001 0.006 3.7e-4 
L1 TMBOC(6,1,4/33) 
E1 CBOC(6,1,1/11,-) 
L1/E1 0.992 0.801 0.983 0.738 0.871 0.094 0.740 0.051 
L1/E1 + SBAS 0.314 0.149 0.276 0.132 0.001 2.3e-5 4.8e-4 1.9e-5 
L1/E1 + L5/E5a 0.561 0.304 0.510 0.266 0.009 0.001 0.006 2.7e-4 
L5 BPSK(10) 
E5a BPSK(10) 
L5/E5a 1 0.982 1 0.965 1 0.731 1 0.563 
L5/E5a + SBAS 0.266 0.128 0.233 0.114 4.5e-4 1.5e-5 1.8e-4 7.7e-6 
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Table E.1 (b). Unavailability ratio of the WLSR RAIM with a constant         
                  . Equivalently, probability that the WLSR RAIM variable     
exceeds                     
      . Dual constellation GPS & Galileo receivers. RAIM: Fault detection. 
Navigation 
solution 
(observation 
matrix) 
GNSS signals 
Pseudorange  
nominal 
error model 
Environment 
Urban Rural 
    
                        
HAL (m) 
25 50 25 50 25 50 25 50 
  4 variables: 
 3D position 
          
L1 BOC(1,1) 
E1 BOC(1,1) 
L1/E1 0.996 0.860 0.991 0.812 0.899 0.147 0.785 0.090 
L1/E1 + SBAS 0.674 0.368 0.619 0.328 0.018 0.001 0.013 2.9e-4 
L1/E1 + L5/E5a 0.962 0.718 0.939 0.664 0.460 0.026 0.333 0.017 
L1 TMBOC(6,1,4/33) 
E1 CBOC(6,1,1/11,+) 
L1/E1 0.995 0.843 0.989 0.792 0.865 0.125 0.733 0.074 
L1/E1 + SBAS 0.370 0.188 0.328 0.168 0.001 4.6e-5 2.9e-4 3.1e-5 
L1/E1 + L5/E5a 0.676 0.375 0.623 0.335 0.018 0.001 0.013 3.7e-4 
L1 TMBOC(6,1,4/33) 
E1 CBOC(6,1,1/11,-) 
L1/E1 0.995 0.842 0.989 0.791 0.864 0.125 0.731 0.074 
L1/E1 + SBAS 0.348 0.178 0.309 0.159 3.7e-4 3.9e-5 2.3e-4 3.1e-5 
L1/E1 + L5/E5a 0.646 0.350 0.592 0.311 0.015 4.9e-4 0.010 2.4e-4 
L5 BPSK(10) 
E5a BPSK(10) 
L5/E5a 1 0.988 1 0.978 1 0.719 1 0.564 
L5/E5a + SBAS 0.295 0.152 0.262 0.137 1.9e-4 2.7e-5 1.1e-4 1.5e-5 
    4 variables: 
 3D position 
          
  
Hybridization 
external altitude 
        m. 
L1 BOC(1,1) 
E1 BOC(1,1) 
L1/E1 0.988 0.746 0.974 0.682 0.798 0.084 0.647 0.048 
L1/E1 + SBAS 0.516 0.201 0.451 0.168 0.008 1.2e-4 0.005 6.6e-5 
L1/E1 + L5/E5a 0.896 0.557 0.858 0.496 0.278 0.009 0.182 0.006 
L1 TMBOC(6,1,4/33) 
E1 CBOC(6,1,1/11,+) 
L1/E1 0.984 0.722 0.969 0.657 0.750 0.073 0.593 0.039 
L1/E1 + SBAS 0.215 0.079 0.180 0.067 1.3e-4 0 7.3e-5 0 
L1/E1 + L5/E5a 0.515 0.204 0.453 0.172 0.006 1.1e-4 0.004 7.7e-5 
L1 TMBOC(6,1,4/33) 
E1 CBOC(6,1,1/11,-) 
L1/E1 0.984 0.721 0.968 0.657 0.747 0.072 0.591 0.039 
L1/E1 + SBAS 0.199 0.074 0.166 0.062 9.3e-5 0 4.2e-5 0 
L1/E1 + L5/E5a 0.485 0.185 0.420 0.153 0.006 8.1e-5 0.004 5.4e-5 
L5 BPSK(10) 
E5a BPSK(10) 
L5/E5a 1 0.966 1 0.942 1 0.576 1 0.427 
L5/E5a + SBAS 0.159 0.060 0.132 0.051 3.1e-5 0 1.9e-5 0 
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Table E.1 (c). Unavailability ratio of the WLSR RAIM with a constant         
                  . Equivalently, probability that the WLSR RAIM variable     
exceeds                     
      . Dual constellation GPS & Galileo receivers. RAIM: Fault detection. 
Navigation 
solution 
(observation 
matrix) 
GNSS signals 
Pseudorange  
nominal 
error model 
Environment 
Urban Rural 
    
                        
HAL (m) 
25 50 25 50 25 50 25 50 
  5 variables: 
 3D position 
         
             
L1 BOC(1,1) 
E1 BOC(1,1) 
L1/E1 0.998 0.907 0.995 0.867 0.954 0.200 0.882 0.121 
L1/E1 + SBAS 0.742 0.499 0.698 0.462 0.032 0.003 0.023 0.002 
L1/E1 + L5/E5a 0.970 0.775 0.953 0.733 0.518 0.042 0.389 0.029 
L1 TMBOC(6,1,4/33) 
E1 CBOC(6,1,1/11,+) 
L1/E1 0.997 0.894 0.994 0.852 0.936 0.171 0.852 0.102 
L1/E1 + SBAS 0.505 0.321 0.467 0.298 0.004 0.001 0.002 4.1e-4 
L1/E1 + L5/E5a 0.742 0.505 0.699 0.468 0.031 0.004 0.022 0.002 
L1 TMBOC(6,1,4/33) 
E1 CBOC(6,1,1/11,-) 
L1/E1 0.997 0.893 0.994 0.851 0.935 0.170 0.850 0.101 
L1/E1 + SBAS 0.486 0.309 0.448 0.288 0.003 4.6e-4 0.002 3.6e-4 
L1/E1 + L5/E5a 0.719 0.481 0.674 0.445 0.026 0.003 0.019 0.002 
L5 BPSK(10) 
E5a BPSK(10) 
L5/E5a 1 0.994 1 0.988 1 0.844 1 0.708 
L5/E5a + SBAS 0.436 0.282 0.402 0.264 0.002 3.4e-4 0.001 2.7e-4 
    5 variables: 
 3D position 
         
             
 
Hybridization 
external altitude 
        m. 
L1 BOC(1,1) 
E1 BOC(1,1) 
L1/E1 0.994 0.822 0.986 0.761 0.900 0.114 0.790 0.062 
L1/E1 + SBAS 0.597 0.331 0.545 0.292 0.012 0.001 0.008 0.001 
L1/E1 + L5/E5a 0.916 0.633 0.886 0.578 0.342 0.014 0.242 0.010 
L1 TMBOC(6,1,4/33) 
E1 CBOC(6,1,1/11,+) 
L1/E1 0.993 0.802 0.983 0.740 0.874 0.096 0.745 0.052 
L1/E1 + SBAS 0.350 0.168 0.311 0.149 0.001 5e-5 0.001 3.1e-5 
L1/E1 + L5/E5a 0.592 0.336 0.543 0.295 0.010 0.001 0.007 3.9e-4 
L1 TMBOC(6,1,4/33) 
E1 CBOC(6,1,1/11,-) 
L1/E1 0.993 0.802 0.983 0.739 0.872 0.095 0.743 0.051 
L1/E1 + SBAS 0.332 0.160 0.295 0.142 0.001 3.9e-5 0.001 1.9e-5 
L1/E1 + L5/E5a 0.571 0.312 0.520 0.273 0.010 0.001 0.006 3.3e-4 
L5 BPSK(10) 
E5a BPSK(10) 
L5/E5a 1 0.982 1 0.966 1 0.732 1 0.564 
L5/E5a + SBAS 0.288 0.141 0.255 0.125 0.001 1.9e-5 3.0e-4 1.5e-5 
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Table E.2 (a). Unavailability ratio of the WLSR RAIM with a constant         
                  . Equivalently, probability that the WLSR RAIM variable     
exceeds                     
      . GPS receivers. RAIM: Fault detection. 
Navigation 
solution 
(observation 
matrix) 
GNSS signals 
Pseudorange  
nominal 
error model 
Environment 
Urban Rural 
    
                        
HAL (m) 
25 50 25 50 25 50 25 50 
  3 variables: 
 2D position 
         
L1 BPSK(1) 
(2-sided BW=2 MHz) 
L1 1 0.998 1 0.996 1 0.983 1 0.957 
L1 + SBAS 0.999 0.968 0.998 0.952 0.994 0.737 0.985 0.635 
L1 + L5 1 1 1 0.999 1 0.998 1 0.994 
L1 BPSK(1) 
(2-sided BW=20 MHz) 
L1 1 0.994 1 0.988 1 0.927 1 0.874 
L1 + SBAS 0.933 0.802 0.911 0.781 0.534 0.222 0.449 0.194 
L1 + L5 0.997 0.943 0.994 0.923 0.973 0.583 0.943 0.501 
L1 BOC(1,1) 
L1 1 0.995 1 0.989 1 0.931 1 0.879 
L1 + SBAS 0.944 0.815 0.926 0.796 0.584 0.242 0.504 0.213 
L1 + L5 0.998 0.954 0.997 0.938 0.986 0.648 0.967 0.561 
L1 TMBOC(6,1,4/33) 
L1 1 0.993 1 0.986 1 0.913 1 0.855 
L1 + SBAS 0.816 0.697 0.795 0.676 0.239 0.114 0.208 0.102 
L1 + L5 0.934 0.805 0.912 0.784 0.546 0.226 0.457 0.199 
L5 BPSK(10) 
L5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
L5 + SBAS 0.792 0.673 0.767 0.655 0.202 0.100 0.168 0.091 
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Table E.2 (b). Unavailability ratio of the WLSR RAIM with a constant         
                  . Equivalently, probability that the WLSR RAIM variable     
exceeds                     
      . GPS receivers. RAIM: Fault detection. 
Navigation 
solution 
(observation 
matrix) 
GNSS signals 
Pseudorange  
nominal 
error model 
Environment 
Urban Rural 
    
                        
HAL (m) 
25 50 25 50 25 50 25 50 
  4 variables: 
 3D position 
         
L1 BPSK(1) 
(2-sided BW=2 MHz) 
L1 1 1 1 0.999 1 0.995 1 0.990 
L1 + SBAS 1 0.993 1 0.990 0.999 0.904 0.998 0.868 
L1 + L5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.999 
L1 BPSK(1) 
(2-sided BW=20 MHz) 
L1 1 0.999 1 0.998 1 0.980 1 0.960 
L1 + SBAS 0.984 0.932 0.977 0.923 0.806 0.491 0.741 0.463 
L1 + L5 1 0.987 0.999 0.981 0.996 0.835 0.989 0.787 
L1 BOC(1,1) 
L1 1 0.999 1 0.998 1 0.981 1 0.962 
L1 + SBAS 0.988 0.938 0.982 0.929 0.839 0.510 0.790 0.481 
L1 + L5 1 0.991 1 0.986 0.999 0.875 0.995 0.823 
L1 TMBOC(6,1,4/33) 
L1 1 0.999 1 0.997 1 0.975 1 0.953 
L1 + SBAS 0.940 0.880 0.930 0.870 0.512 0.345 0.479 0.326 
L1 + L5 0.985 0.933 0.977 0.924 0.813 0.495 0.753 0.467 
L5 BPSK(10) 
L5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
L5 + SBAS 0.929 0.869 0.917 0.861 0.475 0.324 0.436 0.306 
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Table E.2 (c). Unavailability ratio of the WLSR RAIM with a constant         
                  . Equivalently, probability that the WLSR RAIM variable     
exceeds                     
      . GPS receivers. RAIM: Fault detection. 
Navigation 
solution 
(observation 
matrix) 
GNSS signals 
Pseudorange  
nominal 
error model 
Environment 
Urban Rural 
    
                        
HAL (m) 
25 50 25 50 25 50 25 50 
  4 variables: 
 3D position 
         
  
Hybridization 
external altitude 
       m. 
L1 BPSK(1) 
(2-sided BW=2 MHz) 
L1 1 0.999 1 0.996 1 0.983 1 0.958 
L1 + SBAS 0.999 0.969 0.998 0.952 0.995 0.740 0.986 0.638 
L1 + L5 1 1 1 0.999 1 0.998 1 0.994 
L1 BPSK(1) 
(2-sided BW=20 MHz) 
L1 1 0.995 1 0.988 1 0.929 1 0.875 
L1 + SBAS 0.938 0.808 0.917 0.788 0.552 0.232 0.468 0.202 
L1 + L5 0.997 0.944 0.995 0.924 0.975 0.588 0.946 0.507 
L1 BOC(1,1) 
L1 1 0.995 1 0.989 1 0.932 1 0.880 
L1 + SBAS 0.948 0.820 0.930 0.801 0.604 0.250 0.522 0.222 
L1 + L5 0.999 0.955 0.997 0.939 0.987 0.651 0.968 0.564 
L1 TMBOC(6,1,4/33) 
L1 1 0.993 1 0.986 1 0.914 1 0.856 
L1 + SBAS 0.832 0.713 0.812 0.693 0.266 0.123 0.233 0.110 
L1 + L5 0.938 0.810 0.918 0.791 0.558 0.237 0.476 0.208 
L5 BPSK(10) 
L5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
L5 + SBAS 0.814 0.695 0.792 0.677 0.233 0.109 0.196 0.100 
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Table E.3 (a). Unavailability ratio of the WLSR RAIM with a constant         
                  . Equivalently, probability that the WLSR RAIM variable     
exceeds                     
      . Galileo receivers. RAIM: Fault detection. 
Navigation 
solution 
(observation 
matrix) 
GNSS signals 
Pseudorange  
nominal 
error model 
Environment 
Urban Rural 
    
                        
HAL (m) 
25 50 25 50 25 50 25 50 
  3 variables: 
 2D position 
             
E1 BOC(1,1) 
E1 1 0.990 1 0.984 1 0.932 1 0.893 
E1 + SBAS 0.908 0.784 0.890 0.760 0.382 0.210 0.332 0.181 
E1 + E5a 0.992 0.918 0.988 0.896 0.937 0.489 0.913 0.343 
E1 CBOC(6,1,1/11,+) 
E1 1 0.989 1 0.982 1 0.926 1 0.868 
E1 + SBAS 0.799 0.662 0.777 0.629 0.226 0.085 0.199 0.065 
E1 + E5a 0.913 0.795 0.893 0.771 0.439 0.223 0.335 0.194 
E1 CBOC(6,1,1/11,-) 
E1 1 0.989 1 0.982 1 0.926 1 0.866 
E1 + SBAS 0.782 0.637 0.761 0.604 0.205 0.069 0.179 0.051 
E1 + E5a 0.893 0.771 0.876 0.747 0.334 0.193 0.314 0.164 
E5a BPSK(10) 
E5a 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.999 
E5a + SBAS 0.757 0.597 0.734 0.568 0.173 0.047 0.148 0.034 
  4 variables: 
 3D position 
             
E1 BOC(1,1) 
E1 1 0.998 1 0.996 1 0.980 1 0.948 
E1 + SBAS 0.970 0.881 0.956 0.867 0.617 0.295 0.494 0.280 
E1 + E5a 0.999 0.977 0.998 0.965 0.991 0.699 0.980 0.586 
E1 CBOC(6,1,1/11,+) 
E1 1 0.997 1 0.995 1 0.974 1 0.940 
E1 + SBAS 0.893 0.810 0.879 0.795 0.305 0.207 0.289 0.189 
E1 + E5a 0.974 0.886 0.962 0.873 0.669 0.301 0.559 0.287 
E1 CBOC(6,1,1/11,-) 
E1 1 0.997 1 0.995 1 0.974 1 0.939 
E1 + SBAS 0.883 0.798 0.868 0.785 0.293 0.192 0.277 0.176 
E1 + E5a 0.961 0.873 0.946 0.859 0.555 0.287 0.429 0.271 
E5a BPSK(10) 
E5a 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
E5a + SBAS 0.867 0.782 0.853 0.767 0.274 0.171 0.257 0.156 
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Table E.3 (b). Unavailability ratio of the WLSR RAIM with a constant         
                  . Equivalently, probability that the WLSR RAIM variable     
exceeds                     
      . Galileo receivers. RAIM: Fault detection. 
Navigation 
solution 
(observation 
matrix) 
GNSS signals 
Pseudorange  
nominal 
error model 
Environment 
Urban Rural 
    
                        
HAL (m) 
25 50 25 50 25 50 25 50 
  4 variables: 
 3D position 
             
 
Hybridization 
external altitude 
       m 
E1 BOC(1,1) 
E1 1 0.990 1 0.984 1 0.932 1 0.893 
E1 + SBAS 0.914 0.788 0.895 0.765 0.400 0.214 0.339 0.188 
E1 + E5a 0.992 0.919 0.988 0.898 0.938 0.494 0.915 0.348 
E1 CBOC(6,1,1/11,+) 
E1 1 0.989 1 0.983 1 0.926 1 0.869 
E1 + SBAS 0.810 0.677 0.785 0.646 0.234 0.102 0.209 0.083 
E1 + E5a 0.919 0.799 0.898 0.775 0.461 0.227 0.346 0.201 
E1 CBOC(6,1,1/11,-) 
E1 1 0.989 1 0.982 1 0.926 1 0.867 
E1 + SBAS 0.792 0.655 0.770 0.625 0.215 0.089 0.190 0.070 
E1 + E5a 0.899 0.776 0.883 0.753 0.347 0.201 0.319 0.174 
E5a BPSK(10) 
E5a 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.999 
E5a + SBAS 0.768 0.622 0.747 0.592 0.185 0.070 0.162 0.054 
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Table E.4 (a). Unavailability ratio of the WLSR RAIM with a constant         
                  . Equivalently, probability that the WLSR RAIM variable     
exceeds                     
      . Dual constellation GPS & Galileo receivers. RAIM: Fault exclusion (Fault detection in the worst subgroup). 
Navigation 
solution 
(observation 
matrix) 
GNSS signals 
Pseudorange  
nominal 
error model 
Environment 
Urban Rural 
    
                        
HAL (m) 
25 50 25 50 25 50 25 50 
  3 variables: 
 2D position 
          
L1 BOC(1,1) 
E1 BOC(1,1) 
L1/E1 0.999 0.945 0.998 0.922 0.994 0.447 0.974 0.341 
L1/E1 + SBAS 0.800 0.507 0.756 0.458 0.082 0.006 0.055 0.004 
L1/E1 + L5/E5a 0.974 0.827 0.961 0.789 0.746 0.113 0.638 0.073 
L1 TMBOC(6,1,4/33) 
E1 CBOC(6,1,1/11,+) 
L1/E1 0.999 0.939 0.998 0.914 0.991 0.411 0.965 0.307 
L1/E1 + SBAS 0.515 0.275 0.466 0.246 0.006 3.5e-4 0.004 1.9e-4 
L1/E1 + L5/E5a 0.797 0.510 0.754 0.463 0.079 0.006 0.052 0.004 
L1 TMBOC(6,1,4/33) 
E1 CBOC(6,1,1/11,-) 
L1/E1 0.999 0.938 0.998 0.914 0.991 0.409 0.964 0.306 
L1/E1 + SBAS 0.492 0.261 0.443 0.232 0.005 2.7e-4 0.003 1.5e-4 
L1/E1 + L5/E5a 0.775 0.482 0.729 0.433 0.064 0.005 0.043 0.003 
L5 BPSK(10) 
E5a BPSK(10) 
L5/E5a 1 0.997 1 0.994 1 0.962 1 0.906 
L5/E5a + SBAS 0.428 0.225 0.382 0.201 0.003 1.4e-4 0.002 1.0e-4 
  4 variables: 
 2D position 
         
             
L1 BOC(1,1) 
E1 BOC(1,1) 
L1/E1 1 0.962 0.999 0.944 0.998 0.553 0.988 0.436 
L1/E1 + SBAS 0.843 0.646 0.815 0.610 0.130 0.018 0.096 0.013 
L1/E1 + L5/E5a 0.980 0.861 0.969 0.834 0.794 0.164 0.695 0.118 
L1 TMBOC(6,1,4/33) 
E1 CBOC(6,1,1/11,+) 
L1/E1 1 0.957 0.999 0.940 0.997 0.518 0.984 0.401 
L1/E1 + SBAS 0.656 0.452 0.621 0.420 0.020 0.002 0.014 0.001 
L1/E1 + L5/E5a 0.840 0.649 0.812 0.613 0.124 0.017 0.090 0.012 
L1 TMBOC(6,1,4/33) 
E1 CBOC(6,1,1/11,-) 
L1/E1 1 0.957 0.999 0.939 0.997 0.516 0.984 0.400 
L1/E1 + SBAS 0.640 0.436 0.604 0.405 0.017 0.001 0.012 0.001 
L1/E1 + L5/E5a 0.826 0.627 0.796 0.591 0.106 0.015 0.079 0.010 
L5 BPSK(10) 
E5a BPSK(10) 
L5/E5a 1 0.999 1 0.997 1 0.983 1 0.947 
L5/E5a + SBAS 0.596 0.398 0.559 0.369 0.011 0.001 0.007 0.001 
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Table E.4 (b). Unavailability ratio of the WLSR RAIM with a constant         
                  . Equivalently, probability that the WLSR RAIM variable     
exceeds                     
      . Dual constellation GPS & Galileo receivers. RAIM: Fault exclusion (Fault detection in the worst subgroup). 
Navigation 
solution 
(observation 
matrix) 
GNSS signals 
Pseudorange  
nominal 
error model 
Environment 
Urban Rural 
    
                        
HAL (m) 
25 50 25 50 25 50 25 50 
  4 variables: 
 3D position 
          
L1 BOC(1,1) 
E1 BOC(1,1) 
L1/E1 1 0.982 0.999 0.972 0.999 0.654 0.994 0.522 
L1/E1 + SBAS 0.904 0.691 0.874 0.651 0.193 0.020 0.140 0.014 
L1/E1 + L5/E5a 0.995 0.923 0.991 0.897 0.906 0.256 0.834 0.182 
L1 TMBOC(6,1,4/33) 
E1 CBOC(6,1,1/11,+) 
L1/E1 1 0.979 0.999 0.967 0.998 0.608 0.991 0.475 
L1/E1 + SBAS 0.698 0.471 0.655 0.437 0.021 0.002 0.014 0.002 
L1/E1 + L5/E5a 0.904 0.696 0.875 0.656 0.196 0.022 0.142 0.015 
L1 TMBOC(6,1,4/33) 
E1 CBOC(6,1,1/11,-) 
L1/E1 1 0.979 0.999 0.967 0.998 0.606 0.991 0.473 
L1/E1 + SBAS 0.677 0.454 0.634 0.422 0.017 0.002 0.012 0.002 
L1/E1 + L5/E5a 0.887 0.672 0.856 0.631 0.161 0.017 0.116 0.012 
L5 BPSK(10) 
E5a BPSK(10) 
L5/E5a 1 0.999 1 0.998 1 0.990 1 0.968 
L5/E5a + SBAS 0.620 0.413 0.580 0.387 0.010 0.001 0.007 0.001 
    4 variables: 
 3D position 
          
  
Hybridization 
external altitude 
        m. 
L1 BOC(1,1) 
E1 BOC(1,1) 
L1/E1 0.999 0.948 0.998 0.927 0.995 0.465 0.978 0.357 
L1/E1 + SBAS 0.814 0.524 0.773 0.476 0.093 0.007 0.063 0.004 
L1/E1 + L5/E5a 0.977 0.834 0.964 0.798 0.764 0.123 0.660 0.079 
L1 TMBOC(6,1,4/33) 
E1 CBOC(6,1,1/11,+) 
L1/E1 0.999 0.942 0.998 0.919 0.993 0.427 0.970 0.322 
L1/E1 + SBAS 0.545 0.296 0.498 0.266 0.008 4.2e-4 0.005 2.6e-4 
L1/E1 + L5/E5a 0.812 0.527 0.772 0.480 0.090 0.006 0.060 0.004 
L1 TMBOC(6,1,4/33) 
E1 CBOC(6,1,1/11,-) 
L1/E1 0.999 0.942 0.998 0.919 0.993 0.425 0.970 0.321 
L1/E1 + SBAS 0.524 0.283 0.477 0.254 0.006 3.3e-4 0.004 2.2e-4 
L1/E1 + L5/E5a 0.793 0.499 0.748 0.452 0.073 0.005 0.049 0.003 
L5 BPSK(10) 
E5a BPSK(10) 
L5/E5a 1 0.998 1 0.994 1 0.966 1 0.916 
L5/E5a + SBAS 0.466 0.248 0.419 0.222 0.004 2.1e-4 0.002 1.2e-4 
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Table E.4 (c). Unavailability ratio of the WLSR RAIM with a constant         
                  . Equivalently, probability that the WLSR RAIM variable     
exceeds                     
      . Dual constellation GPS & Galileo receivers. RAIM: Fault exclusion (Fault detection in the worst subgroup). 
Navigation 
solution 
(observation 
matrix) 
GNSS signals 
Pseudorange  
nominal 
error model 
Environment 
Urban Rural 
    
                        
HAL (m) 
25 50 25 50 25 50 25 50 
  5 variables: 
 3D position 
         
             
L1 BOC(1,1) 
E1 BOC(1,1) 
L1/E1 1 0.989 1 0.982 1 0.759 0.998 0.643 
L1/E1 + SBAS 0.932 0.789 0.911 0.762 0.283 0.054 0.221 0.040 
L1/E1 + L5/E5a 0.996 0.945 0.993 0.927 0.933 0.345 0.873 0.268 
L1 TMBOC(6,1,4/33) 
E1 CBOC(6,1,1/11,+) 
L1/E1 1 0.987 1 0.980 0.999 0.722 0.997 0.603 
L1/E1 + SBAS 0.798 0.639 0.771 0.614 0.057 0.011 0.042 0.009 
L1/E1 + L5/E5a 0.932 0.792 0.912 0.766 0.286 0.055 0.223 0.041 
L1 TMBOC(6,1,4/33) 
E1 CBOC(6,1,1/11,-) 
L1/E1 1 0.987 1 0.980 0.999 0.721 0.997 0.602 
L1/E1 + SBAS 0.784 0.627 0.757 0.602 0.050 0.010 0.037 0.008 
L1/E1 + L5/E5a 0.920 0.775 0.898 0.748 0.247 0.046 0.190 0.034 
L5 BPSK(10) 
E5a BPSK(10) 
L5/E5a 1 1 1 0.999 1 0.997 1 0.987 
L5/E5a + SBAS 0.750 0.595 0.723 0.573 0.034 0.008 0.024 0.006 
    5 variables: 
 3D position 
         
             
 
Hybridization 
external altitude 
        m. 
L1 BOC(1,1) 
E1 BOC(1,1) 
L1/E1 1 0.964 0.999 0.948 0.998 0.571 0.990 0.455 
L1/E1 + SBAS 0.854 0.660 0.827 0.625 0.144 0.020 0.107 0.014 
L1/E1 + L5/E5a 0.982 0.867 0.972 0.840 0.809 0.176 0.714 0.126 
L1 TMBOC(6,1,4/33) 
E1 CBOC(6,1,1/11,+) 
L1/E1 1 0.960 0.999 0.943 0.998 0.536 0.987 0.419 
L1/E1 + SBAS 0.681 0.477 0.647 0.447 0.024 0.003 0.018 0.002 
L1/E1 + L5/E5a 0.852 0.662 0.824 0.628 0.139 0.020 0.101 0.014 
L1 TMBOC(6,1,4/33) 
E1 CBOC(6,1,1/11,-) 
L1/E1 1 0.960 0.999 0.943 0.998 0.534 0.987 0.418 
L1/E1 + SBAS 0.665 0.463 0.632 0.433 0.021 0.002 0.015 0.001 
L1/E1 + L5/E5a 0.838 0.642 0.810 0.607 0.119 0.017 0.089 0.012 
L5 BPSK(10) 
E5a BPSK(10) 
L5/E5a 1 0.999 1 0.997 1 0.986 1 0.954 
L5/E5a + SBAS 0.627 0.431 0.593 0.402 0.014 0.001 0.010 0.001 
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Table E.5 (a). Unavailability ratio of the WLSR RAIM with a constant         
                  . Equivalently, probability that the WLSR RAIM variable     
exceeds                     
      . GPS receivers. RAIM: Fault exclusion (Fault detection in the worst subgroup). 
Navigation 
solution 
(observation 
matrix) 
GNSS signals 
Pseudorange  
nominal 
error model 
Environment 
Urban Rural 
    
                        
HAL (m) 
25 50 25 50 25 50 25 50 
  3 variables: 
 2D position 
         
L1 BPSK(1) 
(2-sided BW=2 MHz) 
L1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
L1 + SBAS 1 0.998 1 0.997 1 0.988 1 0.976 
L1 + L5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
L1 BPSK(1) 
(2-sided BW=20 MHz) 
L1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
L1 + SBAS 0.996 0.968 0.993 0.963 0.955 0.728 0.930 0.695 
L1 + L5 1 0.996 1 0.994 1 0.963 1 0.943 
L1 BOC(1,1) 
L1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
L1 + SBAS 0.997 0.971 0.995 0.967 0.967 0.751 0.947 0.717 
L1 + L5 1 0.997 1 0.996 1 0.977 1 0.957 
L1 TMBOC(6,1,4/33) 
L1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.999 
L1 + SBAS 0.974 0.937 0.969 0.930 0.760 0.561 0.722 0.532 
L1 + L5 0.995 0.968 0.992 0.964 0.954 0.730 0.930 0.699 
L5 BPSK(10) 
L5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
L5 + SBAS 0.969 0.929 0.963 0.921 0.718 0.526 0.673 0.500 
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Table E.5 (b). Unavailability ratio of the WLSR RAIM with a constant         
                  . Equivalently, probability that the WLSR RAIM variable     
exceeds                     
      . GPS receivers. RAIM: Fault exclusion (Fault detection in the worst subgroup). 
Navigation 
solution 
(observation 
matrix) 
GNSS signals 
Pseudorange  
nominal 
error model 
Environment 
Urban Rural 
    
                        
HAL (m) 
25 50 25 50 25 50 25 50 
  4 variables: 
 3D position 
         
L1 BPSK(1) 
(2-sided BW=2 MHz) 
L1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
L1 + SBAS 1 1 1 1 1 0.999 1 0.998 
L1 + L5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
L1 BPSK(1) 
(2-sided BW=20 MHz) 
L1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
L1 + SBAS 0.999 0.994 0.999 0.993 0.995 0.917 0.989 0.897 
L1 + L5 1 1 1 0.999 1 0.997 1 0.992 
L1 BOC(1,1) 
L1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
L1 + SBAS 1 0.995 0.999 0.993 0.997 0.928 0.993 0.911 
L1 + L5 1 1 1 0.999 1 0.998 1 0.996 
L1 TMBOC(6,1,4/33) 
L1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
L1 + SBAS 0.995 0.988 0.994 0.986 0.931 0.848 0.913 0.832 
L1 + L5 0.999 0.994 0.999 0.992 0.995 0.917 0.989 0.898 
L5 BPSK(10) 
L5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
L5 + SBAS 0.994 0.987 0.993 0.985 0.912 0.831 0.899 0.815 
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Table E.5 (c). Unavailability ratio of the WLSR RAIM with a constant         
                  . Equivalently, probability that the WLSR RAIM variable     
exceeds                     
      . GPS receivers. RAIM: Fault exclusion (Fault detection in the worst subgroup). 
Navigation 
solution 
(observation 
matrix) 
GNSS signals 
Pseudorange  
nominal 
error model 
Environment 
Urban Rural 
    
                        
HAL (m) 
25 50 25 50 25 50 25 50 
     4 variables: 
 3D position 
         
  
Hybridization 
external altitude 
       m. 
L1 BPSK(1) 
(2-sided BW=2 MHz) 
L1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
L1 + SBAS 1 0.999 1 0.998 1 0.991 1 0.979 
L1 + L5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
L1 BPSK(1) 
(2-sided BW=20 MHz) 
L1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
L1 + SBAS 0.997 0.971 0.995 0.967 0.966 0.746 0.947 0.715 
L1 + L5 1 0.997 1 0.995 1 0.970 1 0.950 
L1 BOC(1,1) 
L1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
L1 + SBAS 0.997 0.974 0.996 0.969 0.974 0.768 0.960 0.735 
L1 + L5 1 0.998 1 0.996 1 0.980 1 0.964 
L1 TMBOC(6,1,4/33) 
L1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
L1 + SBAS 0.981 0.946 0.975 0.939 0.803 0.597 0.757 0.565 
L1 + L5 0.996 0.971 0.995 0.967 0.964 0.748 0.946 0.717 
L5 BPSK(10) 
L5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
L5 + SBAS 0.977 0.940 0.971 0.933 0.763 0.567 0.727 0.540 
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Table E.6 (a). Unavailability ratio of the WLSR RAIM with a constant         
                  . Equivalently, probability that the WLSR RAIM variable     
exceeds                     
      . Galileo receivers. RAIM: Fault exclusion (Fault detection in the worst subgroup). 
Navigation 
solution 
(observation 
matrix) 
GNSS signals 
Pseudorange  
nominal 
error model 
Environment 
Urban Rural 
    
                        
HAL (m) 
25 50 25 50 25 50 25 50 
  3 variables: 
 2D position 
             
E1 BOC(1.1) 
E1 1 1 1 0.999 1 0.999 1 0.993 
E1 + SBAS 0.987 0.959 0.982 0.951 0.893 0.724 0.836 0.695 
E1 + E5a 1 0.990 0.999 0.983 0.997 0.922 0.997 0.858 
E1 CBOC(6.1.1/11.+) 
E1 1 1 1 0.999 1 0.999 1 0.990 
E1 + SBAS 0.966 0.916 0.959 0.906 0.754 0.530 0.718 0.479 
E1 + E5a 0.988 0.962 0.983 0.954 0.914 0.739 0.846 0.708 
E1 CBOC(6.1.1/11.-) 
E1 1 1 1 0.999 1 0.999 1 0.990 
E1 + SBAS 0.961 0.908 0.954 0.898 0.726 0.489 0.695 0.442 
E1 + E5a 0.983 0.954 0.978 0.946 0.843 0.707 0.806 0.678 
E5a BPSK(10) 
E5a 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
E5a + SBAS 0.954 0.897 0.946 0.886 0.690 0.431 0.661 0.394 
  4 variables: 
 3D position 
             
E1 BOC(1.1) 
E1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.998 
E1 + SBAS 0.997 0.982 0.996 0.977 0.972 0.798 0.945 0.757 
E1 + E5a 1 0.998 1 0.997 1 0.980 0.999 0.962 
E1 CBOC(6.1.1/11.+) 
E1 1 1 1 1 1 0.999 1 0.998 
E1 + SBAS 0.987 0.960 0.982 0.956 0.825 0.663 0.787 0.646 
E1 + E5a 0.998 0.984 0.996 0.980 0.976 0.817 0.955 0.777 
E1 CBOC(6.1.1/11.-) 
E1 1 1 1 1 1 0.999 1 0.998 
E1 + SBAS 0.984 0.957 0.979 0.954 0.796 0.651 0.758 0.634 
E1 + E5a 0.996 0.979 0.994 0.973 0.954 0.776 0.918 0.734 
E5a BPSK(10) 
E5a 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
E5a + SBAS 0.979 0.954 0.974 0.950 0.754 0.631 0.721 0.614 
Simulation Results (I): RAIM Performance 203 
 
 
 
Table E.6 (b). Unavailability ratio of the WLSR RAIM with a constant         
                  . Equivalently, probability that the WLSR RAIM variable     
exceeds                     
      . Galileo receivers. RAIM: Fault exclusion (Fault detection in the worst subgroup). 
Navigation 
solution 
(observation 
matrix) 
GNSS signals 
Pseudorange  
nominal 
error model 
Environment 
Urban Rural 
    
                        
HAL (m) 
25 50 25 50 25 50 25 50 
  4 variables: 
 3D position 
             
 
Hybridization 
external altitude 
       m 
E1 BOC(1.1) 
E1 1 1 1 1 1 0.999 1 0.995 
E1 + SBAS 0.989 0.962 0.984 0.955 0.916 0.737 0.853 0.707 
E1 + E5a 1 0.991 1 0.985 0.998 0.928 0.997 0.876 
E1 CBOC(6.1.1/11.+) 
E1 1 1 1 0.999 1 0.999 1 0.992 
E1 + SBAS 0.970 0.924 0.964 0.914 0.769 0.564 0.740 0.519 
E1 + E5a 0.990 0.964 0.985 0.957 0.925 0.749 0.868 0.719 
E1 CBOC(6.1.1/11.-) 
E1 1 1 1 0.999 1 0.999 1 0.992 
E1 + SBAS 0.966 0.917 0.960 0.908 0.750 0.530 0.716 0.486 
E1 + E5a 0.985 0.957 0.980 0.950 0.866 0.719 0.822 0.692 
E5a BPSK(10) 
E5a 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
E5a + SBAS 0.960 0.907 0.954 0.899 0.712 0.479 0.684 0.440 
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Appendix F.  Simulation Results (II): Missed Road Segment Rate 
F.1. Minimum trajectory duration  
The following tables contain, for all receiver configurations under study, the minimum duration 
       of a user trajectory trough a geo-object in the fault-free case described in section 5.4.4.2.1, 
from which the required probability of missed road segment recognition with       is met, i.e. 
                                
  , where   is the total trajectory duration. 
 Table F.1. - Minimum trajectory duration for dual constellation GPS & Galileo users. 
 Table F.2. - Minimum trajectory duration for GPS users. 
 Table F.3. - Minimum trajectory duration for Galileo users. 
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Table F.1(a). Minimum user trajectory duration trough a geo-object               from which the required probability of missed road segment recognition with       is 
met, i.e.                                 
  . Red crosses indicate         seconds. Fault free case. Dual constellation GPS & Galileo users. 
 
Navigation 
solution 
(observation 
matrix) 
GNSS signals 
Pseudorange  
nominal 
error model 
WLSR RAIM 
Civil aviation           
    Variable               
Environment 
Urban Rural Urban Rural 
    
                                                
HAL (m) 
25 50 25 50 25 50 25 50 25 50 25 50 25 50 25 50 
  3 variables: 
 2D position 
          
L1 BOC(1,1) 
E1 BOC(1,1) 
L1/E1 x x x x x 16 x 14 x x x 40 25 7 18 6 
L1/E1 + SBAS x 17 x 16 7 2 5 2 25 14 18 13 4 1 3 1 
L1/E1 + L5/E5a x x x x 23 7 19 6 x 29 x 20 11 5 8 4 
L1 TMBOC(6,1,4/33) 
E1 CBOC(6,1,1/11,+) 
L1/E1 x x x x x 15 x 13 x x x 36 24 7 17 5 
L1/E1 + SBAS 18 13 16 12 2 2 2 2 14 10 13 10 1 1 1 1 
L1/E1 + L5/E5a x 17 x 16 6 2 5 2 25 14 19 13 4 1 3 1 
L1 TMBOC(6,1,4/33) 
E1 CBOC(6,1,1/11,-) 
L1/E1 x x x x x 15 x 13 x x x 36 24 7 17 5 
L1/E1 + SBAS 17 12 16 11 2 2 2 2 14 10 13 10 1 1 1 1 
L1/E1 + L5/E5a x 16 x 15 5 2 5 2 22 14 17 12 4 1 3 1 
L5 BPSK(10) 
E5a BPSK(10) 
L5/E5a x x x x x x x x x x x x x 20 x 14 
L5/E5a + SBAS 16 11 15 10 2 2 2 2 13 10 11 10 1 1 1 1 
  4 variables: 
 2D position 
         
             
L1 BOC(1,1) 
E1 BOC(1,1) 
L1/E1 x x x x x 18 x 14 x x x x 32 9 19 7 
L1/E1 + SBAS x 24 x 23 8 4 7 4 37 17 26 16 5 2 4 2 
L1/E1 + L5/E5a x x x x 26 8 22 7 x x x 27 12 5 9 4 
L1 TMBOC(6,1,4/33) 
E1 CBOC(6,1,1/11,+) 
L1/E1 x x x x x 17 x 14 x x x x 29 8 18 7 
L1/E1 + SBAS 25 15 23 15 4 2 4 2 17 14 16 14 2 1 2 1 
L1/E1 + L5/E5a x 24 x 21 7 4 6 3 35 17 26 16 5 2 4 2 
L1 TMBOC(6,1,4/33) 
E1 CBOC(6,1,1/11,-) 
L1/E1 x x x x x 17 x 14 x x x x 29 8 18 7 
L1/E1 + SBAS 24 15 22 15 4 2 4 2 17 14 16 14 2 1 2 1 
L1/E1 + L5/E5a x 24 x 20 7 4 6 3 30 16 24 15 5 2 4 2 
L5 BPSK(10) 
E5a BPSK(10) 
L5/E5a x x x x x x x x x x x x x 21 x 15 
L5/E5a + SBAS 22 15 19 14 4 2 3 2 16 14 15 14 2 1 1 1 
Simulation Results (II): Missed Road Segment Rate 207 
 
 
Table F.1(b). Minimum user trajectory duration trough a geo-object               from which the required probability of missed road segment recognition with       is 
met, i.e.                                 
  . Red crosses indicate         seconds. Fault-free case. Dual constellation GPS & Galileo users. 
 
Navigation 
solution 
(observation 
matrix) 
GNSS signals 
Pseudorange  
nominal 
error model 
WLSR RAIM 
Civil aviation           
    Variable               
Environment 
Urban Rural Urban Rural 
    
                                                
HAL (m) 
25 50 25 50 25 50 25 50 25 50 25 50 25 50 25 50 
  4 variables: 
 3D position 
          
L1 BOC(1,1) 
E1 BOC(1,1) 
L1/E1 x x x x x 20 x 17 x x x x x 10 23 7 
L1/E1 + SBAS x 29 x 26 9 3 8 3 x 22 31 20 5 2 4 2 
L1/E1 + L5/E5a x x x x x 10 28 8 x x x 36 15 5 12 4 
L1 TMBOC(6,1,4/33) 
E1 CBOC(6,1,1/11,+) 
L1/E1 x x x x x 18 x 17 x x x x x 9 22 6 
L1/E1 + SBAS 28 19 28 19 3 2 3 2 22 16 20 15 2 1 2 1 
L1/E1 + L5/E5a x 29 x 26 8 3 8 3 x 22 32 20 5 2 4 2 
L1 TMBOC(6,1,4/33) 
E1 CBOC(6,1,1/11,-) 
L1/E1 x x x x x 18 x 17 x x x x x 9 22 6 
L1/E1 + SBAS 28 19 24 19 3 2 3 2 21 16 19 15 2 1 2 1 
L1/E1 + L5/E5a x 28 x 24 8 3 7 3 39 21 29 19 5 2 4 2 
L5 BPSK(10) 
E5a BPSK(10) 
L5/E5a x x x x x x x x x x x x x 27 x 17 
L5/E5a + SBAS 23 19 22 17 2 2 2 2 20 15 18 14 2 1 1 1 
    4 variables: 
 3D position 
          
  
Hybridization 
external altitude 
        m. 
L1 BOC(1,1) 
E1 BOC(1,1) 
L1/E1 x x x x x 17 x 14 x x x x 26 8 18 6 
L1/E1 + SBAS x 20 x 17 8 3 6 2 29 15 21 13 5 1 4 1 
L1/E1 + L5/E5a x x x x 25 8 20 6 x 30 x 21 12 5 9 4 
L1 TMBOC(6,1,4/33) 
E1 CBOC(6,1,1/11,+) 
L1/E1 x x x x x 16 x 14 x x x 37 24 7 18 5 
L1/E1 + SBAS 23 14 20 13 3 2 2 2 16 11 14 10 1 1 1 1 
L1/E1 + L5/E5a x 20 x 17 7 3 6 2 28 15 21 13 4 1 4 1 
L1 TMBOC(6,1,4/33) 
E1 CBOC(6,1,1/11,-) 
L1/E1 x x x x x 16 x 14 x x x 37 24 7 18 5 
L1/E1 + SBAS 21 14 19 12 2 2 2 2 16 11 14 10 1 1 1 1 
L1/E1 + L5/E5a x 18 x 16 7 2 6 2 26 14 19 13 4 1 3 1 
L5 BPSK(10) 
E5a BPSK(10) 
L5/E5a x x x x x x x x x x x x x 20 x 15 
L5/E5a + SBAS 19 12 18 11 2 2 2 2 15 10 13 10 1 1 1 1 
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Table F.1(c). Minimum user trajectory duration trough a geo-object               from which the required probability of missed road segment recognition with       is 
met, i.e.                                 
  . Red crosses indicate         seconds. Fault-free case. Dual constellation GPS & Galileo users. 
 
Navigation 
solution 
(observation 
matrix) 
GNSS signals 
Pseudorange  
nominal 
error model 
WLSR RAIM 
Civil aviation           
    Variable               
Environment 
Urban Rural Urban Rural 
    
                                                
HAL (m) 
25 50 25 50 25 50 25 50 25 50 25 50 25 50 25 50 
  5 variables: 
 3D position 
         
             
L1 BOC(1,1) 
E1 BOC(1,1) 
L1/E1 x x x x x 23 x 18 x x x x x 12 27 9 
L1/E1 + SBAS x x x 34 10 5 9 4 x 28 x 24 6 4 5 3 
L1/E1 + L5/E5a x x x x x 11 40 10 x x x x 16 7 12 5 
L1 TMBOC(6,1,4/33) 
E1 CBOC(6,1,1/11,+) 
L1/E1 x x x x x 22 x 18 x x x x x 11 25 9 
L1/E1 + SBAS x 24 31 22 6 3 5 3 28 20 24 19 4 2 3 2 
L1/E1 + L5/E5a x x x 34 10 5 8 4 x 28 x 24 6 4 5 3 
L1 TMBOC(6,1,4/33) 
E1 CBOC(6,1,1/11,-) 
L1/E1 x x x x x 22 x 18 x x x x x 11 25 9 
L1/E1 + SBAS x 22 31 21 5 3 4 3 27 19 23 19 4 2 3 2 
L1/E1 + L5/E5a x 40 x 31 10 5 8 4 x 27 x 23 6 3 5 3 
L5 BPSK(10) 
E5a BPSK(10) 
L5/E5a x x x x x x x x x x x x x 32 x 19 
L5/E5a + SBAS 31 21 30 20 4 3 4 3 24 19 22 18 3 2 3 2 
    5 variables: 
 3D position 
         
             
 
Hybridization 
external altitude 
        m. 
L1 BOC(1,1) 
E1 BOC(1,1) 
L1/E1 x x x x x 18 x 15 x x x x 35 9 20 7 
L1/E1 + SBAS x 26 x 25 9 4 8 4 x 18 29 16 6 2 4 2 
L1/E1 + L5/E5a x x x x 29 8 23 7 x x x 29 13 5 10 5 
L1 TMBOC(6,1,4/33) 
E1 CBOC(6,1,1/11,+) 
L1/E1 x x x x x 18 x 15 x x x x 31 9 19 7 
L1/E1 + SBAS 36 17 27 16 5 3 4 2 20 15 18 15 3 1 2 1 
L1/E1 + L5/E5a x 26 x 25 8 4 7 3 x 18 29 16 5 2 4 2 
L1 TMBOC(6,1,4/33) 
E1 CBOC(6,1,1/11,-) 
L1/E1 x x x x x 18 x 15 x x x x 31 9 19 7 
L1/E1 + SBAS 30 17 27 16 5 2 4 2 19 15 17 15 3 1 2 1 
L1/E1 + L5/E5a x 25 x 21 8 4 7 3 x 17 27 16 5 2 4 2 
L5 BPSK(10) 
E5a BPSK(10) 
L5/E5a x x x x x x x x x x x x x 22 x 16 
L5/E5a + SBAS 29 16 26 16 4 2 3 2 18 15 17 15 2 1 2 1 
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Table F.2(a). Minimum user trajectory duration trough a geo-object               from which the required probability of missed road segment recognition with       is 
met, i.e.                                 
  . Red crosses indicate         seconds. Fault-free case. GPS users. 
Navigation 
solution 
(observation 
matrix) 
GNSS signals 
Pseudorange  
nominal 
error model 
WLSR RAIM 
Civil aviation           
    Variable               
Environment 
Urban Rural Urban Rural 
    
                                                
HAL (m) 
25 50 25 50 25 50 25 50 25 50 25 50 25 50 25 50 
  3 variables: 
 2D position 
         
L1 BPSK(1) 
(2-sided BW=2 MHz) 
L1 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
L1 + SBAS x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 28 
L1 + L5 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
L1 BPSK(1) 
(2-sided BW=20 MHz) 
L1 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
L1 + SBAS x x x x x 25 x 24 x x x x 28 22 25 21 
L1 + L5 x x x x x x x x x x x x x 28 x 26 
L1 BOC(1,1) 
L1 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
L1 + SBAS x x x x x 27 x 24 x x x x 29 22 26 21 
L1 + L5 x x x x x x x x x x x x x 31 x 27 
L1 TMBOC(6,1,4/33) 
L1 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
L1 + SBAS x x x x 28 22 25 21 x x x x 23 19 22 18 
L1 + L5 x x x x x 24 x 24 x x x x 28 22 25 21 
L5 BPSK(10) 
L5 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
L5 + SBAS x x x x 25 21 24 21 x x x x 22 19 21 18 
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Table F.2(b). Minimum user trajectory duration trough a geo-object               from which the required probability of missed road segment recognition with       is 
met, i.e.                                 
  . Red crosses indicate         seconds. Fault-free case. GPS users. 
Navigation 
solution 
(observation 
matrix) 
GNSS signals 
Pseudorange  
nominal 
error model 
WLSR RAIM 
Civil aviation           
    Variable               
Environment 
Urban Rural Urban Rural 
    
                                                
HAL (m) 
25 50 25 50 25 50 25 50 25 50 25 50 25 50 25 50 
 4 variables: 
 3D position 
         
L1 BPSK(1) 
(2-sided BW=2 MHz) 
L1 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
L1 + SBAS x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
L1 + L5 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
L1 BPSK(1) 
(2-sided BW=20 MHz) 
L1 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
L1 + SBAS x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
L1 + L5 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
L1 BOC(1,1) 
L1 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
L1 + SBAS x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
L1 + L5 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
L1 TMBOC(6,1,4/33) 
L1 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
L1 + SBAS x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
L1 + L5 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
L5 BPSK(10) 
L5 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
L5 + SBAS x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
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Table F.2(c). Minimum user trajectory duration trough a geo-object               from which the required probability of missed road segment recognition with       is 
met, i.e.                                 
  . Red crosses indicate         seconds. Fault-free case. GPS users. 
Navigation 
solution 
(observation 
matrix) 
GNSS signals 
Pseudorange  
nominal 
error model 
WLSR RAIM 
Civil aviation           
    Variable               
Environment 
Urban Rural Urban Rural 
    
                                                
HAL (m) 
25 50 25 50 25 50 25 50 25 50 25 50 25 50 25 50 
    4 variables: 
 3D position 
         
  
Hybridization 
external altitude 
       m. 
L1 BPSK(1) 
(2-sided BW=2 MHz) 
L1 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
L1 + SBAS x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 29 
L1 + L5 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
L1 BPSK(1) 
(2-sided BW=20 MHz) 
L1 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
L1 + SBAS x x x x x 28 x 28 x x x x x 23 28 22 
L1 + L5 x x x x x x x x x x x x x 29 x 27 
L1 BOC(1,1) 
L1 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
L1 + SBAS x x x x x 28 x 28 x x x x x 23 29 22 
L1 + L5 x x x x x x x x x x x x x 34 x 28 
L1 TMBOC(6,1,4/33) 
L1 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
L1 + SBAS x x x x x 24 x 23 x x x x 27 21 23 19 
L1 + L5 x x x x x 28 x 28 x x x x x 23 28 22 
L5 BPSK(10) 
L5 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
L5 + SBAS x x x x x 23 x 23 x x x x 25 20 23 19 
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Table F.3(a). Minimum user trajectory duration trough a geo-object               from which the required probability of missed road segment recognition with       is 
met, i.e.                                 
  . Red crosses indicate         seconds. Fault-free case. Galileo users. 
Navigation 
solution 
(observation 
matrix) 
GNSS signals 
Pseudorange  
nominal 
error model 
WLSR RAIM 
Civil aviation           
    Variable               
Environment 
Urban Rural Urban Rural 
    
                                                
HAL (m) 
25 50 25 50 25 50 25 50 25 50 25 50 25 50 25 50 
  3 variables: 
 2D position 
             
E1 BOC(1,1) 
E1 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
E1 + SBAS x x x x x 25 30 25 x x x x 25 16 23 13 
E1 + E5a x x x x x x x 35 x x x x x 26 x 23 
E1 CBOC(6,1,1/11,+) 
E1 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
E1 + SBAS x x x x 25 15 25 15 x x x x 18 10 15 9 
E1 + E5a x x x x x 25 33 25 x x x x 26 16 23 14 
E1 CBOC(6,1,1/11,-) 
E1 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
E1 + SBAS x x x x 25 15 25 14 x x x x 17 10 14 8 
E1 + E5a x x x x 33 25 30 21 x x x x 25 15 22 12 
E5a BPSK(10) 
E5a x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
E5a + SBAS x x x x 20 14 19 11 x x x x 15 9 12 8 
  4 variables: 
 3D position 
             
E1 BOC(1,1) 
E1 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
E1 + SBAS x x x x x 26 x 25 x x x x 30 23 26 22 
E1 + E5a x x x x x x x x x x x x x 34 x 27 
E1 CBOC(6,1,1/11,+) 
E1 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
E1 + SBAS x x x x 27 22 26 22 x x x x 23 19 22 19 
E1 + E5a x x x x x 26 x 26 x x x x 32 23 27 22 
E1 CBOC(6,1,1/11,-) 
E1 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
E1 + SBAS x x x x 26 22 24 21 x x x x 22 19 21 18 
E1 + E5a x x x x x 26 x 25 x x x x 28 22 25 22 
E5a BPSK(10) 
E5a x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
E5a + SBAS x x x x 24 21 23 20 x x x x 22 19 20 18 
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Table F.3(b). Minimum user trajectory duration trough a geo-object               from which the required probability of missed road segment recognition with       is 
met, i.e.                                 
  . Red crosses indicate         seconds. Fault-free case. Galileo users. 
Navigation 
solution 
(observation 
matrix) 
GNSS signals 
Pseudorange  
nominal 
error model 
Environment 
Rural 
WLSR RAIM 
Civil aviation           
    Variable               
Failure case 
Fault-free (FD) Faulty (FDE) Fault-free (FD) Faulty (FDE) 
    
                                                
HAL (m) 
25 50 25 50 25 50 25 50 25 50 25 50 25 50 25 50 
  4 variables: 
 3D position 
             
 
Hybridization 
external altitude 
       m. 
E1 BOC(1,1) 
E1 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
E1 + SBAS x x x x x 25 x 25 x x x x 27 19 24 18 
E1 + E5a x x x x x x x x x x x x x 26 x 24 
E1 CBOC(6,1,1/11,+) 
E1 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
E1 + SBAS x x x x 27 19 26 19 x x x x 19 18 18 15 
E1 + E5a x x x x x 25 x 25 x x x x 28 19 24 18 
E1 CBOC(6,1,1/11,-) 
E1 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
E1 + SBAS x x x x 26 19 25 18 x x x x 19 17 18 15 
E1 + E5a x x x x x 25 x 25 x x x x 26 19 23 17 
E5a BPSK(10) 
E5a x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
E5a + SBAS x x x x 23 18 21 18 x x x x 19 17 18 14 
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F.2. Probability of zero valid positions  
The following figures depict the evolution of the average probability of having zero valid positions 
during the trajectory of a user along a geo-object (and thus fail to recognize the corresponding road 
segment) as a function of the trajectory duration. All dual constellation GPS & Galileo receivers under 
study are analyzed in the fault-free case described in section 5.4.4.2.1 with         
  ,       
     and HAL equal to 25 and 50 meters:  
 Figure F.1. - Average probability of                 for L1/E1 BOC(1,1) - iono-free with 
L5/E5a BPSK(10) - users with HAL=25 m. in urban environments. 
 Figure F.2. - Average probability of                 for L1/E1 BOC(1,1) - iono-free with 
L5/E5a BPSK(10) - users with HAL=50 m. in urban environments. 
 Figure F.3. - Average probability of                 for L1 TMBOC(6,1,4/33) & E1 
CBOC(6,1,1/11,+) - iono-free with L5/E5a BPSK(10) - users with HAL=25 m. in urban 
environments. 
 Figure F.4. - Average probability of                 for L1 TMBOC(6,1,4/33) & E1 
CBOC(6,1,1/11,+) - iono-free with L5/E5a BPSK(10) - users with HAL=50 m. in urban 
environments. 
 Figure F.5. - Average probability of                 for L1 TMBOC(6,1,4/33) & E1 
CBOC(6,1,1/11,-) - iono-free with L5/E5a BPSK(10) - users with HAL=25 m. in urban 
environments. 
 Figure F.6. - Average probability of                 for L1 TMBOC(6,1,4/33) & E1 
CBOC(6,1,1/11,-) - iono-free with L5/E5a BPSK(10) - users with HAL=50 m. in urban 
environments. 
 Figure F.7. - Average probability of                 for L5/E5a BPSK(10) users with   HAL=25 
m. in urban environments. 
 Figure F.8. - Average probability of                 for L5/E5a BPSK(10) users with   HAL=50 
m. in urban environments. 
 Figure F.9. - Average probability of                 for L1/E1 BOC(1,1) - iono-free with 
L5/E5a BPSK(10) - users with HAL=25 m. in rural environments. 
 Figure F.10. - Average probability of                 for L1/E1 BOC(1,1) - iono-free with 
L5/E5a BPSK(10) - users with HAL=50 m. in rural environments. 
 Figure F.11. - Average probability of                 for L1 TMBOC(6,1,4/33) & E1 
CBOC(6,1,1/11,+) - iono-free with L5/E5a BPSK(10) - users with HAL=25 m. in rural 
environments. 
 Figure F.12. - Average probability of                 for L1 TMBOC(6,1,4/33) & E1 
CBOC(6,1,1/11,+) - iono-free with L5/E5a BPSK(10) - users with HAL=50 m. in rural 
environments. 
 Figure F.13. - Average probability of                 for L1 TMBOC(6,1,4/33) & E1 
CBOC(6,1,1/11,-) - iono-free with L5/E5a BPSK(10) - users with HAL=25 m. in rural 
environments. 
 Figure F.14. - Average probability of                 for L1 TMBOC(6,1,4/33) & E1 
CBOC(6,1,1/11,-) - iono-free with L5/E5a BPSK(10) - users with HAL=50 m. in rural 
environments. 
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 Figure F.15. - Average probability of                 for L5/E5a BPSK(10) users with HAL=25 
m. in rural environments. 
 Figure F.16. - Average probability of                 for L5/E5a BPSK(10) users with HAL=50 
m. in rural environments. 
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      a) 2D position (known inter-GNSS delay)  b) 3D position (known inter-GNSS delay) 
    
      c) 2D position (unknown inter-GNSS delay) d) 3D position (unknown inter-GNSS delay) 
— constant-    WLSR RAIM              Dotted line:   L1/E1 
— constant-    WLSR RAIM + external altitude        m. Dashed line:  L1/E1 + SBAS corrections 
— variable-    WLSR RAIM Solid line:     iono-free L1/E1 - L5/E5a 
— variable-    WLSR RAIM + external altitude        m.  
 
Figure F.1 ˗ Measurements: nominal (fault-free) ˗ Signals:  L1/E1 BOC(1,1) 
˗            ˗ Environment:  urban   iono-free with L5/E5a BPSK(10) 
˗        m. ˗ Constellation:  GPS & Galileo   
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      a) 2D position (known inter-GNSS delay)  b) 3D position (known inter-GNSS delay) 
    
      c) 2D position (unknown inter-GNSS delay) d) 3D position (unknown inter-GNSS delay) 
— constant-    WLSR RAIM              Dotted line:   L1/E1 
— constant-    WLSR RAIM + external altitude        m. Dashed line:  L1/E1 + SBAS corrections 
— variable-    WLSR RAIM Solid line:     iono-free L1/E1 - L5/E5a 
— variable-    WLSR RAIM + external altitude        m.  
 
Figure F.2 ˗ Measurements: nominal (fault-free) ˗ Signals:  L1/E1 BOC(1,1) 
˗            ˗ Environment:  urban   iono-free with L5/E5a BPSK(10) 
˗        m. ˗ Constellation:  GPS & Galileo   
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      a) 2D position (known inter-GNSS delay)  b) 3D position (known inter-GNSS delay) 
    
      c) 2D position (unknown inter-GNSS delay) d) 3D position (unknown inter-GNSS delay) 
— constant-    WLSR RAIM              Dotted line:   L1/E1 
— constant-    WLSR RAIM + external altitude        m. Dashed line:  L1/E1 + SBAS corrections 
— variable-    WLSR RAIM Solid line:     iono-free L1/E1 - L5/E5a 
— variable-    WLSR RAIM + external altitude        m.  
 
Figure F.3 ˗ Measurements: nominal (fault-free) ˗ Signals:  L1 TMBOC(6,1,4/33) 
˗            ˗ Environment:  urban   E1 CBOC(6,1,1/11,+) 
˗        m. ˗ Constellation:  GPS & Galileo   iono-free with L5/E5a BPSK(10) 
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
10
-6
10
-5
10
-4
10
-3
10
-2
10
-1
10
0
Trajectory Duration (s)
P
( 
N
a
p
t 
=
 0
 )
 
 
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
10
-6
10
-5
10
-4
10
-3
10
-2
10
-1
10
0
Trajectory Duration (s)
P
( 
N
a
p
t 
=
 0
 )
 
 
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
10
-6
10
-5
10
-4
10
-3
10
-2
10
-1
10
0
Trajectory Duration (s)
P
( 
N
a
p
t 
=
 0
 )
 
 
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
10
-6
10
-5
10
-4
10
-3
10
-2
10
-1
10
0
Trajectory Duration (s)
P
( 
N
a
p
t 
=
 0
 )
 
 
P
(N
va
lid
 =
 0
) 
P
(N
va
lid
 =
 0
) 
P
(N
va
lid
 =
 0
) 
P
(N
va
lid
 =
 0
) 
Simulation Results (II): Missed Road Segment Rate 219 
 
 
   
      a) 2D position (known inter-GNSS delay)  b) 3D position (known inter-GNSS delay) 
    
      c) 2D position (unknown inter-GNSS delay) d) 3D position (unknown inter-GNSS delay) 
— constant-    WLSR RAIM              Dotted line:   L1/E1 
— constant-    WLSR RAIM + external altitude        m. Dashed line:  L1/E1 + SBAS corrections 
— variable-    WLSR RAIM Solid line:     iono-free L1/E1 - L5/E5a 
— variable-    WLSR RAIM + external altitude        m.  
 
Figure F.4 ˗ Measurements: nominal (fault-free) ˗ Signals:  L1 TMBOC(6,1,4/33) 
˗            ˗ Environment:  urban   E1 CBOC(6,1,1/11,+) 
˗        m. ˗ Constellation:  GPS & Galileo   iono-free with L5/E5a BPSK(10) 
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      a) 2D position (known inter-GNSS delay)  b) 3D position (known inter-GNSS delay) 
    
      c) 2D position (unknown inter-GNSS delay) d) 3D position (unknown inter-GNSS delay) 
— constant-    WLSR RAIM              Dotted line:   L1/E1 
— constant-    WLSR RAIM + external altitude        m. Dashed line:  L1/E1 + SBAS corrections 
— variable-    WLSR RAIM Solid line:     iono-free L1/E1 - L5/E5a 
— variable-    WLSR RAIM + external altitude        m.  
 
Figure F.5 ˗ Measurements: nominal (fault-free) ˗ Signals:  L1 TMBOC(6,1,4/33) 
˗            ˗ Environment:  urban   E1 CBOC(6,1,1/11,-) 
˗        m. ˗ Constellation:  GPS & Galileo   iono-free with L5/E5a BPSK(10) 
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      a) 2D position (known inter-GNSS delay)  b) 3D position (known inter-GNSS delay) 
    
      c) 2D position (unknown inter-GNSS delay) d) 3D position (unknown inter-GNSS delay) 
— constant-    WLSR RAIM              Dotted line:   L1/E1 
— constant-    WLSR RAIM + external altitude        m. Dashed line:  L1/E1 + SBAS corrections 
— variable-    WLSR RAIM Solid line:     iono-free L1/E1 - L5/E5a 
— variable-    WLSR RAIM + external altitude        m.  
 
Figure F.6 ˗ Measurements: nominal (fault-free) ˗ Signals:  L1 TMBOC(6,1,4/33) 
˗            ˗ Environment:  urban   E1 CBOC(6,1,1/11,-) 
˗        m. ˗ Constellation:  GPS & Galileo   iono-free with L5/E5a BPSK(10) 
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      a) 2D position (known inter-GNSS delay)  b) 3D position (known inter-GNSS delay) 
     
      c) 2D position (unknown inter-GNSS delay) d) 3D position (unknown inter-GNSS delay) 
— constant-    WLSR RAIM              Dotted line:   L1/E1 
— constant-    WLSR RAIM + external altitude        m. Dashed line:  L1/E1 + SBAS corrections 
— variable-    WLSR RAIM  
— variable-    WLSR RAIM + external altitude        m.  
 
Figure F.7 ˗ Measurements: nominal (fault-free) ˗ Signals:  L5/E5a BPSK(10) 
˗            ˗ Environment:  urban   
˗        m. ˗ Constellation:  GPS & Galileo   
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      a) 2D position (known inter-GNSS delay)  b) 3D position (known inter-GNSS delay) 
     
      c) 2D position (unknown inter-GNSS delay) d) 3D position (unknown inter-GNSS delay) 
— constant-    WLSR RAIM              Dotted line:   L1/E1 
— constant-    WLSR RAIM + external altitude        m. Dashed line:  L1/E1 + SBAS corrections 
— variable-    WLSR RAIM  
— variable-    WLSR RAIM + external altitude        m.  
 
Figure F.8 ˗ Measurements: nominal (fault-free) ˗ Signals:  L5/E5a BPSK(10) 
˗            ˗ Environment:  urban   
˗        m. ˗ Constellation:  GPS & Galileo   
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      a) 2D position (known inter-GNSS delay)  b) 3D position (known inter-GNSS delay) 
    
      c) 2D position (unknown inter-GNSS delay) d) 3D position (unknown inter-GNSS delay) 
— constant-    WLSR RAIM              Dotted line:   L1/E1 
— constant-    WLSR RAIM + external altitude        m. Dashed line:  L1/E1 + SBAS corrections 
— variable-    WLSR RAIM Solid line:     iono-free L1/E1 - L5/E5a 
— variable-    WLSR RAIM + external altitude        m.  
 
Figure F.9 ˗ Measurements: nominal (fault-free) ˗ Signals:  L1/E1 BOC(1,1) 
˗            ˗ Environment:  rural   iono-free with L5/E5a BPSK(10) 
˗        m. ˗ Constellation:  GPS & Galileo   
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      a) 2D position (known inter-GNSS delay)  b) 3D position (known inter-GNSS delay) 
    
      c) 2D position (unknown inter-GNSS delay) d) 3D position (unknown inter-GNSS delay) 
— constant-    WLSR RAIM              Dotted line:   L1/E1 
— constant-    WLSR RAIM + external altitude        m. Dashed line:  L1/E1 + SBAS corrections 
— variable-    WLSR RAIM Solid line:     iono-free L1/E1 - L5/E5a 
— variable-    WLSR RAIM + external altitude        m.  
 
Figure F.10 ˗ Measurements: nominal (fault-free) ˗ Signals:  L1/E1 BOC(1,1) 
˗            ˗ Environment:  rural   iono-free with L5/E5a BPSK(10) 
˗        m. ˗ Constellation:  GPS & Galileo   
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      a) 2D position (known inter-GNSS delay)  b) 3D position (known inter-GNSS delay) 
     
      c) 2D position (unknown inter-GNSS delay) d) 3D position (unknown inter-GNSS delay) 
— constant-    WLSR RAIM              Dotted line:   L1/E1 
— constant-    WLSR RAIM + external altitude        m. Dashed line:  L1/E1 + SBAS corrections 
— variable-    WLSR RAIM Solid line:     iono-free L1/E1 - L5/E5a 
— variable-    WLSR RAIM + external altitude        m.  
 
Figure F.11 ˗ Measurements: nominal (fault-free) ˗ Signals:  L1 TMBOC(6,1,4/33) 
˗            ˗ Environment:  rural   E1 CBOC(6,1,1/11,+) 
˗        m. ˗ Constellation:  GPS & Galileo   iono-free with L5/E5a BPSK(10) 
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      a) 2D position (known inter-GNSS delay)  b) 3D position (known inter-GNSS delay) 
     
      c) 2D position (unknown inter-GNSS delay) d) 3D position (unknown inter-GNSS delay) 
— constant-    WLSR RAIM              Dotted line:   L1/E1 
— constant-    WLSR RAIM + external altitude        m. Dashed line:  L1/E1 + SBAS corrections 
— variable-    WLSR RAIM Solid line:     iono-free L1/E1 - L5/E5a 
— variable-    WLSR RAIM + external altitude        m.  
 
Figure F.12 ˗ Measurements: nominal (fault-free) ˗ Signals:  L1 TMBOC(6,1,4/33) 
˗            ˗ Environment:  rural   E1 CBOC(6,1,1/11,+) 
˗        m. ˗ Constellation:  GPS & Galileo   iono-free with L5/E5a BPSK(10) 
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      a) 2D position (known inter-GNSS delay)  b) 3D position (known inter-GNSS delay) 
   
      c) 2D position (unknown inter-GNSS delay) d) 3D position (unknown inter-GNSS delay) 
— constant-    WLSR RAIM              Dotted line:   L1/E1 
— constant-    WLSR RAIM + external altitude        m. Dashed line:  L1/E1 + SBAS corrections 
— variable-    WLSR RAIM Solid line:     iono-free L1/E1 - L5/E5a 
— variable-    WLSR RAIM + external altitude        m.  
 
Figure F.13 ˗ Measurements: nominal (fault-free) ˗ Signals:  L1 TMBOC(6,1,4/33) 
˗            ˗ Environment:  rural   E1 CBOC(6,1,1/11,-) 
˗        m. ˗ Constellation:  GPS & Galileo   iono-free with L5/E5a BPSK(10) 
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      a) 2D position (known inter-GNSS delay)  b) 3D position (known inter-GNSS delay) 
   
      c) 2D position (unknown inter-GNSS delay) d) 3D position (unknown inter-GNSS delay) 
— constant-    WLSR RAIM              Dotted line:   L1/E1 
— constant-    WLSR RAIM + external altitude        m. Dashed line:  L1/E1 + SBAS corrections 
— variable-    WLSR RAIM Solid line:     iono-free L1/E1 - L5/E5a 
— variable-    WLSR RAIM + external altitude        m.  
 
Figure F.14 ˗ Measurements: nominal (fault-free) ˗ Signals:  L1 TMBOC(6,1,4/33) 
˗            ˗ Environment:  rural   E1 CBOC(6,1,1/11,-) 
˗        m. ˗ Constellation:  GPS & Galileo   iono-free with L5/E5a BPSK(10) 
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      a) 2D position (known inter-GNSS delay)  b) 3D position (known inter-GNSS delay) 
    
      c) 2D position (unknown inter-GNSS delay) d) 3D position (unknown inter-GNSS delay) 
— constant-    WLSR RAIM              Dotted line:   L1/E1 
— constant-    WLSR RAIM + external altitude        m. Dashed line:  L1/E1 + SBAS corrections 
— variable-    WLSR RAIM  
— variable-    WLSR RAIM + external altitude        m.  
 
Figure F.15 ˗ Measurements: nominal (fault-free) ˗ Signals:  L5/E5a BPSK(10) 
˗            ˗ Environment:  rural   
˗        m. ˗ Constellation:  GPS & Galileo   
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      a) 2D position (known inter-GNSS delay)  b) 3D position (known inter-GNSS delay) 
    
      c) 2D position (unknown inter-GNSS delay) d) 3D position (unknown inter-GNSS delay) 
— constant-    WLSR RAIM              Dotted line:   L1/E1 
— constant-    WLSR RAIM + external altitude        m. Dashed line:  L1/E1 + SBAS corrections 
— variable-    WLSR RAIM  
— variable-    WLSR RAIM + external altitude        m.  
 
Figure F.16 ˗ Measurements: nominal (fault-free) ˗ Signals:  L5/E5a BPSK(10) 
˗            ˗ Environment:  rural   
˗        m. ˗ Constellation:  GPS & Galileo   
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